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 Abstract  
This dissertation comprises three thematically connected experimental studies of human behavior 
under non-standard conditions: time-pressure and stress. In the  Introduction section I present the 
argument for why it is important for economists to recognize stress research as a valid part of the 
research in economics and how it can contribute to the growing knowledge of human behavior in 
general, including several examples from the literature. The first paper presented in Chapter 2 
examines the effect of time pressure on the individual propensity to herd, while the remaining 
two papers examine the effect of acute stress on risk-preferences and herding behavior, 
respectively. Herding behavior is a very important phenomenon in human decision making since 
social influence is very frequent in our lives and economic decisions: consider traders in 
financial markets, wait-and-see investors, but also purchase behavior due to fads, fashion and 
top-ten lists. Risk preferences are another essential factor which determines many important 
economic outcomes, and the assumption of their stability is a building block of many economic 
theories.  
The first article investigates the effect of time pressure on herding behavior. To do so, an 
experiment was run where subjects solved a cognitively simple task under three levels of time 
pressure in a within-subject design. After having performed first alone, they were then allowed to 
look at the decisions of others and according to that, change their own decision, which was taken 
as an indicator of herding behavior. The main finding is that people did frequently change their 
original decisions, but the rate of doing so was not different under the different levels of time 
pressure. Nevertheless, other variables implicitly associated with time pressure were significant 
as predictors of herding behavior, such as the time spent on the screen showing the decisions of 
others, reported subjective levels of stress and the increase in heart rate during the solution of the 
task. The fact that the increased heart-rate during the solution of the task correlated with the 
subjective levels of stress suggests time pressure can be used as a mild stressor. However heart 
rate is a rather crude measure of physiological stress as it can rise due to other factors, such as 
effort or simple movement, and not stress, and as a single measure of stress is not satisfactory. 
We also observe an interesting correlation between heart-rate increases and risk-preferences of 
men which suggests that there may be a relationship between physiological stress and risk-taking 
behavior. 
   
In the second article we report on an experiment where we exposed 151 subjects to an 
efficient laboratory stress-inducing or a control procedure - the Trier Social Stress Test for  
Groups - in order to find the causal effect of stress on individual risk-attitudes. As a risk measure 
we used a standard externally validated multiple-price list method. Using three different 
measures, we first show that the subjects in the treatment-stressed group were both 
physiologically and psychologically stressed: their heart-rate and cortisol levels increased while 
they felt worse and more nervous compared to the baseline and to the control group. Our main 
result is that for men, the exposure to a stressor (intention-to-treat effect, ITT) and the 
exogenously induced psychosocial stress (the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT) 
significantly increase risk aversion when controlling for their personal characteristics. The 
estimated treatment difference in certainty equivalents is equivalent to 69% (ITT) and 89% 
(ATT) of the gender-difference in the control group. The effect on women goes in the same 
direction, but is weaker and insignificant.  
The third article examines whether stress causes differences in individual herding 
behavior. To impose stress we employ the same methodology as in the second article, the Trier 
Social Stress Test for Groups, on a sample of 140 subjects and show using the same three 
measures as in the previous chapter (heart-rate, cortisol and mood questionnaire) that subjects 
were indeed stressed. Herding behavior was measured in a Bayesian updating task that allowed 
for full control over the information provided to subjects either from private or public sources. 
The main result is that herding behavior as a relative weight of public signals in individual 
decision making does not change under stress. Apart from that, the weight of private signals and 
the precision of the stated probabilities were also not different between the treatment and control 
groups, even after controlling for personality characteristics and the subjects' psychological 
measure of conformity. On the other hand, we observe updating behavior comparable with other 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction  
The three research papers presented in the remaining chapters examine individual economic 
behavior under stress and time pressure. At the onset of my dissertation research I was 
concerned about the effect of time pressure on individual propensity to conform to the opinion 
of others as this can be observed in the real world e.g. during panics, bank-runs and crashes in 
the stock and financial markets. To examine whether people really do conform and copy the 
behavior of others under stress, I carried out the first experiment where subjects could change 
their mind after observing the choices of others and revise their original decisions, and they 
were supposed to be stressed using different levels of time pressure. Subjects however did not 
change their decisions more frequently under increased time pressure, but subjective stress 
and heart-rate increase were positively associated with the probability of the revision of their 
decisions. The link between time pressure and stress was found to be rather weak and heart-
rate was found to be, according to the literature, insufficient as the only measure of 
physiological stress. Therefore, the findings could not be interpreted as the causal effects of 
stress but left this question open. Apart from that, an interesting correlation between risk-
preferences and increases in heart-rate was found, suggesting a relationship between 
physiological stress and risk-preferences. The results of this research were published in 2013 
in the journal Prague Economic Papers. 
The results of the first experiment inspired me to conduct another experiment, the 
results of which are presented in the remaining two articles that investigate the causal effect of 
stress on risk-preferences (Chapter 3) and herding behavior (Chapter 4). I then spent a long 
time preparing an improved experimental design that was almost sure to introduce an acute 
stress reaction in the majority of subjects and I explored ways to most effectively measure it. 
The procedure finally applied is well known in the psychology literature and has been in use 
since 1993: the Trier Social Stress Test. It was found to be the most efficient laboratory 
stressor in terms of the increases in cortisol it elicits and in 2011 a modification was 
introduced that allowed its application in groups, which is an essential feature for the 
possibility of its use in the design of economic experiments (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; 
Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993; von Dawans, Kirschbaum, & Heinrichs, 2011). The 
authors of this procedure Clemens Kirschbaum and Bernadette von Dawans were very helpful 
in advising me how to properly use it and how to avoid common mistakes in measuring the 
common indicators of stress.  
I was aware that this methodology is new in economics and it would be risky 
conducting experiments in a less explored area and publishing the results in economic 
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journals, because no experimental work on stress effects on economic behavior had been 
published in an economic journal to date. Nevertheless, I decided to take that risk and 
proceed. The experiment gave rise to two papers, one has been published in the journal 
Experimental Economics (Chapter 3) and the other (Chapter 4) is awaiting submission. After 
its presentation at various conferences, we generally received very good feedback on this 
methodology and thus felt encouraged to proceed with the work. Therefore we conducted also 
other experiments that are not reported in this dissertation, but also received good feedback at 
prestigious economic conferences, like American Economic Association and Economic 
Science Association meetings. Overall, stress research is now coming on the radar of 
economists, also thanks to the contributions that are presented in this dissertation. However, 
most economists are not well informed about what stress actually is, what impacts it has and,  
most of all, why is it actually important to study it. In the next pages I therefore first argue 
why economists should care about stress, and summarize the most important aspects of stress 
with focus on published research on economic behavior under stress. 
Why is it important for economists to study stress? 
In contemporary society, stress is present in many aspects of human life, including economic 
choices. It is ubiquitous – people of almost all professions have to deal with more or less 
severe stress that stems from their jobs and family environment; and almost all people have to 
face difficult and potentially stressful decisions that imply serious consequences for their 
future lives, like asking for promotions and attending job-interviews. Just consider stress that 
is documented to arise from everyday time constraints (Buckert, Oechssler, & Schwieren, 
2014; Lundberg, 1993) work conditions including being under constant pressure, lack of 
health-insurance, shift-work, job insecurity, unemployment, long working hours, low job 
control (Goh, Pfeffer, & Zenios, 2015) unequal gender composition (Elwér, Harryson, Bolin, 
& Hammarström, 2013) unfair treatment (Feige, 2005), competitive environment (Fletcher, 
Major, & Davis, 2008), and poverty (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013; 
Chemin, Laat, & Haushofer, 2013).  
The adverse health-effects and associated costs of stress have already been subjected 
to a substantial amount of research (Ganster & Rosen, 2013); they are significant: let us 
mention alone that the disability caused by stress is estimated to be as great as the disability 
caused by workplace accidents or common diseases like hypertension and diabetes (Kalia, 
2002). Stress currently ranks the second most commonly reported work-related health 
problem in Europe while it causes almost a half of all working days lost in Europe (Eurofound 
& EU-OSHA, 2014). In the USA, the 10 most common workplace stressors are responsible 
for 120,000 deaths p.a. and approximately 5-8% of annual health-care costs could be saved by 
proper management of the workforce (Goh et al., 2015). Moreover, since stress is often 
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accompanied by negative emotions, many people try to avoid stressful situations completely. 
Unfortunately, stressful situations are also often situations involving high stakes, and their 
abandonment thus reduces the future prospects of an individual (e.g. women may shy away 
from competitive environments as in Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007).  
The stress-generated health inequalities imply also socio-economic outcomes; stress 
can thus operate as a major source of social inequalities (Aizer & Currie, 2014; Currie, 2011). 
Social inequality and everyday lack of resources for survival, poverty, act as a persistent 
chronic stressor that may bias the decision making of the poor toward the short-sighted, less 
efficient decisions that make it harder to escape their poverty (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). 
Moreover, children raised in a stressful environment have worse cognitive abilities than 
children from a more normal environment (Blair et al., 2011), which further strengthens the 
vicious circle of poverty. Apart from that, acute stress increases the probability of the relapse 
of risky behavior, such as smoking, drug abuse or alcoholism which generate further costs for 
society (Arnsten, 2009; Sinha, 2001, 2008).  
Stress is a complex individual physiological, psychological and usually also a 
behavioral response that evolved in order to help animals minimize the dangerous effects of 
an uncontrollable perceived threat (a stressor) to their major goals (Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004). The acute stress reaction stimulates the body, including the responses of the nervous, 
hormonal and metabolic systems. The long-term processes that are not immediately 
necessary, like digestion, growth and immunity, are temporarily suppressed in favor of an 
immediate inflow of energy and enhancement of short-term coping strategies. This is 
certainly not sustainable in the long term: The body sooner or later depletes its energy 
reserves and the stimulating effects thus cease, but the important long-term functions remain 
disrupted which may eventually result in health problems (McEwen, 2012). The behavioral 
effects of short-term and long-term stress may thus seriously differ. Generally speaking, the 
individual stress response is a complicated process and it is hard to generalize whether the 
behavioral effects are helpful or harmful for the decision-maker. 
The effects of stress may differ with respect to the type of stressor. Stress typically 
arises when an organism is threatened on life and its body is exposed to non-standard 
conditions. Such stress may thus be termed the physical stress with stressors being all sorts of 
life-threatening circumstances, including blood-loss, electric shocks, infection, pain, food and 
sleep deprivation, dental procedures, hyper or hypothermia and drug withdrawal states. 
Psychological (mental) stressors do not threaten the physical survival, but are connected with 
important goal in one’s social, emotional or personal life.  Emotional stressors then include 
interpersonal conflict, loss of relationship, death in family and loss of a child, while personal 
psychological stressors can be daily hassle, meeting deadlines, traffic jams or interpersonal 
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conflicts (Sapolsky, Romero, & Munck, 2000; Sinha, 2008). A prominent type of a 
psychological stressor is the psycho-social stressor. Since human is a social animal, it 
possesses also a "social-self", which reflects one's social value, esteem, status and is mostly 
based on individual perception of self-worth. Threat to preserving such social self has been 
shown to induce similar stress reaction as a threat to physical survival. Generally, the 
aforementioned types of stress differ in terms of physiological and psychological response. 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Behaviorally, the effects may also differ: as noted below, 
Haushofer & Jang (2015) compare the effects of three different types of stressors on temporal 
discounting: social, physical and an economic game. They find opposing effects of the social 
stressor and the economic game, while the physical stressor has no effect.  
Based on a meta-study of 208 laboratory studies, the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; 
Kirschbaum et al., 1993; von Dawans et al., 2011) used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 has been 
considered the most efficient laboratory stressor in terms of the magnitude of cortisol increase 
it stimulates (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Moreover, the type of stress it induces in subjects, 
the acute psycho-social stress, is the most common type of stress experienced by the general 
public in the workplace (Ganster & Rosen, 2013; Goh et al., 2015) compared to other types of 
stressors. A different typical laboratory stressor that induces physical stress is the Cold 
Pressor Test: the procedure consists of putting the non-dominant hand or one foot into ice-
cold water (0-4ˇC) for a period of 5 minutes (Blandini, Martignoni, Sances, Bono, & Nappi, 
1995; Hines & Brown, 1936; Schwabe, Dalm, Schächinger, & Oitzl, 2008). However, e.g. the 
result of Lighthall et al. (2009) show this procedure may be problematic: the male treated 
subjects did not have the cortisol change significantly different to the control group and the 
female subjects showed only a mild increase. Apart from the mentioned procedures, 
commonly used are also time pressure (Buckert, Oechssler, et al., 2014), information about 
future performing in TSST protocol (Engert et al., 2013), and mere watching other participant 
undergoing TSST (Engert, Plessow, Miller, Kirschbaum, & Singer, 2014). Also combinations 
of psychological and physical stressors have been used, e.g. Cold Pressor Test in combination 
with mental arithmetic task and social evaluation (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004).   
The current frontier in the stress research is to use one type of a stressor and study its 
effects on one type of behavior. The next steps will be to focus on the robustness of the 
behavioral results with respect to various changes in the protocol, such as the change of the 
type of stressor, the timing of the intervention and behavioral task, the age of the subjects, 
culturally specific reaction to stressors etc. In particular, the robustness of the behavioral 
results with respect to the type of stressor has been studied consistently only once, particularly 
in the domain of time-preferences (Haushofer & Jang 2015). Thus, investigating the effects of 
a wider variety of stressors on risk-preferences and herding behavior would certainly increase 
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the scientific value and the external validity of this thesis, but it is not within its scope and 
rather suggested for future research. 
 Another issue worth discussing is the relative importance of the monetary stakes that 
subjects disposed with during the experiments in this thesis: the amounts were typical for the 
experiments in the area and not too much smaller than the stakes used in comparable 
experiment in other countries, when adjusted for the purchasing power parity. However, the 
intrinsic hardship of the situation created by the stress procedure may have prevailed over the 
extrinsic concern over money (Skořepa, 2010) and the subjects may have not cared about 
their decisions enough. Thus what we observe is probably only a lower bound of the effects of 
stress on the particular type of behavior, and it is an interesting area for a future research to 
assess the effects of stake size, as has been the case with other phenomena in behavioral 
economics (e.g. Ultimatum game; Andersen, Ertaç, Gneezy, Hoffman, & List, 2011), since in 
many "choking-under-pressure" situations people get stressed because they deal with big 
amounts of money (Dohmen, 2008). 
The line of stress research has implications also for economic theory: consider that 
most of the theories in economics and finance assume that preferences are quite stable over 
time, and take this assumption as one of the building blocks that ultimately generate elegant 
economic models. Several studies have shown that this is not the case (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales, 2013; Kandasamy et al., 2014) and stress is one of the circumstances when 
individual preferences temporarily or permanently shift. Let us highlight the role of risk-
preferences that are one of the most studied behaviors under acute stress: in Chapter 3 we 
show that risk-preferences do change due to exposure to acute stress, in particular people 
(mostly men) become more risk-averse. This finding draws important implications: since 
most of the traders of various boards of exchange are men and they react to the major events 
in their markets with moderate stress, the higher risk-aversion generated by stress may 
exaggerate their defensive trading behavior during market crises thus deepening the bottom of 
economic cycles (Coates & Herbert, 2008). Similar evidence is provided by priming of a bust 
scenario, which may be indirectly connected with stress (Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, & 
Maréchal, 2015). 
The behavioral effects of stress 
To illustrate that the area of research in this dissertation is already advancing, I would 
like to mention a few studies on the effects of stress on economic behavior. Generally 
speaking, the early (Hartley & Adams, 1974; Hockey, 1970) as well as recent studies (Leder, 
Häusser, & Mojzisch, 2013, 2015; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009) of human behavior under stress 
reveal that acute stress is detrimental to performance in tasks that are demanding on complex, 
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strategic and flexible thinking, but enhances performance in simple or well-practiced tasks 
since people stick to habitual responses and well-known practices. The neurological evidence 
shows that this behavioral change stems from the effects of stress on the prefrontal cortex, 
which is the part of the brain responsible for long-term oriented, rational behavior (McEwen, 
2012). Let us highlight three areas of economic decision making investigated under acute 
stress: risk-, time- and social preferences. 
The area of risk-preferences has been quite extensively investigated but overall there 
have not been any conclusive results, which may be due to the fact that the methodology was 
very heterogeneous. There have been a variety of methods used to elicit risk-preferences, a 
variety of stress-inducing procedures, and other methodological factors that may have caused 
the different results. Some studies point to increased risk-taking under stress (Putman, 
Antypa, & Crysovergi, 2010 for high rewards; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008), 
others find decisions to be more risky under stress for men, but less risky for women 
(Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009), or conclude on 
no change in risk preferences under stress (von Dawans et al., 2012). Porcelli and Delgado 
(2009) obtain increased risk-aversion for gain domains, but increased risk-seeking for loss 
domains; Pabst, Brand, & Wolf  (2013b) find less risky behavior of stressed groups for loss 
domains but not gain domains; Buckert, Schwieren, Kudielka, & Fiebach (2014) observe 
more risk-seeking in gain domains and no difference in loss domains (refer to Table 1-1 for an 
overview).  
The mentioned studies have to be treated with care. Some of the existing studies on 
risk attitudes under stress focus rather on the correlations of stress and risk preferences and 
not on the causal effect of stress (Buckert, Schwieren, et al., 2014; van den Bos et al., 2009). 
In these studies the results from behavioral tasks are not analyzed according to the random 
assignment to treatment, but rather by division of the treatment group according to the cortisol 
reaction into high-cortisol and low-cortisol responders. Showing a difference between high-
cortisol and low-cortisol responders in the treatment group is potentially an important 
correlation, but it does not show a causal effect of stress – it may just capture differences in 
underlying preferences among people who become stressed easily and those who do not 
(Trautmann, 2014). Apart from that, the tasks applied to elicit risk preferences were quite 
different.
1
 The observed change in behavior under stress can be attributed to multiple driving 
mechanisms, not just to a change in risk preferences. In the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999), 
Baloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) and in the Game of Dice Task (Brand et al., 
2005), feedback is given throughout the task and the performance therefore greatly depends 
                                                 
1 For standard economic measures of risk-preferences, see a summary of  Harrison and Rutström (2008) 
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on feedback processing, which is itself affected by stress (Starcke and Brand, 2012). This 
situation in the literature was an opportunity to report on my experiment (Chapter 3) that 
clearly identifies the causal effects of stress on risk preferences and overcomes the limitations 
of the previous contributions. 
Even though the commonly known effect of stress is both psychologically and 
physiologically a suppression of a long-term oriented behavior in favor of the short-term 
behavior, research on time-preferences using an efficient stressor in a laboratory has brought 
so far robust null results (Haushofer et al., 2013). To follow-up on this, Haushofer & Jang 
(2015) exposed subjects in Nairobi to three different types of stressors: social, physical and an 
economic game. They find that the social stressor decreases temporal discounting (i.e. makes 
subjects more patient), the physical stressor has no effect and the economic stressor increases 
discounting. This further supports the idea of the differential effects of different types of 
stress stemming from different types of stressors. 
Also the dimension of social preferences has come under scrutiny. One study exposed 
a sample of 72 men to a social stressor and let them play a set of simple binary games, right in 
the middle of the stress protocol. Subjects have been found to be more trusting, trustworthy 
and sharing, while they did not show a change in the non-social risk and "punishment" 
dimensions, compared to the control group (von Dawans, Fischbacher, Kirschbaum, Fehr, & 
Heinrichs, 2012). In another study, male participants went also through TSST-G protocol and 
then were tested in pro-social decision making either directly after or 75 minutes later to 
reveal time-dependent effects of stress on behavior. The games applied were the Ultimatum 
game (UG) and a one-shot Dictator game (DG) where subjects could donate to charity. The 
stressed participants acted as responders in UG while the hypothetical identity of proposers 
and the proposed division of the pie was varied. The stressed participants in the late condition 
showed significantly smaller rejection rates in UG than the early condition and also than both 
late and early conditions in the control group. In the DG the stressed participants donated 
significantly less than the control group, while there were no differences in these groups with 
respect to the timing of the game (Vinkers et al., 2013). 
The above mentioned studies demonstrate the need for economists to take the stress 
research into account and show that some promising research is already taking place. Due to 
its complicated nature and serious effects on human decision making I believe that it is of 
great importance to  uncover and understand also the direct behavioral changes due to stress 
so that we can prevent the adverse effects and promote the stimulating effects that this 
reaction may bring. The generated insights may be beneficial in many economic fields, e.g. 
implementing incentive structures in labor markets in order to encourage the efficiency-
enhancing and avoid the cost-imposing effects of stress. Theories dealing with efficient 
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matching, risk-management and financial decision-making in general should be prepared for 
periods of stress since these are usually of a crucial practical importance. The research 
presented in this dissertation aims to contribute to building knowledge in this emerging area 
of literature.
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Table 1-1: Summary of previous literature on the effect of stress on social preferences (based on Starcke and Brand (2012), extended) 
Study Results – Risk preferences under 
stress 
Participants Stressor Stress 
measurement 
Task Task measures Other limitations 
Buckert, Schwieren, et 
al.,(2014) 
More risky behavior of cortisol-
responders 
Students, 89, 




Taylor-made Risk-preferences A third of subjectsnot stressed, 
not causal analysis 
Pabst, Brand, & Wolf  
(2013b) 
Less risky behavior of stressed in 
losses, no effect in gains 
Students 







GDT framing with unequal 
distributed EVs across 
alternatives 
Testing between 10AM and 
12AM, subjects informed of 
stress 
von Dawans et al. (2012) Men: No difference in the number 
of risky choices between treatment 
and control 
Students  
67 m  







Risk preferences Subjects knew effects of stress 
were sutdied (risk of self-
selection correlated with risk 
aversion) 
van den Bos et al. (2009) High-cortisol responders chose the 
disadvantageous (riskier) deck less 




30 m/34 f 




Not a full control procedure in 
TSST; Analysis: not a causal 
effect of stress,  
Lighthall et al. (2009) Men: higher average number of 
balloon pumps in treatment 
Women: lower average number of 
balloon pumps in treatment 




No cortisol increase for men, 
mild for women; Task: in the 
analysis only observations 
where the balloon did not 
explode were used 
Starcke et al. (2008) Stress led to more disadvantageous 
choices. Cortisol reactions and risky 
decisions are correlated. 
Students  





GDT Risk preferences, 
strategy application, 
feedback processing  
 
Porcelli and Delgado 
(2009) 
On gain domain trials, stress led to 
more conservative choices, on loss 
domain trials, stress led to more 
risky choices 
Students  
14 m/13 f 
CPT Skin 
conductance 
Modified CGT Risk preferences, 
feedback processing 
(reward sensitivity) 
Within-subject treatment – 
control, then stress condition 
(order effects?) 
Preston et al. (2007) Men: Acutely-stressed men are 
risk-taking, acutely-stressed women 











Stressor less effective, no 
cortisol measure 
Putman et al. (2010) Stress led to more risky decisions 










Notes: f=female, m=male; TSST=Trier Social Stress Test, TSST-G =Trier Social Stress Test for Groups, CPT=Cold Pressor Task; STAI=State Trait Anxiety Inventory; 
IGT=Iowa Gambling Task, BART=Baloon Analogue Risk Task. GDP=Game of Dice Task, CGT=Cambridge Gambling Task
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In this paper we explain individual propensity to herding behavior and its relationship to time-
pressure by conducting a laboratory experiment. We let subjects perform a simple cognitive task 
with the possibility to herd, which was implemented as an explicit change in subject's decision 
only due to the observation of the decisions of some other subjects, under three levels of time 
pressure in a within-subject design. The main finding is that the propensity to herd was not 
significantly influenced by different levels of time pressure, even after the addition of many 
control variables. However, there could be an indirect effect through other variables, such as the 
time subjects spent revising the decision and levels of stress which have been significantly 
associated with the tendency to herd. Apart from that we show that heart-rate significantly 
increased over the baseline during the performance of a task and its correlation to the 
subjectively stated level of stress was positive but weak, which suggests that time pressure may 
be used as a mild stressor. Our results suggest that under time pressure, people are not more 
likely to copy the behavior of others, provided the time pressure does not cause stress.  
                                                 
2 This chapter has been published in a slightly different form as Cingl, L. (2013). Does Herd Behavior Arise Easier 
Under Time Pressure? Experimental Approach. Prague Economic Papers, 22(4), 558–582. 
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2.1 Introduction  
In the current constantly accelerating world and with the ever increasing value of our time, many 
decisions are made under severe time pressure. Moreover, we are under the influence of the 
decisions of others in almost every activity, including investments and financial transactions. For 
example, the news that Warren Buffet buys a stock quickly influences its price which may on the 
one hand be completely rational, but on the other hand it may only be the result of investors and 
managers blindly following the crowd, engaging in herding behavior (Hirshleifer & Hong Teoh, 
2003). Despite its importance, the effects of time-pressure on decision making have however 
been largely omitted in research (Kocher & Sutter, 2006). If we focus on the impact of time 
pressure on herding behavior, it may be of high importance e.g. in stock and financial markets 
where the participants have to almost instantly react to the arrival of new information and the 
subsequent development of the markets. If time pressure changes the individual propensity to 
engage in herding behavior, e.g. if it increases that propensity, traders knowing that may earn 
more money if they rely less on the development of the market and more on objective sources of 
information. Furthermore, a commonly neglected fact in the economic literature is that human 
behavior heavily depends on the physiological state of the body which is hard to consciously 
control, such as the stress reaction. Time pressure has been shown to cause a mild stress reaction 
(Lundberg, 1993) which we hypothesize can reinforce the urge to engage in herding behavior. 
This paper is thus the first to experimentally investigate the effects of time pressure on individual 
willingness to engage in herding behavior. 
As to the underlying mechanism of herding, there are many reasons for taking into 
account the decisions of other people, but generally two main approaches have been proposed so 
far: bounded-rationality and the behavioral approach. The behavioral approach proposes that 
some personal characteristics predispose certain individuals to be more conforming than others, 
while the bounded-rationality approach disregards personality and focuses only on the 
information conveyed in the decisions of other people. Ignoring one’s own signals when the 
behavior of others contains more information has been labeled in the literature as an information 
cascade (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; 
Welch, 1992).  A theoretical synthesis of these two approaches has already been made (Cao & 
Hirshleifer, 2000) and this experiment does not try to resolve the duality between them 
(Baddeley, Pillas, Christopoulos, Schultz, & Tobler, 2007), but it rather focuses on the 
relationship between time pressure and herding, which has so far been omitted in the literature.  
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Generally, the effects of time-pressure on decision making are not straightforward. Maule 
& Edland (2000) provide a useful review of the effects of time-pressure on individual decision 
making: it can reduce the quality of the activities, change risk preferences, increase the 
importance of internal sources of information at the expense of the external ones, increase the 
relative importance of different information sources, and many others. However, these effects do 
not always appear. The main effect of time-constraint on information-processing can be 
characterized as that participants process information faster and with a higher selectivity of 
important facts (Payne, Bettman, & Luce, 1996; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). Kocher & Sutter 
(2006) in the framework of an experimental beauty-contest game found that the convergence to 
equilibrium is faster and the payoffs are higher in the low pressure treatment than in the high 
time pressure treatment; however during a period of high pressure the quality of decision making 
does not decrease.  
In this paper we present an experiment where subjects were supposed to count the 
number of zeros in a table of 400 symbols with only ones and zeros (Abeler, Falk, Goette, & 
Huffman, 2011; Falk, Menrath, Kupio, & Siegrist, 2006) under varying levels of time pressure. 
Their performance was rewarded by a fixed-portion of payment for the accuracy of their guesses 
and by a decreasing time-dependent portion which was the means of inducing time pressure. 
After setting the first guess of the correct number of zeros in the table, subjects had an 
opportunity to observe the first guesses that had already been entered by other subjects, and 
subsequently change the first guess. If a subject had looked at information about other players' 
results and as a result changed his/her guess, it is used as 0/1 proxy for the occurrence of herding 
behavior. Subjects performed the task under three different levels of time-pressure in a within-
subject design. Since the propensity to herd may be influenced by both the personality and the 
information contained in the decisions of others, we control for both. Personal characteristics are 
tracked and controlled for by using the standardized psychometric protocols IPIP-NEO 
(Goldberg, 2010) that measures the  "Big-Five" personality dimensions. Tracking of personal 
characteristics is important also for other reasons, as stress can have a different impact on the 
performance of people with different attitudes to risk (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2009). Since 
Baddeley, Burke, Schultz, Tobler, & Tobler (2010) found a positive association of herding with 
personality traits associated with risk-taking, namely impulsivity and venturesomeness, we also 
elicit the risk-preferences using an incentivized protocol (Dohmen et al., 2011; Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman, & Sunde, 2010). 
The main investigated hypothesis is whether the occurrence of herding is not more 
frequent under more severe time pressure, conditional on the decision to see the publicly 
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available information. Our results show that indeed, this hypothesis cannot be rejected in various 
specifications which implies that there is no level relationship between time pressure and herding 
behavior. On the other hand, variables implicitly associated with time pressure, such as time 
spent examining the publicly available information, reported subjective level of stress, and heart-
rate are significant predictors of the tendency to herd which suggests that there may be a more 
complicated relationship. Apart from that, we show a small but significant correlation between 
subjective levels of stress and heart-rate increases during the task solution, mainly driven by 
women under high time pressure, which suggests that time pressure can act as a stressor. The fact 
that we see no effect of time pressure per se but a significant effect of stress variables suggests 
that stress is the channel through which time pressure may actually operate in increasing the 
probability of herding behavior. 
2.2 Methodology 
A laboratory experiment was executed using Z-TREE (Fischbacher, 2007) and ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004) in April 2010 and was attended by 90 participants. There were six experimental sessions in 
two days plus one pilot session that was used for parameter calibration. The majority of 
participants were undergraduate students – mostly Czechs (77.8%) followed by Slovaks (12.2%) 
and other nationalities (10%). The participants were 62.2% males, the most common field of 
study was economics and business (75%) and the median age was 22. Participants were paid 
privately at the end of the experiment; the average payment was 350 CZK (app. 13.5 €) including 
a guaranteed show-up fee of 150 CZK (app. 6 €). In total, the experiment lasted less than 2 
hours. 
The participants performed a simple cognitive effort task (Abeler et al., 2011; Falk et al., 
2006), which was supposed (i) not to require previously earned skills or any innate cognitive 
abilities, (ii) not to induce any emotions, (iii) not to induce a learning effect and (iv) only 
positive payoffs were allowed in order to eliminate the loss-aversion effect (see Figure 2-1 for a 
screenshot of the task). The participants were required to count the correct number of zeros from 
a table of 400 symbols (zeros and ones only) that appeared on the screen. The numbers were 
randomly generated from a uniform distribution with a variability large enough so that accurate 
random guessing without counting was highly improbable. Each participant was supposed to 
solve eleven tasks in total, including the practice session. After counting the number of zeros, 
participants were supposed to enter their estimated number (guess) into a field on the screen.  
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Figure 2-1: Task screenshot.  
 
There were three different within-subject treatments: first the subjects were not restricted 
by time and had two tasks only to practice. Second, three levels of time pressure were 
introduced, which was represented by a strict time constraint, and three types of time-dependent 
parts of payment. Third, in the last rounds subjects had an opportunity to look at the first guesses 
of others who were faster than the subject and then to revise the original guess. In this context 
the occurrence of herding is defined as a situation when a participant used information from 
observing the guesses of the other participants. This 0/1 variable is meant to be the observable 
outcome of an unobservable tendency to herd, which is the main variable of interest. The 
subjects could choose whether or not to see the publicly available information (see Figure 2-2).  
In the revision part of the task each subject could observe only the first guesses of the 
other subjects who had submitted them before him/her. This was supposed to correspond to the 
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Figure 2-2: Scheme of decision-making process after setting the first guess. 
 
Time pressure was imposed both on the counting part as well as on the revision part of 
the task: i.e. time was running out during both parts of the task. Time pressure in the counting 
part served as a generator of uncertainty about one’s private signal and time pressure in the 
revision part was expected to influence the individual propensity to herd. Had there been no time 
pressure in the counting part of the task, everybody would have reached very precise private 
information and thus would have had no incentive to revise it by taking inspiration from others. 
The pay-off function consisted of two components: a fixed part and a time-dependent 
part. Similarly as in Falk et al. (2006), participants were paid a fixed amount of 100 ECU (2€) 
per task if they answered exactly the number of zeros in the sheet, 80 ECU if their answer was in 
the range of +/- 1, or 40 ECU if it was in the range +/- 2. The size of the time-dependent part was 
different with each level of time pressure (see Table 2-1) and was calibrated so that participants 
would receive a similar number of ECU across the different levels of time pressure. The time 
limit was binding in the sense that if the task was not completed in the given time, the participant 
got zero ECU in total for the given task. Also the precision of the guess was binding such that if 
a participant missed the correct number of zeros by more than two, he/she received zero from 
both fixed amount as well as from the time dependent bonus. The fixed part of the payment per 
task served as the motivation to count accurately while the time-dependent part motivated 
subjects to count as quickly as possible. All subjects are under the same level of time pressure at 
the time, so the individual performance relative to others should stay the same and the beliefs 
about other subjects and the probability of their success should not change with different levels 
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Table 2-1: Payoff function parameters 
Level of time pressure Time limit 
Time-dependent part  
(start value) 
Factor of decreasing  
(per second) 
Low 150s 400 ECU -3 ECU 
Medium 130s 500 ECU -4 ECU 
High 100s 600 ECU -5 ECU 
Heart rate is the frequency of the contractions of the heart muscle and its unit of 
measurement is frequency per minute. Changes in heart rate refer to higher levels of arousal, 
which are often somatically mediated, which suggests that when heart-rate increases, the body is 
in a state of increased awareness, such as stress (Lo & Repin, 2002). Heart-rate increase 
measured as the individual difference of the average heart-rate during the performance of the 
task minus the hear-rate during the resting period was used as a proxy of endured stress, even if 
it could be considered a rather rough measure.
3
 Heart rate increases are typically correlated with 
endured psychosocial stress (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) and are also generally considered to be a 
sign of an increased physical activity or arousal. The caveat is that increased heart-rate may be a 
result of stimuli other than stress, like a sole effort without distress, which limits the 
interpretation of our results (Clow, 2001).
4
  
Following Baddeley et al. (2007), some individuals with certain personality 
characteristics can be expected to be more prone to follow the behavior of others. To capture the 
personality profile of participants, the “Big Five” factors were assessed, where each factor 
represents a summary of a large number of specific personality characteristics (Openness to 
Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism; see Table 2-2 for 
their summary; Goldberg, 2010). The “Big Five” domains is a standard psychological tool for the 
assessment of personality traits that may be useful in the explanation of behavior in as much as 
preferences (Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, & Kautz, 2011; Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, 
& Weel, 2008; Heckman, 2011).  
 
                                                 
3 Heart-rate monitors Polar R800 (Polar Electro, Finland) with a precision of one second were used. 
4 For the precise measurement of stress, heart-rate should be combined with several other measures, e.g. the 
concentration of cortisol in saliva, systolic blood pressure and self-reports (Jennings et al., 1981). However, the 
measurement of blood pressure would have significantly prolonged the experiment and it would not be possible to 
administer during the task; and the measurement of cortisol was at the time of conducting the experiment 
impossible. Therefore only heart-rate was used as the measure of physiological stress with the known limitations of 
this approach. 
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Table 2-2: The “Big Five” domains and their facets.  
Factor Facets Definition of a factor 
I. Openness to Experience 
Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings, 
Actions, Ideas, Values 
The degree to which a person needs 







The degree to which a person is 
willing to comply with conventional 
rules, norms, and standards. 
III. Extraversion  
Warmth, Gregariousness, 
Assertiveness, Activity, 
Excitement seeking, Positive 
emotions 
The degree to which a person needs 





The degree to which a person needs 
pleasant and harmonious relations with 
others. 
V. Neuroticism  
(Emotional Stability) 




The degree to which a person 
experiences the world as threatening 
and beyond his/her control. 
Source: Hogan & Hogan (2007). 
Procedures 
The timeline of the experiment is summarized in Table 2-3. Before the start of the experiment, 
the heart-rate monitors were attached and during the rest of the experiment the heart-rate of the 
participants was recorded. After being read the instructions aloud and having them explained  in 
detail, subjects were asked a few questions to check their understanding of the rules. The 
participants went through three main parts of the experiment that were based on the task 
described above. The first part included the first treatment to familiarize subjects with the task; 
the second and the third parts included the second and the third treatments, respectively. Each 
participant was supposed to solve two tasks in the first treatment, three tasks in the second 
treatment and six tasks in the third treatment. Participants were informed before each task about 
the level of time pressure, the time limit for the task and the time-dependent amount of payment 
they could get. This information was provided on a separate introductory screen. Participants 
saw their payoffs from the task always on a summary screen after each task and this screen also 
included the cumulative payoff from the treatment. At the end of each task, the participants had 
to answer a question on their subjective perception of the pressure they were under on a scale 
from 1 to 10 (Svenson & Benson, 1993) and had 30 seconds to rest before the next task.  
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Table 2-3: Timeline of the experiment.  
Subjects arrive to the lab 
  
 Heart-rate monitors attached 
  
 Reading instructions aloud 
control questions 
  
 First part – practice 
2 tasks to solve 
  
 Second part - introducing time pressure 
3 tasks to solve 
  
 Risk-preferences protocol - lottery task 
Task-confidence 
  
 Third part  
6 tasks to solve under varying levels of time pressure  
Possibility to see public information and revise a decision 
  
 Questionnaire 
personality profile - traits 
Personal characteristics 
  
 Sitting quiet 5mins  
payout & leave 
Before the third part of the experiment where they could see the results of others, the 
participants were asked a non-incentivized question on their relative performance
5
 in the task in 
order to measure how confident they felt. The answer ranged from one to five with five being 
expectation of being in the top 20% of the performance distribution and one being the bottom 
20% and it enters the model in the form of the variable Self Confidence. After they had finished 
this, the participants were asked to fill out a separate sheet of paper with an extra paid-for task 
aimed at the assessment of their attitudes to risk (Dohmen et al., 2010). Prior to the end of the 
experiment, the participants filled out a questionnaire with questions on the personality profile 
and additional personal characteristics. After this they were asked to stay a few minutes at rest 
with their eyes closed which was necessary to establish a reference level for the heart rate.  
Hypotheses description 
Generally speaking, if participants were perfectly rational, they would neither fail in the task nor 
would seek information about the decisions of other participants since this is costly. If we relax 
this assumption by assuming that individual decision-making is based on individual bounded 
                                                 
5 Exact wording of the question: “Please try to guess in which part of the distribution of results you are (i.e. if you 
think, that you are in the top 20%, please click on the "Top20%", which means how close you are to the top).” 
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rationality, we may expect a negative monotonic relationship between the level of time pressure 
and their performance in the task. Gilbert & Kogan (2005) show that the possibility to learn from 
others has an impact mostly on worse players, who tend to improve not only results, but also 
decision making processes. The reasoning in this case should be straightforward: the less time 
for completing the task (which corresponds to a higher level of time pressure) the less precise 
his/her private information and thus the more appropriate it is to seek for and use public 
information. Rieskamp & Hoffrage (2008) however show that when people are under increased 
time-pressure, they tend to process information faster and focus more selectively on more 
important information.  Consider a participant who happens to see the first-guesses of a half of 
the participants. The faster subjects used less time to finish the task which suggests that their 
results may be more imprecise than his/hers. On the other hand, the faster participants could have 
had better individual abilities to solve the task in general which suggests that their guesses are 
more precise than his/hers. The effect of time pressure on herding will therefore most probably 
depend on the individual assessment of whether the public information is useful. 
Hypothesis 1: Herding is not more frequent under higher levels of time pressure, 
conditional on seeing the public information.  
The second hypothesis concerns the effect of time pressure on individual heart-rate. If time 
pressure increases heart-rate, it may be a sign of the stress reaction. If so, the increase should be 
positively correlated with the subjectively stated level of stress. 
Hypothesis 2: Time pressure does not increase the individual’s heart rate relative to the 
base level during the performance and is not positively correlated with the subjectively stated 
level of stress.  
2.3 Model description 
Binary variable InfoUsed was defined as equal to one for the situation when a subject changed 
his/her decision after being confronted with the decisions of others, and zero otherwise. These 
two outcomes are mutually exclusive and we assume that they arise with probability 
              and                , respectively. The standard probit regression6 approach 
with standard errors clustered at the individual level to account for intra-individual correlations is 
used (Baddeley et al., 2007; Brock & Durlauf, 2001; Greene, 2003). We further assume that the 
error term    is normally distributed white noise stochastic term with zero mean and a finite 
variance. It is important to note that revising the original guess is conditional on the decision to 
see the information in the first place, which limits our analysis only on this specific sub-group of 
                                                 
6 Robustness check of the results by carrying out an estimation of the same model by logit and the linear probability 
model shows that the results were almost equivalent across the three techniques; results available upon request. 
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decisions, while leaving a considerable amount of decisions when subjects decided not to see 
others' decisions out of our analysis, which is however not the main point of this paper.  
Description of variables 
In the model specification, three sets of variables are incorporated: the first set represents the 
information that was on the screen with public information, the second group represents the 
individual personality and the third contains other task characteristics that may be important for 
the decision making.  
Time Pressure indicators 
The exogenously set level of time pressure (low/medium/high) the subjects endured during the 
task is indicated by 0/1 dummy variables. It enters the regression as a set of two variables 
TP_Medium and TP_High
7
. To test Hypothesis 1, these variables should be significant in the 
explanation of the tendency to herd, especially when indicating the “high” level of time pressure: 
the variable TP_High=1.  
Time dimension: TimeLeft, TimeDeciding 
Variable TimeLeft is the number of seconds participants had on the screen when they entered 
their original estimate and thus could use for the revision part of the task. A majority of subjects 
did not have much time to waste so if they had it, they would likely invest it wisely. On the other 
hand, the total time they had left should already be irrelevant if it was above a certain threshold - 
either there was useful info or less useful info, but the time to switch the estimate or to go further 
without switching was not dependent on the total time the subjects had. Due to the low variation 
in age, education and nationality these were not used as the control variables in the model, 
however it may be important in other settings.  
Another explanatory dimension of time can be hidden in the time which subjects spent on 
the screen with the public information. Intuitively, because they were under time pressure, they 
must have decided fast whether to use the information and change the value, or to go further 
without changing the value, as described above. Had they decided to change their estimate, they 
had to think of the new value, which is already a deliberative process and needs more time, so 
the variable TimeDeciding, which indicates the time the subjects spent on the screen with the 
public info, is expected to be positively associated with the InfoUsed.  
                                                 
7 Time_Pressure_Medium and Time_Pressure_High. Due to the perfect colinearity this provides, the indicator of the 
treatment with low time pressure, TP_Low, must have been omitted 
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Stress variables 
The stress induced by the time pressure can also be an important variable and as part of 
Hypothesis 2 it is expected to positively influence the probability of herding - InfoUsed. There 
are shown two measures of it: the subjectively stated level of stress SubjectiveStress and the 
difference of the average level of heart-rate during the task to the base-line heart rate 
HR_Increase. 
Measure of information: Similarity score 
To capture the value of the information that the subjects had on their screens, we introduce the 
index Similarity score as the measure of the similarity of the subject’s original estimate to the 
observed values of others. Similarity score was computed in the following way: if the subject’s 
original estimate was not further than one from a value of an estimate on the screen, Similarity 
score got one point. The summation over all observed values yields the final value of Similarity 
score. The idea behind this variable is that the more similar one’s guess to others’ guesses is, the 
less meaningful it is to switch. 
Risk attitudes 
The risk-averse subjects could react to time pressure differently than the risk-seeking. Therefore 
we control for this possible effect by measuring the risk-preferences of subjects by a standard 
risk-protocol (Dohmen et al., 2010). Specifically we measure a certainty equivalent and include 
it in regression analysis as a continuous measure of risk-aversion.  
Other personal characteristics: Female,  Age, Self Confidence, TotalProfit, "Big-
Five" Personality Traits 
Generally speaking, we can also expect that the subjects with a higher task-specific self-
confidence to have lower incentives to look at the public information and if they do, they will be 
reluctant to conform to the majority.  
The endowment effect caused by the fact that the participants saw their earnings after 
each round was controlled for by adding total profit (variable TotalProfit) that the subject had 
already earned, which also serves as a control for individual performance. Because we expect it 
to behave similarly to the general behavior of wage-related variables; i.e. that it is likely to be 
log-normal, we transform it by using a natural logarithm so that the new variable lnTotProf is 
normally distributed. Female is a dummy variable indicating a female subject and it is added to 
control for the gender effect found by Baddeley et al. (2010), that a female is more likely to herd.  
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2.4 Main Findings 
Figure 2-3 presents that the percentage of people using the public information is higher in the 
High level of time pressure. There were generally fewer people willing to see the public 
information, but once they saw it, they would have a slightly higher chance to use it than in the 
other lower levels of time pressure (47% vs 40%). However, standard F-test results in that the 
levels are insignificantly different from each other, also when compared pair-wise
8
.  
Figure 2-3: Percentage of choices when participants were affected by the information about 
the decisions of others (InfoUsed), conditionally on seeing the public information. 
 
Qualitative analysis: subjects’ “Player” profiles 
In the experiment different types of subjects emerged: there were some that benefited from the 
possibility to see the public information, but also some for whom the information was useless. 
Out of 90 subjects, there were 13 subjects who never looked at the public info, and 8 out of them 
                                                 
8 P-value=0.576. When High level of time pressure compared to the pooled other two, Wilcoxon rank sum test also 
yields insignificant results (               ) 
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performed significantly better than average. This is the “successful” type of subject that would 
only lose money by viewing the public info. Apart from this, there was another type of subject 
who also never used the information, but this one must have had another motivation as their 
performance was mostly below average. We label this type “unsuccessful honest”.
9
  
On the one hand, there were 33 subjects who did look at the public information each time 
they had a chance to, but out of those 33 only five always used the information, so these “curious 
and imprecise” subjects were also not the only type of subjects. On the other hand, there were 
eight subjects who looked every time, but never switched – the “self-assuring” types. These eight 
subjects were mostly highly successful in the task, so they probably just assured themselves that 
their result was correct.  
Was public information useful? 
We can have a look at the rate of “success” of revision: if the new estimate brought a higher 
payoff than the original one. The percentage of successful changes is shown in Figure 2-4 – in 
most experimental sessions the subjects could improve using public information in more than 
80% cases. However, session No. 3 was exceptional and had this rate lower than 50%. 
Figure 2-4: Rate of success of switching the estimate after seeing public information. 
 
                                                 
9 I found out in feedback that there was a type of player not willing to see the public info due to fear of getting 
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In this exceptional session No. 3 there were four subjects who randomly guessed the 
number shortly after the beginning of each task, so they added significant noise to the 
information seen on the screen by other subjects. Interestingly, their results were in the first three 
periods followed by others. As a result, the rate of successful switch in this session was much 
lower than in the other sessions where there were on average 3 incorrect switches, but in this 
session there were 14 incorrect switches. There were even incorrect cascades when the number 
followed was far from the true one: it happened in the first part of a period and it was caused by 
the subjects who guessed the result who were followed by two to three other subjects. However, 
in the second half of the period, three to four “honest” participants arrived and brought the 
correct information to light. Then the next subjects mostly either entered the result correctly or 
did not use the public info at all. This result supports the idea of the fragility of cascades in a 
continuous setting: an incorrect cascade began, but was overrun by the arrival of the information 
brought by the subjects who counted well and whose estimate was more precise. In real life, we 
also cannot distinguish who, when in a cascade, ignores private information and follows the 
crowd and on the contrary, who accidentally gets the same result and falls into a cluster of 
subjects with the same results. The results generally suggest that if subjects expect the arrival of 
true information to the public, the moment of the arrival may with a high probability break the 
cascade.  
Data from heart-rate monitors 
The average heart rate
10
 over the time when the task was performed minus the base-line heart-
rate
11
 gives the resulting difference between these two (HR_Increase), which should account for 
the personal physiological differences of different base-line heart-rate levels. The summary 
statistics of the HR-variables are shown in Table 2-4. Some subjects had average HR almost the 
same as when they stayed calm in the end, others had peaks as high as 151 beats per minute, 
which is equivalent to moderately demanding physical activity. 
Table 2-4: Descriptive Statistics of variables concerning heart-rate.  




Average heart-rate during the task  677 59 151 90.94 0.601 15.63 
Base-line Heart Rate  677 50 98 74.47 0.391 10.18 
Difference of base-line to actual HR 
(HR_Increase) 
677 0 53 16.47 0.377 9.82 
                                                 
10 further on HR 
11 Heart-rate measured in a “steady” state when no activity is performed; the interval after completion of a 
questionnaire and before collecting the money. Also sometimes referred to as “quiescent”.  
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Qualitatively, there were different kinds of HR curves: a majority of them (over 50%) 
were very legible and fit the data well, i.e. there was a significant and stable increase during the 
performance of the task and HR went back to normal levels between the tasks; but some were 
rather similar to white noise. Interestingly, some subjects had a steep peak at the beginning of the 
task, probably when they decided to guess the number instead of performing the task (took only 
a short time of thinking), but others did not. Many subjects also had a short peak just before a 
task started and then the normal inverted-U shape followed, which is a sign of a reaction to the 
introduction screen of each task. Overall, HR during tasks was significantly different to the 
baseline rate, therefore we can reject the first part of Hypothesis 2 on 1% level (t=43.6; 
p<0.000).   












Pearson Correlation -0.242*** 
p-value 0.000 
N 203 
Note: *, ** and ** indicate significance on 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Hypothesis 2 also mentioned that if the increase in HR should be taken into account as a measure 
of physiological stress, it should positively correlate with subjectively stated levels of stress, in 
our case the variables HR_Increase and SubjectiveStress. Table 2-5 presents that indeed there is 
a significant positive relationship between the HR_Increase and subjective stress, but the size of 
the coefficient is rather small. Next the negative relationship between HR_Increase and InfoUsed 
suggests that the more aroused a person is (which may be a sign of stress, concentration or 
activity in general), the less willing he/she is to use public information. However, without 
another measure of stress, the reason for the increase of the HR cannot be distinguished  , which 
limits the interpretation of the results, but suggests an interesting relationship. An indication of 
the relationship presents Table 2-6, where the correlation between HR_Increase and Subjective 
stress is broken down by gender and time pressure. We can observe that the positive relationship 
is driven mainly by women under high time pressure. This is a clear reason to control for gender 
in the regression analysis performed in section 2.5. 
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Table 2-6: Correlation of Subjective Stress and Heart-rate increase 
  
HR Increase 
    TP Low TP Medium TP High all 
SubjectiveStress Pearson Corr -0.006 0.080 0.132* 0.103** 
 p-value 
0.937 0.277 0.0716 0.0152 
  N 184 185 188 557 
Female 
SubjectiveStress Pearson Corr 0.064 0.183 0.261** 0.212*** 
 p-value 
0.603 0.135 0.0289 0.0023 
  N 68 68 70 206 
Male 
SubjectiveStress Pearson Corr -0.041 0.008 0.050 0.030 
 p-value 
0.665 0.933 0.588 0.572 
  N 116 117 118 351 
Note: *, ** and ** indicate significance on 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Stress, Heart-rate and Time Pressure 
When we examine the differences in HR_Increase under the three levels of time pressure, we 
find that under Medium and High levels of time pressure the increase in heart-rate is 
significantly
12
 higher than in the Low level, but the medium and high levels do not differ. There 
are also no gender differences as shown in the right part of Figure 2-5.  
 
                                                 
12 T-test for comparison of levels High and Low:        ; Medium to Low:         . 
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Figure 2-5: Comparison of heart-rate increases with respect to time pressure. 
 
Note: Comparison of heart-rate increases (HR_Increase) with respect to time pressure (left) and divided by gender 
(right).  
Figure 2-6 shows a similar result for the subjectively reported level of stress. In the left 
part of the figure you can see that, whereas the means of SubjectiveStress in Low and Medium 
levels of time pressure are marginally significantly
13
 different from each other, in the High level 
of time pressure the mean is significantly higher than both of the other two levels. The 
psychological subjective stress increases almost in a linear way when subjects face tougher time 
constraints. When we inspect the gender differences in the same situation (right part of Figure 
2-6), we observe that the increase in subjective stress in High level of time pressure is driven by 
women: they report a higher level of stress than males, where the difference is significant only 
under the High level of time pressure, although in both Low and Medium levels of time pressure 
the subjective stress for women is slightly higher than for men. 
                                                 
13 T-test for comparison of levels High and Low as well as High and Medium:        ; Medium to Low: 
        . 
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Figure 2-6: Comparison of subjectively stated levels of stress (SubjectiveStress) across different 
levels of time pressure (left) and divided by gender (right). 
 
Heart rate and Risk Preferences 
Next we compare the levels of both increase in heart-rate and subjective stress with respect to the 
risk attitudes. Figure 2-7 presents a scatter plot of heart-rate increase by the elicited certainty 
equivalent. In the left panel of Figure 2-7 a trend line indicates a significant negative correlation 
between an increase in heart-rate and certainty equivalent, which suggests that for subjects with a 
lower tolerance for risk, heart-rate increases by a smaller margin. If we interpret the increase in 
heart-rate as stress, then the results suggest that the more stressed participants were also more 
risk-averse. After the break-down by gender presented in the right panel it is obvious that the 
correlation is driven by men, while for women there is no relationship. However, since the risk-
preferences of participants were elicited in between the tasks, they may be also affected by the 
stress reaction and thus we cannot say which way the causality flows: whether stress induced 
men to be more risk-averse or that the risk-averse participants react with a higher increase in 
their heart-rate. The breakdown by gender and by the levels of time pressure with the associated 
p-values of the correlation coefficients is presented in Table 2-11 in the Appendix.  
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Figure 2-7: Comparison of HR_Increase with respect to certainty equivalent (left) and divided by 
gender (right). 
 
When we examine the correlation of the risk-preferences and the subjective stress levels, we do 
not find any significant effects for any level of time pressure or gender-specific effect (see Table 
2-11 in the Appendix).  
2.5 Model evaluation 
Table 2-7 presents the regression results that are reported as marginal effects after probit 
estimation first with the personality controls (see Table 2-12 in the Appendix for the results 
without personality controls). A robust result across all specifications is that the coefficient of the 
dummy variable indicating a High level of time pressure is not significantly different from zero, 
including column 2 where the dummy for Medium time pressure is added, which means that 
there are no differences between the levels of time pressure in the probability to engage in 
herding behavior. In column 3 we add the variable Self confidence which is significant and 
negative, which suggests that more confident subjects were less likely to use public information. 
In column 4 the interaction term of Self confidence and High time pressure (variable 
SelfConHigh) is marginally significant and positive which shows that under a high level of time 
pressure, the normally more confident subjects are more likely to use public information. In 
column 5 the Similarity score indicating the value of similarity of the subject's first estimates to 
the first estimates seen on the screen with public information is added, the coefficient of which is 
significant on 1% level and negative. This means that when a subject had an estimate more 
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similar to the estimates of others, she was less likely to change it. Column 6 then includes 
additional control for the cumulated profit earned in previous rounds which is significant and 
positive. This shows that the more ECU a subject had, the more likely she was to use public 
information, probably because subjects with higher earned money were less cautious about 
possible loss after changing their minds according to the public information. In the last column 
we control for risk preferences (adding the variable Certainty equivalent) which is insignificant 
and does not affect any of the coefficients. The personality characteristics included in the models 
are age, Female and the "Big Five" personality traits. Age is significant and positive across all 
specifications indicating that older subjects were more likely to switch from their original 
estimates. From the personality traits, Conscientiousness is marginally significant but this 
disappears with the addition of controls, when Extraversion gains marginal significance 
(columns 5 to 7), while its coefficient is negative, suggesting that extroverted individuals have a 
lower probability of being influenced by others. To contrast this result with the literature, 
Baddeley et al. (2010) used in a sample of 17 subjects a different set of personality traits which 
was, as in our case, also not interacted with gender to find that herding was less likely in 
extroverted and/or empathetic individuals. On the other hand, in a study of a large representative 
sample of the German population where the personality traits were interacted with gender, no 
impact was found on risk-preferences or impatience (Dohmen et al., 2010).  
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Table 2-7: Regression analysis.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES      InfoUsed         
High Time Pressure 0.0827 0.0787 0.0840 -0.102 -0.157 -0.161 -0.137 
 





     
  
(0.0650) 
     Age 0.0369** 0.0370** 0.0448*** 0.0456*** 0.0312* 0.0395** 0.0399** 
 
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0183) (0.0180) 
Female -0.0649 -0.0647 -0.103 -0.106 -0.0761 -0.0615 -0.0932 
 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.0953) (0.0954) (0.0856) (0.0928) (0.0944) 
Openness to 
Experience -0.00145 -0.00144 -0.00196 -0.00196 0.00146 7.86e-05 0.00429 
 
(0.00796) (0.00797) (0.00796) (0.00800) (0.00745) (0.00776) (0.00803) 
Conscientiousness -0.0151* -0.0151* -0.0115 -0.0117 -0.00970 -0.00889 -0.0115 
 
(0.00841) (0.00841) (0.00866) (0.00874) (0.00855) (0.00866) (0.00871) 
Extraversion -0.00391 -0.00389 -0.00809 -0.00829 -0.0135* -0.0139* -0.0159* 
 
(0.00788) (0.00787) (0.00822) (0.00828) (0.00760) (0.00807) (0.00883) 
Agreeableness 0.00568 0.00565 0.00934 0.00943 0.0123 0.0126 0.00318 
 
(0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.00890) (0.00930) (0.00983) 
Neuroticism -0.000637 -0.000621 -0.00462 -0.00488 -0.00875 -0.00728 -0.0123 
 
(0.00929) (0.00926) (0.00955) (0.00963) (0.00820) (0.00874) (0.00951) 
Self confidence 
  
-0.0873** -0.111*** -0.129*** -0.134*** -0.114*** 
   
(0.0386) (0.0389) (0.0316) (0.0331) (0.0327) 
SelfConHigh 
   
0.0727* 0.0780* 0.0802* 0.0786* 
    
(0.0408) (0.0433) (0.0444) (0.0474) 
Similarity score 
    
-0.0685*** -0.0726*** -0.0726** 
     
(0.0256) (0.0272) (0.0284) 
ln (Total Profit) 
     
0.0397** 0.0349* 
      
(0.0172) (0.0181) 
Certainty equivalent 
      
-0.0167 
              (0.0104) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 264 
Pseudo R2 0.0401 0.0402 0.0638 0.0682 0.158 0.174 0.180 
Log-Likelihood -187.5 -187.5 -182.9 -182.1 -164.5 -161.3 -145.8 
Chi2 11.47 11.79 17.00 20.07 31.37 33.38 35.04 
Note: Marginal effects after probit. Dependent variable: InfoUsed. Robust standard errors clustered at individual 
level in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Next we turn our attention to the role of stress. Since the treatment intervention increased 
both levels of subjective stress as well as heart-rate, we cannot put all these variables into a 
single regression due to endogeneity. However we provide an exercise where we substitute the 
dummy for the High time pressure with the two other variables; the results are presented in Table 
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2-8. When we regress InfoUsed only on the levels of subjective stress, this variable is significant 
and negative, similarly to when we use the increase in heart-rate instead. All of these results hold 
even after controlling for the personality variables as in Table 2-7 (columns 4 to 6). This 
suggests that with higher stress, people tend to use the public information less in their decisions. 
Table 2-8: Regression analysis, focus on stress dimension. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES InfoUsed 



























       Observations 287 287 203 287 287 203 
Personality controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.00297 0.0194 0.0461 0.0401 0.0541 0.106 
Log-likelihood  -194.8 -191.6 -130.2 -187.5 -184.8 -122.1 
Chi2 1.834 4.873 5.783 11.47 17.64 10.79 
Note: Marginal effects after probit. Robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Personality controls include Age, Female, and the 
Big-Five personality traits; their coefficients behave similarly as in Table 2-7, results available upon request. 
In the next step we focus on the role of the time. Similarly as in the preceding sections, 
we have to separate the time variables from the dummy indicating the level of time pressure 
because of potential endogeneity in estimation. In Table 2-9 we present the estimation results 
when the dummy indicating High time pressure is substituted by TimeDeciding which is the time 
subjects spent on the screen with the public information (column 2) and by TimeLeft which is the 
number of seconds they had remaining to finish the task. The variable TimeDeciding is highly 
significant and positive, which is a sign that the longer they examined the public information, the 
more likely they were to use it. An alternative interpretation is that after observing the public 
information, they either decided to switch to a new estimate or not; and if so, then they tried to 
identify the best new estimate which was time consuming. The coefficient of the variable Time 
left is not significant which tells us that there was no impact of how much time the subjects had 
left for their decision on the probability to use public information. 
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Table 2-9: Regression analysis, focus on time dimension. 
 




                 



























       Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 
Personality controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.00297 0.136 0.00125 0.0401 0.179 0.0365 
Log-likelihood  -194.8 -168.9 -195.1 -187.5 -160.4 -188.3 
Chi2 1.834 21.25 0.301 11.47 48.26 9.307 
Note: Marginal effects after probit. Robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Personality controls include Age, Female, and the 
Big-Five personality traits; their coefficients behave similarly as in Table 2-7, results available upon request. 
 Hypothesis evaluation 
Hypothesis 1 – Herding and time pressure 
The dummy variables indicating the levels of time pressure are not significantly different from 
zero, and this result is fairly stable across various specifications except for one, so we can 
conclude that there is no general relationship between the level of time-pressure and tendency to 
herd. The time dimension which was different under the three levels of time pressure played an 
important role in the sense that the time they spent looking at the public information was 
significantly positively associated with the probability to use the public information, but the 
mechanism may be more complicated as noted above. 
Hypothesis 2 – Stress and heart-rate increase  
The average increase in the heart-rate during the task to the base level was 16.47 so the variable 
HR_Increase looks like a good measure of the induced stress, and it is significantly positively 
correlated with subjectively stated level of stress. The break-down by the level of time pressure 
and gender shows that it is driven by women under High time pressure. However, heart-rate can 
increase not only due to stress, but also due to effort, which could be our case. Therefore the 
correlation between subjective stress and heart-rate increase is significant but rather small in 
magnitude. When regressed on InfoUsed, both stress variables are significantly negatively 
associated with the probability to use public information on a 1% level of significance which can 
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be interpreted that with higher stress levels, people have a lower tendency to engage in herding 
behavior. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between the individual 
propensity to herd and time pressure. To do this, we designed and carried out a laboratory 
experiment where we measured the occurrence of herding as a 0/1 variable when participants 
changed their original decision after being exposed to information about the decisions of others. 
Apart from the behavior in the task, we also tracked individual attributes such as risk 
preferences, task-specific confidence, personality traits and subjective levels of stress as well as 
heart-rate which is a sign of physiological stress.  
The central result of this experiment is that time pressure indicated by indicator variables 
plays no significant role in predicting the tendency to herd, even though there was a behavioral 
change indicative of higher herding under high time pressure. Nevertheless, variables indirectly 
associated with time pressure concerning the time dimension and stress, as revealed by the time 
spent on the screen with public information, reported subjective stress levels and heart-rate 
increases are robust and significant predictors of the tendency to herd. Contrary to our 
expectations, personality traits are not significantly associated with the tendency to herd, except 
for the trait Extroversion which is marginally significant after the addition of other control 
variables, however with a negative sign, contrary to results in other literature (Baddeley et al., 
2010, 2007).  
Apart from that, we show that time pressure can be used as a stressor: the level of 
reported subjectively perceived stress was significantly positively correlated to the heart-rate 
increase during a task solution, which was mostly driven by women under High time pressure. 
The correlation was rather weak which suggests that the heart-rate increase may have indicated 
rather physical arousal in general than stress. Another interesting finding is the positive 
correlation between the heart-rate increase and risk-aversion, mainly in men, which is an area for 
future research. 
Generally speaking, even though the results from this experiment have to be treated with 
care due to the specific nature of the given task, this experiment has provided initial insights into 
the state of the analysis of behavior under time pressure in connection to the propensity to herd. 
Since we show that both stress variables positively influence the tendency to herd while there is 
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no effect of time pressure per se, stress may be the channel which actually changes the 
propensity to herd and thus should be examined in further research.  
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2.7 Appendix 
 Table 2-10: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model.  
variable label N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
InfoUsed If really used the info 287 0 1 0.42 0.49 
Similarity score 
Score of similarity of 
own estimate to the 
others' values 
495 1 15 3.27 2.71 
TimeDeciding 
Time spent on screen 
with public information 
942 0 67.38 3.34 6.72 
TimeLeft 
Time left when original 
estimate set 
760 0 157 43.67 32.44 
TP_Medium Medium Time Pressure 760 0 1 0.33 0.47 




90 26 50 39.94 5.25 
C Conscientiousness 90 22 46 34.00 5.44 
E Extraversion 90 17 48 32.80 6.63 
A Agreeableness 90 24 48 34.60 4.65 
N Neuroticism 90 10 38 25.81 5.23 
SubjectiveStress Stress (Subjective) 760 1 10 5.76 2.45 
Female Female if 1 90 0 1 0.38 0.49 
Certainty 
Equivalent 
Certainty equivalent 90 2 21 14.59 3.45 
RiskAverse Weakly Risk Averse 90 0 1 0.92 0.28 
Self Confidence Self Confidence 90 1 5 3.17 1.24 
TotalProfit Total Profit 942 0 2017 347.54 397.71 
HR_Increase 
Difference of base-line 
to actual HR 
677 0 53 16.47 9.82 
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Table 2-11: Correlations of certainty equivalent (CE) with stress measures across levels of time 
pressure.  
  
TP Low TP Medium TP High all 
    HR_DIF SubjStress HR_DIF SubjStress HR_DIF SubjStress HR_DIF SubjStress 
CE 
Pearson 




p-value 0.033 0.455 0.078 0.289 0.056 0.311 0.00 0.104 




Corr -0.024 -0.019 0.143 -0.072 0.091 0.068 0.074 -0.010 
 
p-value 0.860 0.869 0.285 0.521 0.487 0.542 0.285 0.871 














p-value 0.009 0.319 0.001 0.535 0.001 0.519 0.00 0.209 
  N 108 148 109 150 110 151 397 449 
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Table 2-12: Regression analysis, no personality controls. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES InfoUsed 
High Time Pressure 0.0674 0.0616 0.0662 -0.0798 -0.136 -0.139 -0.121 
 
(0.0499) (0.0595) (0.0504) (0.102) (0.115) (0.117) (0.120) 
Self confidence 
  
-0.0480 -0.0656* -0.0842*** -0.0836** -0.0811** 
   
(0.0360) (0.0370) (0.0321) (0.0341) (0.0369) 
Self confidence * 
TP_High 
   
0.0561 0.0646 0.0662 0.0657 
    
(0.0382) (0.0405) (0.0412) (0.0433) 
Similarity score 
    
-0.0695*** -0.0737*** -0.0716*** 
     
(0.0239) (0.0256) (0.0266) 
ln (Total Profit) 
     
0.0310 0.0272 




      
-0.00551 
       
(0.00821) 
CE * Female 
      
-0.00966 
       
(0.00602) 
Medium Time Pressure 
 
-0.0125 
     
  
(0.0650) 
     
        Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 264 
Personality controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Pseudo R2 0.00297 0.00305 0.0125 0.0153 0.114 0.126 0.133 
Log-likelihood -194.8 -194.8 -192.9 -192.4 -173.1 -170.8 -154.3 
Chi2 1.834 1.903 3.759 5.703 17.20 16.02 21.21 
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Co-authored by Jana Cahlíková 
Abstract 
Many important decisions are made under stress and they often involve risky alternatives. There 
has been ample evidence that stress influences decision making, but still very little is known 
about whether individual attitudes to risk change with exposure to acute stress. To directly 
evaluate the causal effect of psychosocial stress on risk attitudes, we adopt an experimental 
approach in which we randomly expose participants to a stressor in the form of a standard 
laboratory stress-induction procedure: the Trier Social Stress Test for Groups. Risk preferences 
are elicited using a multiple price list format that has been previously shown to predict risk-
oriented behavior out of the laboratory. Using three different measures (salivary cortisol levels, 
heart rate and multidimensional mood questionnaire scores), we show that stress was 
successfully induced on the treatment group. Our main result is that for men, the exposure to a 
stressor (intention-to-treat effect, ITT) and the exogenously induced psychosocial stress (the 
average treatment effect on the treated, ATT) significantly increase risk aversion when 
controlling for their personal characteristics. The estimated treatment difference in certainty 
equivalents is equivalent to 69% (ITT) and 89% (ATT) of the gender-difference in the control 
group. The effect on women goes in the same direction, but is weaker and insignificant. 
  
                                                 
14 This chapter has been accepted in the journal Experimental Economics and has been published in a version 
slightly different from this chapter under Cingl, L., & Cahlíková, J. (2013). Risk Preferences under Acute Stress. 
IES Working Paper No. 17/201. IES FSV, Charles University in Prague. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, stress has become an integral part of society. Daily decision making in many 
professions involves risky choices under severe pressure or even stress, such as trading stocks, 
diagnosing patients in emergency rooms, or controlling air-traffic. Stress is an instinctive 
psychological, physiological and behavioral reaction to perceived threats and as such it cannot be 
controlled by human will (Goldstein & McEwen, 2002). Most people have to face stressful 
situations with risky choices throughout their lives, for instance university exams, job-interviews, 
asking for promotions, or starting their own businesses. The choices made in these situations are 
crucial determinants of economic outcomes and therefore we consider it important to understand 
whether they might be affected by stress.  
In the context of developing countries, poverty remains one of the most pressing global 
issues, with 836 million people still living on less than 1.25 a day (United Nations, 2015). 
Recently it has been argued that poverty causes stress and a negative emotional state which can 
play an important role in the perpetuation of poverty by increasing risk-aversion and lowering 
patience (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). Risk preferences are relevant for the housing, investment, 
schooling, and occupational decisions of the poor. Higher risk-aversion could lead to choices that 
make it hard to escape poverty, thus creating a feedback loop. Poverty is indeed found to be 
correlated with higher risk-aversion (Guiso & Paiella, 2008; Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009) and the 
first part of the proposed relationship—poverty causes stress—has been well established 
(Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013; Chemin et al., 2013). Still, much less is 
known about the causal relationship between stress and risk preferences, a question that we 
examine in this paper. 
Moreover, risk preferences are incorporated in major economic theories in fields ranging 
from finance, labor economics, the economics of innovation to development economics. These 
theories typically assume the stability of risk preferences, which in turn allows for an elegant 
solution to the proposed models. However, increasingly more evidence shows that this 
assumption may not always hold: risk preferences may temporarily fluctuate (Cohn et al., 2015; 
Guiso et al., 2013), can be affected by the direct administration of cortisol (Kandasamy et al., 
2014), and emotions (Nguyen & Noussair, 2014). We contribute to this literature by studying the 
stability of risk preferences with respect to stress.  
Behavioral changes under stress have been studied extensively in the psychological 
literature, mainly looking at the effects of stress on memory and performance, but also on 
various other aspects of decision making (see review in Starcke & Brand, 2012). However, due 
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to the methodological limitations of previously published studies, only little is known about the 
effect of stress on risk preferences. Our study differs from the previous literature by (i) using an 
efficient stressor and a risk task that is (ii) easy to understand and (iii) involves neither feedback 
processing nor learning which itself may be affected by stress (Petzold, Plessow, Goschke, & 
Kirschbaum, 2010). 
In this paper, we identify the causal effect of stress on risk preferences using a laboratory 
experiment with 151 subjects, who are randomly assigned to a stress treatment or a control 
group. Our stress-inducing procedure, the Trier Social Stress Test  (Kirschbaum et al., 1993)  in 
the group modification (TSST-G, von Dawans et al., 2011), is well-established in the literature 
and has been shown to be one of the most efficient laboratory stressors in terms of physiological 
as well as psychological reactions (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). We use three different 
measures to validate the efficiency of the TSST-G procedure: two physiological (heart-rate and 
salivary cortisol concentration) and one psychological (Multi-Dimensional Mood Questionnaire 
scores, MDMQ, Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997). To elicit risk-preferences we use 
the task of Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde (2010), which is easily comprehensible to subjects, 
is incentive compatible and has been shown to predict risk-taking behavior outside of the 
laboratory in 30 countries (Vieider et al., 2014).  
In addition, we measure the ”Big-Five” personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Goldberg et al., 2006) that are one of the most enduring and popular models of personality and 
include them in our analysis. We do so because recent laboratory experiments have shown that 
personality plays an important role in the explanation of individual risk-attitudes, potentially 
through the mediation of emotions that may be connected to stress; and because personality may 
reflect generally stable patterns in behavior, motivation and cognition (Capra, Jiang, Engelmann, 
& Berns, 2013; Deck, Lee, & Reyes, 2010; Deck, Lee, Reyes, & Rosen, 2012). 
We were successful in inducing stress using the TSST-G procedure. All three measures 
of stress responded in the expected direction: compared to the reaction of the control group, the 
cortisol levels and heart-rates of the treatment group increased and their reported mood shifted 
towards the bad and nervous poles. On an individual level, when we focus on the increase of 
salivary cortisol as an indicator of stress, we show that the compliance rate i.e. the correct 
physiological response to either the TSST-G stress or control procedure is 78%. 
Our main result is that acute psychosocial stress increases risk aversion in men, when 
controlling for personal characteristics. The estimated magnitude of the effect is comparable to 
the gender difference in risk-attitudes. Since not all subjects exposed to the stress-inducing 
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procedure were actually stressed and vice-versa, we need to face the problem of imperfect 
compliance. Therefore in the analysis we distinguish between the intention-to-treat effects (ITT - 
effect of random exposure to the stressor on risk preferences) and the average treatment effect on 
treated (ATT, effect of being stressed on risk preferences). The ATT effect is estimated using a 
two-stage instrumental variable regression, with random exposure to the stressor used as an 
instrument for the physiological state of stress. The ITT and ATT effects of stress on risk 
preferences are significant for men at 10% and 5% level, respectively, when controlling for age 
and "Big-5" personality traits, showing that stress increases risk-aversion. The effect on women 
goes in the same direction, but is insignificant. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Measurement of Risk Preferences 
Risk preferences were elicited using a simple task similar to the one in Dohmen et al. (2010), 
where participants repeatedly chose between a lottery and different safe payments. Subjects had 
to fill in a table of 10 rows, where in each row the lottery stayed the same paying either 4,000 
ECU or 0 ECU with 50% probability each, but the safe payment gradually increased from 0 ECU 
by increments of 300 ECU up to 2,700 ECU. Detailed instructions and a screenshot of the 
decision-making task can be found in the Appendix. Subjects knew that one row would be 
randomly determined for payment and that they would be paid according to their choices in that 
row. We allowed for inconsistent behavior; subjects filled in all 10 rows and were not in any way 
guided to a single switching point. The risk task was programmed in and conducted with the 
software Z-TREE (Fischbacher, 2007).  
If the individual's behavior is consistent, then the row where the subject switches 
preferences indicates the individual certainty equivalent, i.e. the safe amount which makes the 
individual indifferent to choosing or not choosing the lottery. For the descriptive statistics, the 
individual certainty equivalent is determined as the central point of the switching interval. For 
interval regressions, the certainty equivalent is specified as lying in the interval between the two 
safe amounts where the switch occurred.
15
 As the expected value of the lottery is 2,000 ECU, 
risk neutral subjects should start by preferring the lottery up to the safe amount equal to 1,800 
ECU (row 7) and then switch to preferring the safe amounts. Risk-averse subjects may switch to 
preferring safe amounts earlier, with the switching row depending on their degree of risk-
                                                 
15 For example, if the participant preferred the lottery up to row 6 (safe amount=1,500 ECU) and switched to 
preferring the safe amount starting in row 7 (safe amount=1,800 ECU), 1,650 ECU is taken as the certainty 
equivalent.  For the interval regression, the certainty equivalent is defined as lying between 1,500 and 1,800 ECU. 
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aversion (the more risk-averse they are, the earlier they switch). Only risk-loving subjects should 
choose lottery for the safe amounts greater than or equal to 2,100 ECU.  
3.2.2 Trier Social Stress Test for Groups 
Stress was induced by a standard validated stress procedure the Trier Social Stress Test for 
Groups (von Dawans et al., 2011) which is a modified version of an individual TSST originally 
developed in Kirschbaum et al. (1993). The TSST-G provides a combination of a social-
evaluative threat and uncontrollable elements, which are the key attributes of an efficient 
psychosocial stressor (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Specifically, the TSST-G treatment (i.e. 
stress-inducing) protocol consists of two parts -- a public speaking task and a mental arithmetic 
task that are performed in front of an evaluation committee. The control group faces cognitively 
similar tasks but with no stressful aspects present. 
In our case, during the public speaking task each participant was asked to perform her 
best at a fictive job interview for two minutes. In the second part during the mental arithmetic 
task participants were asked one by one to serially subtract 17 from a high number (e.g. 4878) 
for two minutes. Participants were called one by one in random order, were separated by 
cardboard barriers and wore headphones so that they would not see or hear the other participants. 
The two committee members wore white laboratory coats and had two video cameras at their 
sides that recorded the performance of the participants. The committee was trained not to give 
any feedback on the subjects' performance, neither verbally or physically. 
The full TSST-G control protocol was applied to the control group, which mirrors the 
activities of the treatment protocol but omits the stressful aspects of the situation. Participants 
also went through a public speaking task where they were asked to read a text out loud and then 
were given a simple mental arithmetic task, i.e. to count by multiples of a small number, e.g. 5-
10-15 and so on. There was a committee present in the room, but they were not evaluating the 
performance of participants, did not wear white lab coats and was asked to act naturally. There 
were no cameras in the room and the participants did not have the headphones on. 
To conform to the standards of experimental economics, we modified the TSST-G 
original protocol so that it did not contain any deception or false information. These 
modifications concerned mainly the information given to the participants in the treatment 
condition; they were not told that the panel members were trained in behavioral analysis, and we 
did not tell them that the video recordings would later be analyzed.
16
 
                                                 
16 The detailed treatment and control instructions and protocol scripts can be provided on a request. 
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3.2.3 Measurement of Stress Response 
To measure individual stress response, we combine two physiological measures, salivary cortisol 
concentration and heart rate, and one psychological measure of stress reaction. First, cortisol is 
the final hormone of the major endocrine stress axis of the human body (hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axis, Dedovic et al., 2009) and Foley & Kirschbaum (2010) show that it is highly 
predictive of psychosocial stress, while being the most commonly used measure of stress in 
general. Cortisol concentration peaks in the interval approximately 20 to 40 minutes after the 
onset of the stressor (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Saliva sample 1 was collected right before 
the TSST-G procedure, sample 2 was collected right after the stress procedure, and sample 3 was 
gathered before the risk-preferences protocol, approximately 15 minutes after the cessation of the 
stressor. We decided to use three samples in order to be able to show that (i) the groups did not 
differ in the cortisol levels before the TSST-G protocol, (ii) the TSST-G administration was 
successful and (iii) the reaction lasted as in the comparable experiments.
17
 
Second, as shown in Kirschbaum et al. (1993), heart rate increases are correlated with 
endured psychosocial stress and can be used as a proxy for the immediate reaction of the 
sympathetic nervous system. The heart-rate of participants was measured with standard heart-
rate monitors.
18
 The individual difference between the average heart-rate during the TSST-G 
procedure and the average baseline level can be used as one measure of the induced stress. 
Third, Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire (MDMQ, Steyer et al., 1997) was used to 
assess the effects of the TSST-G procedure on the mood of the participants.
19
 Mood is measured 
in three dimensions: good-bad, awake-tired, and calm-nervous. The MDMQ questionnaire has 
two parts. In our case, participants filled in one part of the MDMQ right before the TSST-G 
procedure and the other part right after the TSST-G procedure, where the order of the two parts 
was randomized across sessions. Based on previous literature, we expected that the stress 
response would be associated with scores closer to the "bad" and "nervous" poles of the 
respective dimension (Allen, Kennedy, Cryan, Dinan, & Clarke, 2014). 
                                                 
17 Saliva samples were collected using a standard sampling device Salivette. The samples were frozen to -20˘C after 
each experimental session and the salivary cortisol concentration was analyzed by the laboratory of the 
Biopsychology department at TU Dresden and by the Department of the Clinical Biochemistry at the Military 
Hospital in Prague. Prior to the experiment we conducted a separate pilot session where only the TSST-G procedure 
was administered and five saliva samples were collected and analyzed. The dynamics of the cortisol elevation in the 
pilot session followed the trajectory common in the literature (e.g. in von Dawans et al., 2011) including the 
recovery phase and therefore we assume the same trajectory in our subjects. Moreover, cortisol levels show a short-
term pulsatility and therefore only one post-stress sample is insufficient to prove the increase in cortisol levels 
(Young, Abelson, & Lightman, 2004). 
18 The types used are Polar RS400 and Polar S725X which are composed of a wireless chest transmitter and a wrist 
monitor. The recording precision was 1s (Polar RS400) or 5s (Polar S725X). 
19 An English version of the MDMQ was used. Available at: http://www.metheval.uni-jena.de/mdbf.php  
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3.2.4 Measurement of Personality Traits 
Apart from basic observable characteristics, such as gender or age, personality traits can also 
explain individual differences in risk attitudes (Borghans et al., 2008; Heckman, 2011). Becker, 
Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse (2012) find that economic preferences and personality traits 
are not substitute, but rather complementary concepts for explaining economic choices. To 
capture the personality profile of participants, we used a battery of 50 questions to construct the 
"Big Five" factors that are Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness and Neuroticism (Goldberg, 2010). The "Big Five" factors are the most 
commonly used measure of personality traits, where each factor represents a summary of a large 
number of specific personality characteristics (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
3.3 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was run at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics in Prague in two batches: 
the first six sessions were run in May/June 2012 and the additional five in November 2014. All 
the procedures were identical so we pooled the results. Each session included treatment and 
control group with 7 subjects in each.
20
 All of the sessions were conducted between 4:30 PM and 
7:00 PM to control for the impact of the circadian variability in cortisol levels. Each session 
lasted on average a little less than two and a half hours. The average payment was 500 CZK 
(about EUR 20), including the fixed show-up fee of 150 CZK (about EUR 6). Throughout the 
experiment, all payoffs were denominated in experimental currency units (ECU), with the 
conversion rate was set to 32 ECU = 1 CZK. The whole experiment was run in English, which is 
the standard working language in this laboratory. No communication among the participants was 
allowed. The study was approved by the Internal Review Board of the Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics. 
Subjects were recruited via the standard on-line recruitment-system ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004). In addition to standard invitation, subjects were informed in the recruitment e-mail that 
through-out the experiment, the physiological responses of their bodies would be measured using 
standard procedures. For this reason, they were instructed to abstain from heavy food, nicotine 
intake and strenuous exercise at least two hours prior to the experiment. No further specification 
regarding the content of the experiment was given, in order to avoid self-selection.   
Before the start of the experiment, the participants filled in a screening questionnaire in 
order to find out if there were any circumstances that would interfere with the cortisol 
                                                 
20 For session 1 only 11 participants arrived.  
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measurement. Before entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned into either the 
control or treatment group. We made sure that women taking oral contraceptives were evenly 
distributed across the two groups. 
Figure 3-1: The timeline of the experiment 
 
The timeline of the experiment is summarized in Figure 3-1. The instructions explaining 
the general procedure of the experiment were read aloud first and subjects were then asked to 
sign an informed consent form. In the consent form and through-out the experiment, the TSST-G 
protocol was referred to as a "challenge task".  It was emphasized in the consent form that 
subjects could leave at any point of the experiment, still receiving their show-up fee.   
The heart-rate monitors were attached and subjects were asked to fill-out a questionnaire 
to measure their personality traits. They were then given instructions on a task studying Bayesian 
updating and completed two trial and five real rounds of this task (results from this task are not 
reported in this paper).
21
 Next, the first saliva samples were collected and participants filled in 
the first part of the MDMQ questionnaire. 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 4 for details about the design of the Bayesian updating task. This task does not confound the results 
in this paper as subjects learned about their payment from the Bayesian updating task only at the end of the 
experiment. Even though subjects' expected earnings may still matter, we do not consider this as issue as the TSST-
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Afterwards, instructions to either the TSST-G stress-inducing treatment or TSST-G 
stress-free control procedure were distributed, describing the tasks that would follow. Subjects in 
the treatment group were informed that they would be evaluated in public and recorded on video. 
Subjects read the instructions quietly and had five minutes for preparation. Then the groups were 
taken to two separate rooms where they completed the TSST-G treatment or control procedure, 
which lasted about 30 minutes.  
When finished, the participants arrived back in the laboratory, gave the second sample of 
their saliva, filled in the second part of the MDMQ questionnaire and continued in the task aimed 
at Bayesian updating for the following 15 minutes. Afterwards, the third saliva sample was 
collected and the risk-preferences task was run, which did not last more than five minutes. Then 
the payments for the whole experiment were revealed, subjects were asked to fill-out a 
questionnaire regarding their personal characteristics, returned the heart-rate monitors and were 
paid. After the participants from the control group had left, a thorough debriefing about the 
TSST-G treatment procedure was conducted. 
3.3.1 Sample 
In total 70 female (mean age 22.2, SD = 2.0 years) and 81 male subjects (mean age 22.8, SD = 
3.1 years) took part in the experiment. Participants were mostly students of economics or related 
disciplines (73.5%). The participants had not participated in a TSST-G-related study before. 
With one exception the participants were all normal body-weight and 26 women indicated taking 
oral contraceptives.
22
 From the end-questionnaire, we confirm that all subjects were unfamiliar 
with the stress-inducing procedure and they mostly did not know other participants. We repeat 
that they were required to sign an informed consent form, which emphasized an option to leave 
at any point of the experiment.
23
 Out of the 151 participants, none decided to leave, but five were 
dropped from the analysis due to inconsistent answers in the risk-preferences task (see below), so 
we were left with 71 observations in the treatment group (39 men and 32 women) and 75 
observations in the control group (41 men and 34 women).  
Descriptive statistics of the sample with respect to our main control variables are 
presented in the Appendix Table 3-10. Our treatment and control groups are balanced regarding 
                                                                                                                                                             
G treatment group actually earned slightly more money in the Bayesian task compared to the control group, but the 
difference is not significant. 
22 Above-normal weight (BMI above 25) and the intake of hormonal contraceptives may affect cortisol response to 
stress (Kudielka et al., 2009). Out of the 26 women indicating intake of oral contraceptives, 13 were assigned to the 
treatment group. 
23 One subject left in the pilot session prior to the TSST-G procedure, confirming that this option was salient 
enough. 
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gender and age. The sample of men is balanced for all observed characteristics except for the 
"Big-5" personality trait Neuroticism, while for women we saw an imbalance in Extraversion. To 
make sure potential imbalances in personality traits do not influence our results regarding the 
effect of the exposure to the stressor on risk preferences, we control for the "Big-5" personality 
traits in the following analysis. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Stress Response 
First, we show that our external manipulation was successful: stress was induced in the 
participants in the TSST-G treatment procedure but not in the participants in the control 
procedure. 
The dynamics of our primary measure of stress, the cortisol reaction, are presented in 
Figure 3-2. As a response to the TSST-G procedure, salivary cortisol levels significantly 
increased for the treatment group, but remained stable over time for the control group. The 
average maximum cortisol response, calculated as the maximum difference between the baseline 
sample (sample 1) and samples taken after the stress-inducing procedure (sample 2 or 3), was an 
increase of 10.47 nmol/l in the treatment group (SD=11.38) and a decrease of -0.31 nmol/l in the 
control group (SD=2.96). 
In other words, the treatment and the control group do not differ in cortisol levels before 
the stress procedure (sample 1: p=0.570, d=-0.13), but the cortisol level is significantly higher 
for the treatment group both immediately after the TSST-G procedure (sample 2: p<0.001, d=-
1.10) and 15-20 minutes after its end, right before the risk-preferences task (sample 3: p<0.001, 
d=-1.09). The differences are tested using a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test and the reported 
effect sizes are Cohen's d, unless stated otherwise. The stress manipulation was successful for 
both genders, as reported in Figure 3-6 in the Appendix. In line with results from comparable 
studies, the cortisol response to the stress treatment was stronger among males (Kudielka, 
Hellhammer, & Wüst, 2009). 
Similarly, the average heart-rate of subjects during the TSST-G stress procedure is 
significantly higher than the heart-rate of subjects during the control procedure (p=0.058, d=-
0.42), but not afterwards (p=0.231, d=-0.16). When we look at the average heart rate response 
associated with the TSST-G procedure (average heart rate during the procedure - average heart 
rate prior to the procedure), the average heart rate increases for both treatment and the control 
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group, but significantly more for the treatment group (p=0.023, d=-0.46). Heart-rate dynamics is 
plotted in Figure 3-7. 
To measure the psychological response to stress, we test the effect of the TSST-G stress-
induction/control procedure on the mood of the participants, using a good-bad dimension, 
awake-tired dimension and calm-nervous dimension from the Multidimensional Mood 
Questionnaire. As summarized in Figure 3-8, the treatment and control group score similarly in 
all three dimensions before the TSST-G procedure, but subjects who underwent the TSST-G 
stress-induction procedure feel worse (p<0.001, d=0.71) and more nervous (p<0.001, d=0.63) 
compared to subjects who underwent the TSST-G control procedure. The treatment group also 
feels more awake, but the difference is not significant (p=0.177, d=-0.17). These results are 
robust across gender, see Figure 3-9 in the Appendix. 
The results of our stress manipulation confirm that stress reaction is complex and cortisol 
can be used only as a proxy for the stress response. The maximum cortisol response is correlated 
not only with the heart rate response (ρ =0.344, p<0.001, Spearman's rank correlations), but also 
with the psychological measures in the good-bad dimension (ρ=-0.296, p<0.001) and in the 
calm-nervous dimension (ρ =-0.208, p=0.013). 
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   Note: Stress Treatment: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction 
procedure, Control: subjects were exposed to the TSST-G control procedure. Sample 1 was collected before the 
TSST-G stress-induction/control procedure, sample 2 after the TSST-G procedure and sample 3 before the risk task.  
Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. 
3.4.2 Compliance 
We have shown that the manipulation of the stress condition was successful on the aggregate 
level. To analyze compliance on an individual level, we focus on the cortisol response. 
We define that a participant is stressed if their maximum cortisol response is greater than 
2.5 nmol/l as is standard in the literature and may be even overly conservative (R. Miller, 
Plessow, Kirschbaum, & Stalder, 2013). Following this classification, 52 out of 75 subjects in 
the treatment group are stressed and 60 out of 71 subjects in the control group are not stressed, so 
the compliance rate is 78%.
24
 We have a lower compliance rate among women in the treatment 
group, which is consistent with women showing weaker cortisol response to TSST in general 
(Allen et al., 2014). 
Of course, stress reaction is generally highly complex and cortisol reactivity individual, 
so this approach is necessarily a simplification. However, we still consider using the cortisol 
response as a proxy for being stressed a useful simplification as it enables us to distinguish the 
effect of random exposure to the stress treatment  from the physiological effect of stress on risk 
preferences (see below).   
3.4.3 Risk Preferences 
Starting with the descriptive statistics of the elicited risk attitudes, we see that inconsistent 
behavior, i.e. multiple switches between preferring lottery and safe payment in the risk task 
occurred in five cases (four in the control group, one in the treatment group). These subjects 
were dropped from the analysis, as their certainty equivalent could not be inferred.
25
 For the 
remaining 146 observations (75 in the treatment group and 71 in the control group), the modal 
certainty equivalent is 1,950 ECU, the median is 1,650 ECU and 83% of subjects are weakly 
                                                 
24 The maximum cortisol response is not available for two subjects in the control group, where saliva samples could 
not be analyzed. 
25 We perform two robustness checks of our results, in which we do not drop the multiple switchers from the 
analysis. In the first robustness check, risk preferences are measured not using the elicited certainty equivalent, but 
using the number of risky choices made. We then estimate the intention-to-treat effect of stress on risk preferences 
using ordered probit. As a second robustness check, we treat the inconsistent subjects as indifferent between the safe 
amounts and the lottery for the entire interval in which multiple switches occur, as suggested by Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau, & Rutström (2006). This means that the certainty equivalent of these subjects is elicited in a wider interval than 
the certainty equivalent of subjects who switch just once. The intention-to-treat effect of stress on risk preferences is 
then estimated using interval regression. The results of both robustness checks are reported in Table 3-7 in the 
Appendix and show that results presented in the main text are robust to including the multiple switchers. 
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risk-averse, i.e. their certainty equivalent is below 2,000 for a lottery paying either 4,000 ECU or 
0 ECU with 50% probability each. 
To talk about the effect of stress on risk preferences, we need to distinguish the effect of random 
exposure to the stressor (the TSST-G stress-induction procedure) on risk preferences from the 
effect of stress (a physiological state of the body) on risk preferences. The problem of imperfect 
compliance does not usually arise in economic experiments performed in the laboratory, but it is 
a relevant issue when estimating the effects of laboratory-induced stress. 
We start the analysis by presenting the differences in risk attitudes between the TSST-G 
treatment and control group, to estimate the effect of random exposure to the psychosocial 
stressor on risk preferences (intention-to-treat effect, ITT). Next, we show correlation between 
induced physiological stress and risk attitudes, using cortisol response as a proxy for the endured 
stress. To estimate the causal effect of physiological stress on risk preferences (the average 
treatment effect on the treated, ATT), we apply a two-stage instrumental variable regression with 
random exposure to the stressor as an instrument for the induced physiological stress. 
3.4.4 Effect of Exposure to Stressor - ITT 
Risk preferences of the TSST-G stress and control groups are summarized in Figure 3-3, which 
presents the elicited certainty equivalent for a lottery paying either 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 
50% probability each. The differences between the treatment and control groups will first be 
tested using a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the reported effect sizes are Cohen's d. 
Figure 3-3 shows that the group exposed to psychosocial stressor is more risk-averse than 
the control group, but the difference is not statistically significant for our sample size (N=146, 
p=0.192, d=0.2). As can be seen in Figure 3-3, the effect goes in the same direction for men and 
women, but is not significant for either group (Males: N=80,p=0.299, d=0.23; Females: N=66, 
p=0.447, d=0.18). Note that women in our sample are in general more risk-averse than men 
(p=0.001, d=0.51), which is a standard result in the literature, and this is true both for the 
treatment group (p=0.013, d=0.54) and for the control group (p=0.037, d=0.50). 
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Figure 3-3: Risk preferences by Stress Treatment. 
 
Note: Risk preferences are presented using an elicited certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU 
with 50% probability each. Stress Treatment: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G 
stress-induction procedure, Control: subjects were exposed to the TSST-G control procedure. Error bars indicate 
mean +/- SEM. 
Even though exposure to the stressor does not have significant effects on risk preferences 
using a simple mean comparison, we need to control for other observable characteristics that 
have been shown to affect risk preferences. Therefore, we conduct a more detailed analysis by 
regressing the elicited certainty equivalent on the treatment status Exposed to stressor and 
additional controls: gender, age, and personality traits measured prior to the stress procedure 
("Big Five" – openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and 
neuroticism), which have been found to be important determinants of risk preferences in the 
literature (Borghans et al., 2008; Dohmen et al., 2010; Dohmen & Falk, 2011). We also allow for 
different responses to treatment across gender by including an interaction term Exposed to 
stressor*Female. Effects are estimated using an interval regression, to account for the fact that 
certainty equivalents were elicited in intervals. 
The results for the whole sample are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 3-1. Controlling for 
age and personality traits in column 3, we find that the assignment to treatment increases risk 
aversion (p=0.089) and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same for both 
genders, as the interaction term Exposed to stressor*Female is insignificant (p=0.582). Still, 
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show that the effect is driven by men (p=0.052); the effect on women is weaker and insignificant 
when estimated for this subsample separately (p=0.415). Ordered probit regression is used as a 
robustness check, marginal fixed effects are reported in the Appendix Table 3-5 for men, and in 
Table 3-6 for women. The results confirm that men exposed to the stressor are more likely to 
have the lower values of the certainty equivalent (1,350 and 1,650, for a lottery paying 4,000 
ECU or 0 ECU with a 50% probability each) and less likely to have certainty equivalents of 
1,950 and 2,250. The effects on women are again weak and insignificant.  
To illustrate the size of the treatment effect estimated in columns 4 and 5, in Panel A of 
Appendix Table 3-12 we generate predicted certainty equivalents for an average man and an 
average woman in our sample, meaning that we fix their age and personality profile on the 
gender-specific average. Men in the control group have a predicted certainty equivalent equal to 
1939 ECU (for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with a 50% probability each), while men 
exposed to the stressor have 1696 ECU. The prediction for women in the control and treatment 
groups yields values of 1587 ECU and 1469 ECU, respectively. Thus, the effect size among men 
is about twice the size of that found among women, and the estimated treatment effect for men is 
equivalent to 69% of the gender difference in the control group. 
In Appendix Table 3-11 we run a sensitivity analysis to check which of the additional 
controls in Table 3-1 influence the results in the gender-specific regressions. For women, adding 
additional controls does not change the estimated treatment effect much. For men, it is 
controlling for the personality trait neuroticism alone which makes the difference (compare 
columns 4 and 3). Neuroticism is the trait that is not balanced across men in our treatment and 
control group and as it significantly affects risk-preferences in our sample, we find it appropriate 
to control for personality traits in our baseline analysis.  
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Table 3-1: Effects of random exposure to stressor on risk preferences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Interval regression 
Dependent variable Certainty equivalent 
Sample All All All Males Females 
            
Exposed to stressor -136.15 -145.27 -215.74* -242.74* -118.16 




    
 
(155.23) (149.43) 
  Exposed to stressor*Female 
 
28.41 97.69 
    
 
(203.97) (177.70) 
  Age 
 
157.54 203.32 399.08** -700.54 
  
 
(122.05) (125.51) (157.15) (483.08) 
Age squared 
 
-2.82 -3.74* -7.31*** 15.08 
  
 
(2.21) (2.25) (2.77) (10.51) 
Big Five Personality Traits: 
  
  
    
  
  
    Openness to experience 
  
-2.26 -0.68 -9.43 
  
  
(11.74) (11.18) (20.40) 
  Conscientiousness 
  
-3.37 -1.90 -7.63 
  
  
(8.30) (9.76) (12.97) 
  Extraversion 
  
-0.61 -3.69 7.01 
  
  
(7.76) (8.86) (11.78) 
  Agreeableness 
  
-17.07* -1.01 -46.43*** 
  
  
(9.61) (10.55) (15.56) 
Neuroticism 
  
16.28** 26.15*** 1.48 
  
  
(7.54) (9.73) (10.54) 
Constant 1,755.35*** -209.22 -450.74 -3,890.76 11,766.59** 
  (77.68) (1,637.60) (2,160.63) (2,657.66) (5,911.69) 
chi2 1.75 10.78 19.73 15.80 10.53 
Observations 146 146 146 80 66 
Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50% 
probability each, calculated from the binary choices in the risk preferences task. Exposed to stressor: indicator 
variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction procedure. The reported coefficients in 
columns 1-5 are marginal effects, estimated using interval regressions to correct for the fact that the dependent 
variable is elicited in intervals.  Robust standard errors in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.4.5 Induced Stress and Risk Preferences - correlation 
and ATT 
Before we identify the causal effect of physiological stress on risk preferences, we present 
differences in risk preferences across participants who are under stress and who are not, 
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independent of treatment. A participant is considered to be under stress if her cortisol increase 
exceeds 2.5 nmol/l.  
As can be seen in Figure 3-4, there is a strong difference in risk preferences between men 
who are under stress and men who are not (N=78,p=0.031, d=0.60). For women, the difference is 
much smaller and insignificant (N=66,p=0.953, d=-0.04).  
Figure 3-4: Risk preferences by induced stress 
 
Notes: Risk preferences are presented using an elicited certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 
ECU with 50% probability each. Under stress = 1 if the maximum cortisol response of the subject, calculated as the 
maximum difference between the baseline sample (sample 1) and samples taken after the stress-inducing procedure 
(sample 2 or 3), was above 2.5 nmol/l. Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. 
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Table 3-2: Risk preferences by induced stress (measured by cortisol response) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Interval regression 
Dependent variable Certainty equivalent 
Sample All All All Males Females 
        
  Under stress -88.77 -354.08*** -353.13*** -338.62*** 66.25 




    
 
(202.96) (199.67) 
  Under stress*Female 
 
-502.72*** -375.95*** 
    
 
(133.35) (138.21) 
  Age 
 
152.59 192.84 366.72** -729.80 
  
 
(123.16) (127.45) (157.41) (465.41) 
Age squared 
 
-2.86 -3.67 -6.83** 15.81 
  
 
(2.24) (2.31) (2.78) (10.05) 




    
  
  
  Openness to experience 
  
1.34 3.42 -6.60 
  
  
(11.88) (11.45) (19.93) 
Conscientiousness 
  
-4.92 -5.07 -5.68 
  
  
(8.04) (9.80) (12.40) 
Extroversion 
  
-2.70 -5.13 4.57 
  
  
(7.80) (9.01) (11.67) 
Agreeableness 
  
-16.64* 0.61 -47.32*** 
  
  
(9.63) (10.72) (15.39) 
Neuroticism 
  
15.34** 23.70** 1.76 
  
  
(7.38) (9.37) (10.42) 
Constant 1,723.58*** 56.18 -156.51 -3,317.33 11,918.75** 
  (73.48) (1,631.64) (2,138.99) (2,641.36) (5,745.51) 
chi2 0.75 17.39 25.06 15.99 10.69 
Observations 144 144 144 78 66 
Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50% 
probability each, calculated from the binary choices in the Risk preferences task. Under stress = indicator variable 
equal to one if the difference in cortisol levels between baseline (sample 1) and sample 2 or sample 3 is bigger than 
2.5 nmol/l. The reported coefficients in columns 1-5 are marginal effects, estimated using interval regressions to 
correct for the fact that the dependent variable is elicited in intervals. 
Next, we run a more detailed analysis, which controls for additional observables. The 
results of an interval regression with the indicator variable Under Stress are presented in the first 
three columns of Table 3-2 for the whole sample, and then separately for men and women. The 
results confirm that on average, there is no significant correlation between the cortisol response 
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and the certainty equivalent (column 1 in Table 3-2). However, there are significant gender 
differences as captured by the coefficient Under Stress*Female in columns 2-3. Men under stress 
are more risk averse than men who are not under stress, with the effect being significant at the 
1% level (column 4 in Table 3-2, p=0.005). The size of the effect is economically important. The 
estimated certainty equivalent for a lottery paying either 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50 % 
probability each is around 350 ECU lower for men under stress, meaning that men under stress 
switch to preferring the safe amount about 1.2 rows prior to men not under stress on the scale of 
10 rows. On the other hand, the link between physiological stress and the risk preferences of 
women is weak and insignificant and actually goes in the other direction (column 5 in Table 3-2, 
p=0.657). As a consequence, while there is a significant gender difference in risk preferences 
among participants not under stress (coefficient of the variable Female in column 3 of Table 
3-2), the gender difference disappears for the participants who are under stress (as measured by 
the term Female+Under stress*Female in column 3, p=0.801). 
Yet, the observed strong correlation between stress and risk preferences in men could be 
driven both by the effect of stress on risk preferences and by the different underlying risk 
preferences of compliers and non-compliers. Subjects that get stressed in the TSST-G control 
procedure are most likely different from subjects who do not get stressed during the TSST-G 
stress procedure. Therefore, to identify the causal effect of physiological stress on risk 
preferences, we next look at which part of the effect is due to the random assignment to 
treatment. 
Therefore, we analyze the data using an instrumental variable (IV) interval regression
26
 
using stress treatment (variable Exposed to stressor) as an IV for the indicator of physiological 
stress (Under stress). The first stages are fitted using an OLS model and the second stage is fitted 
using an interval regression. Here we are assuming that stress treatment affects risk preferences 
only through cortisol increase, which is merely a simplification of the complex stress reaction. 
Apart from that, we are aware that IV is an asymptotic estimator, so applying it in small samples 
generally leads to biased estimates. However, this should not be a problem in our case as the 
instruments are very strong. 
The results of the IV interval regression are presented in   
                                                 
26 This was calculated using the cmp module in Stata (Roodman, 2012). 
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Table 3-3 for the whole sample and then again separately for men and women. The first 
stages show that the assignment to treatment is strongly correlated with the stress (cortisol) 
response and therefore confirm that the assignment to treatment is a strong instrument. The 
second-stage results reveal that for men, the strong correlation between physiological stress and 
risk preferences was not driven by selection. The estimated causal effect of stress on risk 
preferences in column 4 is still strong and significant (p=0.042), showing that physiological 
stress makes men more risk averse, when controlling for age and personality traits.
27
 For women, 
where there was no significant correlation between physiological stress and risk preferences, the 
causal effect of physiological stress on risk-preferences (column 5) again points towards 
increased risk-aversion, but this effect is weaker and insignificant, p=0.426). Still, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same across both genders, as the estimated coefficient 
Under stress*Female in column 3 is not significantly different from zero (p=0.663).  
The size of the ATT effect is illustrated in Panel B of Appendix Table 3-12. We use estimation 
results from regressions reported in columns 4 and 5 of   
                                                 
27 As was the case in the ITT estimation, the results are very similar if we control for neuroticism only. Estimation 
results are available upon request. 
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Table 3-3 and generate predicted certainty equivalents for an average (in terms of age and 
personality traits) man and an average woman in our sample. Men who are under exogenously 
induced stress have a predicted certainty equivalent of 1638 ECU (for a lottery paying 4,000 
ECU or 0 ECU with a 50% probability each), while those who are not have 2053 ECU. The 
prediction for women in the same respective groups yields values of 1356 ECU and 1585 ECU, 
respectively. Therefore, the effect size among men is almost twice the effect size among women 
and the estimated treatment effect for men is equivalent to 89% of the gender difference in the 
control group. 
To sum up, the estimated effect of physiological stress on risk preferences (ATT) 
confirms the results obtained by estimating the effect of random exposure to the stressor (ITT) 
on risk preferences, both showing that stress leads to increased risk aversion for men, when 
controlling for other personal characteristics. The effect on women goes in the same direction, 
but is weaker and insignificant when estimated for this subsample separately. 
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Table 3-3: Effect of stress on risk preferences: IV interval regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   IV Interval regression 
Sample All All All Males Females 
  
       Second stage: Certainty equivalent 
  
     Under stress -247.70 -261.95 -381.49* -414.51** -229.90 




    
 
(387.01) (340.11) 
  Under stress*Female 
 
-379.47** -324.03* 
    
 
(190.13) (178.36) 
  Age 
 
151.74 191.46 360.69** -712.87 
  
 
(121.92) (127.09) (159.32) (505.68) 
Age squared 
 
-2.79 -3.65 -6.79** 15.40 
  
 
(2.20) (2.28) (2.79) (11.04) 
Big Five Personality Traits: No No Yes Yes Yes 
  
       First stage: Under stress 
  
     Exposed to stressor 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.51*** 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Exposed to stressor*Female 
 
-0.10 -0.11 
      (0.13) (0.13)     
  
       First stage: Under stress*Female 
  
     Exposed to stressor 
 
0.00 0.01 
    
 
(0.00) (0.02) 
  Exposed to stressor*Female 
 
0.50*** 0.49*** 
    
 
(0.09) (0.09) 
              
chi2 76.57 474.87 560.77 283.27 61.92 
Observations 144 144 144 78 66 
Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50% 
probability each, calculated from the binary choices in the Risk preferences task.  Under stress = indicator variable 
equal to one if the difference in cortisol levels between the baseline (sample 1) and sample 2 or sample 3 is greater 
than 2.5 nmol/L. Exposed to stressor: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-
induction procedure. IV interval regression is calculated as a mixed-process regression using the cmp module in 
Stata (Roodman, 2012), where the first stages  are fitted using a linear probability model and the second stage is 
fitted using an interval regression. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 Physiological or Psychological Effects of Stress 
We cannot clearly distinguish whether the change in risk preferences we observe is caused by the 
physiological or the psychological reaction to the stressor. This is because the cortisol response 
is strongly correlated with the heart-rate response and also with the mood response, as shown 
above, and possibly with other aspects of stress that we do not measure. 
When we focus on cortisol response only, we find a strong correlation between cortisol 
response and risk-aversion among men. We can also look at the link between risk-preferences 
and other measures of stress. The correlation between the heart-rate response and risk-aversion is 
weaker, but still statistically significant at the 10% level for men, when controlling for other 
observable characteristics (see Table 3-8 in the Appendix). Similarly, if we focus just on the 
change in mood, we find a significant correlation between a mood change in the good-bad 
direction and the elicited certainty equivalent (see Table 3-9 in the Appendix). This shows that 
the response to the stressor is complex and may operate through physiological as well as 
psychological channels. 
The relative importance of the physiological and psychological aspect of stress can be 
subject-specific and can also differ by the type of stressor. In this paper we concentrate on 
psycho-social stressors as we believe they are the most widespread types of stressors in 
developed countries: it is social status, not physical survival that is being threatened in 
subjectively uncontrollable situations (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Stressors generally differ 
from each other by the effects they cause in the body: a physical stressor (stemming from e.g. 
blood loss and sleep deprivation) may eventually produce a different response than a 
psychological stressor (e.g. interpersonal conflict or death in the family; Baum & Grunberg, 
1997; Clow, 2001). Another way of inducing stress could be increasing the stakes involved. The 
"choking under pressure" literature (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Dohmen, 
2008) shows the negative effects of high stakes on performance, which may operate through 
stress. However, our paper is different from this literature as it concentrates on the effects of 
stress on preferences and not performance.  
Our results are related to the emerging literature on the effects of mood on risk 
preferences, since TSST has been found to generally increase negative emotions (Allen et al., 
2014). Our results that exposure to the stressor increases risk aversion are in line with the 
findings of Michl, Koellinger, & Picot (2011), who found that for no stakes, a sad mood induced 
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risk-aversion (but no effect was present for high stakes). Similarly, Nguyen & Noussair (2014) 
used face-reading software to show that positive emotions correlate with more risk-taking. 
Further, we can relate our findings to the existing literature on the effects of cortisol on 
decision making. On the sample of 17 professional traders, Coates & Herbert (2008) found an 
increase in their salivary cortisol levels when anticipating higher volatility and thus higher 
uncertainty in their trading market. The authors hypothesized that there is a direct positive 
association between stress, cortisol and risk-aversion, but could not prove it. Following up on 
that, Kandasamy et al. (2014) induced in a sample of students increases in cortisol comparable to 
the findings from traders by direct administration of hydrocortisone. They found no effect when 
they measured risk-preferences shortly after the first dose, but after long term administration (8 
days) they found increased risk-aversion in the treatment group. 
However, we argue that the effects of stress are more complex than effects of cortisol 
only, since the stress reaction includes a complicated interplay of physiological and 
psychological changes (allostasis).
28
 This can be demonstrated by the opposing results of the 
following two studies on the link between time-preferences, stress and cortisol: Cornelisse et al. 
(2013) directly administered hydrocortisone and found that subjects 15 minutes after application 
revealed increased preferences for a small, more immediate reward compared to the placebo 
group. Contrary to that, Haushofer et al. (2013) employed the TSST protocol to obtain no effect 
of stress on time-discounting that they measured at three distinct time-points after the 
manipulation. 
Therefore we acknowledge the results of Kandasamy et al. (2014), which moreover 
support our findings of increased risk-aversion, but claim that our study is not directly 
comparable as we study the effects of psychosocial stress and not of cortisol only. We believe 
that direct hydrocortisone administration may not provide enough insight into the complex 
effects of stress that people experience in everyday life and that we aim to measure in this paper. 
Our ATT effect estimation which assumed that the TSST-G treatment affected risk-preferences 
only through cortisol is necessarily a simplification as we show that other channels are possibly 
in operation. 
                                                 
28 To support this argument, consider that under stress, there are many other hormones released: First, the autonomic 
nervous system activates the adrenal medulla to release adrenaline and nor-adrenaline. Second, the hypothalamus-
pituitary-adrenal axis follows with the secretion of vasopressin and corticotropin-releasing hormones in the 
hypothalamus. These hormones in turn stimulate the secretion of adrenocorticotropic hormone in the pituitary, 
which then triggers the massive secretion of cortisol in the adrenal glands (Kemeny, 2003). We take cortisol as a 
proxy of the physiological response mainly due to the convenience of its measurement, but we do not claim that it is 
only cortisol which causes the effects on behavior. 
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To summarize, studying the effects of psychosocial stress is different from studying the 
effects of direct hydrocortisone administration or mood induction alone, since the stress reaction 
includes a complex interplay of physiological as well as psychological aspects. In this paper, we 
estimate the effect of a random exposure to the stressor which captures the effects of all of the 
above. The results show that exposure to the stressor (the ITT effect) increases risk aversion for 
men, when controlling for other characteristics, and it should be taken as the principle finding of 
this paper. 
3.5.2 Gender-specific Response to Stressor 
Our results show that stress leads to increased risk-aversion among men, when controlling for 
age and personality characteristics. Even though we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of 
stress is the same for both genders, the effect among women is weaker and insignificant when 
analyzing this subsample separately. There can be several reasons why the response among 
women is less strong. 
As reviewed in Kajantie & Phillips (2006) and confirmed by our data, female 
physiological reaction to stress is typically of a smaller magnitude than the reaction of men of the 
same age, including the secretion of cortisol. In our sample, only 50% of women after the stress 
procedure show a cortisol increase above 2.5 nmol/l. This can be partially attributed to a weaker 
cortisol response among women who take hormonal contraceptives (see Table 3-4 in the 
Appendix; Kudielka et al., 2009). Therefore, if the main channel causing the effect we observe is 
the increase in cortisol, women should be less affected than men, which is what we find in our 
results. 
We acknowledge the fact that our findings concerning women are limited due to the fact 
that we did not ask about the phase of the menstrual cycle, since the cortisol reaction may depend 
on it (Kajantie & Phillips, 2006). However, there is emerging evidence that risk-preferences are 
stable throughout the cycle (Schipper, 2012) so we believe that the overall results are not 
affected. 
Second, as women are typically found to be more risk-averse than men (Charness & 
Gneezy, 2012), which holds in our sample, it is possible that there is a floor effect in the sense 
that the downward reactivity of risk preferences is lower compared to men.  
Moreover, recent studies suggest behavioral response to stress may be gender-specific. 
The "fight-or-flight" behavioral response is considered to be a rather male reaction to acute 
stress, while the typical female reaction may be characterized as "tend-and-befriend" (Taylor et 
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al., 2000). In brief, the "tend-and-befriend" reaction means that females under stress show 
tendencies to maximize the chance of survival themselves and their offspring by seeking help in 
social networks or groups. An evolutionary perspective can help to explain both the facts that 
women are more risk-averse under normal conditions and that stress should increase risk-
aversion especially in men. In human history, the division of gender roles has typically been such 
that men had to expose themselves to riskier conditions than women, for example while hunting. 
In this sense, males generally needed to be more risk-seeking than women, but this tendency had 
to be regulated when facing an immediate threat. 
This leads us to a general note: most of the laboratory research on behavioral decisions 
under stress has been carried out only on men, mainly because their cortisol response is affected 
by fewer other factors, such as the use of hormonal contraceptives or the phase of the menstrual 
cycle (Kirschbaum, Kudielka, Gaab, Schommer, & Hellhammer, 1999). But since gender 
differences in preferences and decision-making can be large (Croson & Gneezy, 2009), studying 
the effects of stress on men only gives half of the story. More emphasis in the future should be 
put on understanding gender-specific responses to stressors. 
3.5.3 Link to Other Studies on Stress and Risk 
Preferences 
Several studies have already been published on the topic of stress and risk-preferences, but 
overall they do not provide conclusive results. Some studies point to increased risk-taking under 
stress (Starcke et al., 2008), others find men take more risks under stress, while women take 
fewer (Lighthall et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2009), or conclude on no change in risk 
preferences under stress (von Dawans et al., 2012). Pabst, Brand, & Wolf (2013) found a time 
trend in risk-taking behavior with respect to the time elapsed from the onset of the stressor. 
Porcelli & Delgado (2009) obtain increased risk-aversion for gain domains, but increased risk-
seeking for loss domains. Buckert, Schwieren, Kudielka, & Fiebach (2014) found that cortisol 
increase correlates with risk-taking in the gain domain, but not in loss domain.
29
 However, the 
problem with these studies is that they either do not show a causal relationship, are unable to 
effectively induce stress in the majority of subjects, or use tasks for elicitation of risk-preferences 
that include feedback-processing which itself can be affected by stress and thus confound the 
results (Petzold et al., 2010; Starcke et al., 2008).
30
 
                                                 
29 See Buckert et al. (2014) for a detailed comparison of psychological studies on this topic. 
30 The risk-preferences tasks that have been used in previous studies such as the Balloon Analogue Task (Lejuez et 
al., 2002), the Game of Dice Task (Starcke et al., 2008) and the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) all 
include feedback processing, which is a potential confound. Other standard measures like Holt & Laury (2002) and 
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The closest study to ours is by von Dawans et al. (2012), who included a risk-game as a 
control task in their framework for studying social preferences under successfully induced 
psychosocial stress in men. The risk game consisted of a repeated choice between high-risk and 
low-risk lotteries and was executed in the middle and right after the end of the TSST-G protocol. 
Contrary to our results, no difference was found between the treatment and control groups in 
terms of risk-preferences. This may have been caused by several factors: First, our task was 
administered relatively later after exposure to the stressor. As suggested in Pabst et al. (2013), 
hormones adrenaline and noradrenaline which are released immediately after the onset of the 
stressor and disappear from the body within several minutes after the cessation of the stressor 
may have opposing effects to cortisol, which is released later than adrenaline and its presence 
lasts longer (Starcke & Brand, 2012). Second, the task of von Dawans et al. (2012) combined 
positive and negative payoffs and it is possible that the effect of stress on risk preferences is 
heterogeneous over the gain and the loss domains (Buckert, Schwieren, et al., 2014; Pabst et al., 
2013b; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). As risk preferences in von Dawans et al. (2012) were 
measured just by the number of risky choices made (the task does not allow for the direct 
computation of a risk-aversion parameter), it is possible that the effects in the gain domain and 
loss domain canceled each other out. Third, the elicited risk preferences may depend on the 
framing of the risk-task. In our risk-elicitation protocol subjects made their choices between a 
risky lottery and a safe payment, whereas in von Dawans et al. (2012) subjects faced two 
different lotteries. Lastly, the recruited subjects in von Dawans et al. (2012) anticipated the stress 
procedure since it was literally stated in the advertisement, which may have led to self-selection 
for the experiment, possibly directly linked to risk attitudes. Although we cannot distinguish 
between these factors in our data, related literature suggest the timing explanation seems to be 
the most promising and thus should be explored by future studies. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by studying the effect of acute psychosocial stress on 
individual risk attitudes. We induce stress with an effective laboratory stressor Trier Social Stress 
Test for Groups (von Dawans et al., 2011). Subjects are divided randomly to experience either 
the treatment "stress procedure", or the control "no-stress" procedure. Individual risk-preferences 
are elicited using the task similar to Dohmen et al. (2010) which is an easily comprehensible, 
incentive compatible and externally validated measure of risk attitudes. By using three different 
measures (salivary cortisol concentration, heart rate and multi-dimensional mood questionnaire 
                                                                                                                                                             
G. M. Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak (1964) may be too complicated to understand, which may be amplified under 
stress and thus again confound the results. 
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scores) we show that subjects exposed to the stressor were indeed stressed, while the subjects in 
the control group were not, with the compliance rate around 78%. Our main result is that stress 
increases risk aversion when controlling for additional observable characteristics. The effect is 
mostly driven by men; the effect on women goes in the same direction, but is weaker and 
insignificant.  
 Overall, if risk-aversion indeed increases under stress, it has important consequences. 
First, the assumption of the stability of risk preferences should be relaxed if the economic models 
incorporating them are to provide more accurate predictions including for periods of stress.  
Second, our results are relevant for the previous literature finding that people who have 
experienced some sort of negative shock are more risk-averse. To name a few, people who went 
through the Great Depression or financial crisis in 2008 choose more conservative investment 
strategies (Guiso et al., 2013; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011). Other studies document that risk-
preferences are altered as a result of natural disasters (Cameron, Erkal, Gangadharan, & Zhang, 
2015; Cassar, Andrew, & von Kessler, 2011; Eckel, El-Gamal, & Wilson, 2009) or exposure to 
violence (Callen, Long, & Sprenger, 2014; Voors et al., 2012), although evidence regarding the 
direction of the change is mixed. It could be well expected that all of these circumstances are 
highly stressful and thus stress should be considered as a possible driving mechanism behind the 
observed change in preferences. In a similar vein, our results support the hypothesis of 
Haushofer & Fehr (2014) that extreme poverty may decrease the willingness to accept risk 
through increased stress, resulting in choices that make it hard to escape poverty. By showing 
that stress increases risk-aversion, we provide evidence of the latter part of the link.   
Furthermore, our findings help to explain observed phenomena from financial markets. 
During periods of market stress there tends to be a high demand for "safe-haven assets", such as 
safe government bonds (Upper, 2000) safe currencies (Kaul & Sapp, 2006), and gold (Baur & 
McDermott, 2010). We suggest stress can be an important operating channel even in financial 
markets, with the high probability of losing money acting as a stressor.  
Generally, it could be argued that professions involving high levels of stress attract 
people who are less sensitive to the effects of stress. Trading floors are a good example of such a 
stressful environment that also includes strict selection and self-selection (Oberlechner & 
Nimgade, 2005). Still, as Coates & Herbert (2008) show, active traders still respond to market 
volatility with increased stress, as measured by cortisol levels. Cohn et al. (2015) further 
document that the risk-preferences of professional traders change when primed with market 
boom or bust, with higher risk-aversion under the bust scenario. We therefore argue that the 
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relationship uncovered in this paper is relevant even for people who self-select into high-stress 
environments.   
As a policy implication we suggest in accordance with Haushofer & Fehr (2014) that 
targeting the psychological consequences of poverty is a promising new strategy for the 
eradication of poverty in developing countries and as such should be tested in the field. 
Similarly, the economic consequences of stress should be considered when designing programs 
targeting people who experience negative income shocks such as unemployment or bankruptcy.  
Last but not least, for professions that encounter stress regularly, higher risk-aversion 
may not be desirable, for example with managers who should pursue risky innovations, police 
during strikes, or doctors trying new medical treatments. This highlights the necessity of 
guidelines for times of stress and panic. Furthermore, training and simulations should be widely 
used when possible, since the physiological reaction to a specific stressor diminishes with regular 
exposure (Kudielka et al., 2009).  
We should note that our study concerns only immediate reactions to an acute stressor. 
Even though our results are consistent with much field evidence from situations involving 
chronic stress, the behavioral effects of acute and chronic stress can in principle be different (as 
the physiological changes are; Goldstein & McEwen, 2002). More research is thus needed to 
understand how the interplay between acute and chronic stress influences economic outcomes.  
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3.7 Appendix A - Instructions: Risk task 
Figure 3-5: Screen shot of the experimental instructions. 
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3.8 Appendix B - Additional results 
Figure 3-6: Induced Stress Reaction by gender: Mean levels of free salivary cortisol. 
 
Notes: Stress Treatment: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction 
procedure, Control: subjects were exposed to the TSST-G control procedure. Sample 1 was collected before the 
TSST-G stress-induction procedure, sample 2 after the TSST-G procedure and sample 3 before the risk task.  Error 
bars indicate mean +/- SEM. 
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Figure 3-7: Induced Stress Reaction: Development of mean heart rate during the 
experiment 
 
Notes: Points indicate averages over minute intervals. Stress Treatment: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were 
exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction procedure, Control: subjects were exposed to the TSST-G control 
procedure. Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. 
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Figure 3-8: Induced Stress Reaction:  Mood 
 
Notes: Mood - scores from the  Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire before and after the TSST-G stress-induction 
procedure. Stress Treatment: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction 
procedure, Control: subjects were exposed to the TSST-G control procedure. Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. 
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Figure 3-9: Induced Stress Reaction by gender:  Mood - 
 
Notes: Induced Stress Reaction by gender:  Mood - scores from the Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire before 
and after the TSST-G stress-induction procedure. Stress Treatment: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were 
exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction procedure, Control: subjects were exposed to the TSST-G control 
procedure. Error bars indicate mean +/- SEM. 
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Table 3-4: Induced cortisol response among women, by the intake of oral contraceptives 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
OLS 
Dependent variable Maximum cortisol response 
Sample Females 
        
Exposed to stressor 8.94*** 8.97*** 11.75*** 
 
(1.79) (1.77) (2.65) 





Exposed to stressor*Taking oral contraceptives 
  
-7.36** 
   
(2.95) 
Constant -1.35*** -0.05 -1.48*** 
 
(0.32) (0.73) (0.42) 
    Observations 66 66 66 
R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.35 
Notes: The dependent variable is the maximum cortisol response of a subject, calculated as the maximum difference 
between the baseline sample (sample 1) and samples taken after the stress-inducing procedure (sample 2 or 3). 
Taking oral contraceptives = dummy variable equal to one if the women states that she takes oral (hormonal) 
contraceptives. Exposed to stressor: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-
induction procedure. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-5: The effects of random exposure to stressor on risk preferences (Males) - ordered probit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Ordered probit Marginal fixed effects after ordered probit 
Dependent variable Certainty equivalent Probability of the certainty equivalent being equal to: 
    750 1050 1350 1650 1950 2250 
Sample Males Males Males Males Males Males Males 
        
 
      
Exposed to stressor -0.510** 0.010 0.019 0.099** 0.051* -0.072* -0.048* 
  (0.244) (0.012) (0.015) (0.050) (0.029) (0.039) (0.028) 
Age 0.792*** -0.016 -0.030 -0.156** -0.080** 0.116* 0.075* 
  (0.296) (0.017) (0.022) (0.069) (0.038) (0.064) (0.038) 
Age squared -0.015*** 0.000 0.001 0.003** 0.001** -0.002* -0.001** 
  (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Big Five Personality Traits:   
          
      Openness to experience -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Conscientiousness -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Extroversion -0.017 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Agreeableness -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Neuroticism 0.054*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.011*** -0.005** 0.008** 0.005** 
  (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
chi2 20.79 20.79 20.79 20.79 20.79 20.79 20.79 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50% probability each, calculated from the binary choices 
in the risk preferences task. Column 1 presents the overall results of ordered probit estimation, while columns 2-7 present marginal fixed effects obtained from 
the estimation, i.e. present estimated probabilities of certainty equivalent being equal to the specified amounts. The results are presented only for certainty 
equivalent equal to 750-2,250, which is true for 87% of the subjects in our sample. Exposed to stressor: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to 
the TSST-G stress-induction procedure. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-6: The effects of random exposure to stressor on risk preferences (Females) - ordered probit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Ordered probit Marginal fixed effects after ordered probit 
Dependent variable 
Certainty equivalent 
Probability of the certainty equivalent being equal to: 
  750 1050 1350 1650 1950 2250 
Sample Females Females Females Females Females Females Females 
                
Exposed to stressor -0.211 0.019 0.036 0.011 -0.010 -0.029 -0.020 
  (0.254) (0.024) (0.043) (0.015) (0.013) (0.034) (0.027) 
Age -1.264 0.112 0.217 0.066 -0.062 -0.172 -0.120 
  (0.889) (0.095) (0.169) (0.059) (0.062) (0.139) (0.090) 
Age squared 0.027 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 
  (0.019) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Big Five Personality Traits:   
          
      Openness to experience -0.014 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.035) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Conscientiousness -0.013 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.022) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Extroversion 0.010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.020) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Agreeableness -0.080*** 0.007* 0.014** 0.004 -0.004 -0.011** -0.008** 
  (0.028) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Neuroticism 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
chi2 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50% probability each, calculated from the binary 
choices in the risk preferences task. Column 1 presents the overall results of ordered probit estimation, while columns 2-7 present marginal fixed effects obtained 
from the estimation, i.e. present estimated probabilities of certainty equivalent being equal to the specified amounts. The results are presented only for certainty 
equivalent equal to 750-2,250, which is true for 87% of the subjects in our sample. Exposed to stressor: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to 
the TSST-G stress-induction procedure. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3-7: The effects of random exposure to stressor (TSST-G stress procedure) on risk 
preferences - including subjects with multiple switches in the risk task 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Ordered Probit Interval regression 
Dependent variable Number or risky choices Certainty equivalent 
              
Exposed to stressor -0.22 -0.25 -0.39* -127.16 -146.40 -222.71* 









































Big Five Personality Traits: 
  
  
     
  
  




















































  1,744.21*** -0.45 -424.78 
        (77.38) (1,627.63) (2,156.77) 
chi2 1.688 12.17 21.14 1.546 11.22 21.08 
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Notes:The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the number of risky choices in the Risk preferences task. The 
dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the certainty equivalent calculated from the binary choices in the Risk 
preferences task. Subjects with multiple switches between lottery and safe amount are not dropped as inconsistent, 
as throughout the paper, but considered indifferent for the entire switching interval. Exposed to stressor: indicator 
variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction procedure. Columns 1-3 are estimated 
using ordered probit, columns 4-6 are estimated using interval regressions to account for the fact that the dependent 
variable was elicited in intervals. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-8: Risk preferences by induced stress (measured by heart-rate response) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Interval regression Ordered Probit 
Dependent variable Certainty equivalent Certainty equivalent 
              
Heart-rate response -1.81 -8.40 -8.92* -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
































































































     
  
(8.45) 
   Constant (80.51) (1,771.09) (2,327.30) 
   
  
1,720.98**
* -44.31 -135.19       
chi2 0.33 10.22 22.03 0.02 6.76 17.07 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent calculated from the binary choices in the Risk preferences 
task. Heart-rate response = individual difference between the baseline heart rate (average heart rate before the TSST-
G stress induction procedure) and the average heart rate during the TSST-G stress or control procedure. The 
reported coefficients in columns 1-3 are marginal effects, estimated using interval regressions to correct for the fact 
that the dependent variable is elicited in intervals. Reported coefficients in columns 4-6 are estimated using ordered 
probit estimation. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Table 3-9: Risk preferences by induced stress (measured by change in mood - MDMQ) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Interval regression Ordered Probit 
Dependent variable Certainty equivalent Certainty equivalent 
Change in Mood State 
  
  
   Good-Bad 24.62* 28.84 29.42 0.04* 0.05 0.05* 
  (14.65) (22.23) (20.30) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Awake-Tired 6.59 -2.49 -2.17 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
  (10.58) (9.95) (10.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Calm-Nervous -11.71 -14.56 -14.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 





























































Big Five Personality Traits: 
  
  


















































Constant (58.36) (1,744.17) (2,218.09) 
     1,746.63*** -474.99 -1,451.97       
chi2 6.02 15.69 36.53 7.26 12.4 31.01 
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent calculated from the binary choices in the Risk preferences 
task. Change in Mood = change between the Multidimensional-mood-state-questionnaire (MDMQ) scores before 
and after the TSST-G stress induction procedure. All three MDMQ dimensions are considered: good-bad, awake-
tired and calm-nervous. The reported coefficients in columns 1-3 are marginal effects, estimated using interval 
regressions to correct for the fact that the dependent variable is elicited in intervals. The reported coefficients in 
columns 4-6 are estimated using ordered probit estimation. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level 
in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-10: Sample characteristics - randomization check 
Panel A: Whole Sample 
 
 
Stress Treatment Control Diff p-value 
Female 0.45 0.45 0.975 
age mean 22.11 22.89 0.260 
age sd. 1.78 3.29 
 Big Five Personality Traits: 
  Openness to experience 36.67 37.13 0.273 
Conscientiousness 33.16 34.07 0.386 
Extraversion 34.29 32.20 0.087 
Agreeableness 36.47 36.23 0.596 
Neuroticism 31.73 29.51 0.094 
N 75 71 
 




Treatment Control Diff p-value 
age mean 22.24 23.33 0.428 
age sd. 1.79 3.94 
 Openness to experience 37.05 36.90 0.714 
Conscientiousness 33.12 33.69 0.710 
Extraversion 32.32 31.79 0.686 
Agreeableness 34.10 34.54 0.927 
Neuroticism 33.83 30.46 0.057 
N 41 39 
 




Treatment Control Diff p-value 
age mean 21.94 22.34 0.401 
age sd. 1.79 2.21 
 Openness to experience 36.21 37.41 0.208 
Conscientiousness 33.21 34.53 0.418 
Extraversion 36.68 32.69 0.040 
Agreeableness 39.32 38.28 0.392 
Neuroticism 29.21 28.34 0.508 
N 34 32 
 Notes: Means. Differences are tested using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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Table 3-11: Effects of random exposure to stressor on risk preferences: Sensitivity analysis with respect to additional control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Interval regression 
Dependent variable Certainty equivalent 
Sample Males Males Males Males Females Females Females Females 
Exposed to stressor -140.69 -136.93 -242.74* -220.49* -127.13 -120.83 -118.16 -122.01 





  -472.53 -700.54 




  (477.81) (483.08) 




  10.11 15.08 




  (10.28) (10.51) 
 Big Five Personality Traits: 
    
  


























































26.15*** 23.87**   
 
1.48 
   
  
(9.73) (10.07)   
 
(10.54) 
 Constant 1,887.16*** -3,193.52 -3,890.76 1,159.09*** 1,592.44*** 7,057.38 11,766.59** 1,635.15*** 
  (96.07) (2,146.64) (2,657.66) (336.59) (119.32) (5,512.51) (5,911.69) (369.63) 
chi2 1.237 7.065 15.80 6.762 0.640 1.915 10.53 0.646 
Observations 80 80 80 80 66 66 66 66 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the certainty equivalent for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECU with 50% probability each, calculated from the binary choices in the risk 
preferences task. Exposed to stressor: indicator variable equal to 1 if subjects were exposed to the TSST-G stress-induction procedure. The reported coefficients in columns 
1-8 are marginal effects, estimated using interval regressions to correct for the fact that the dependent variable is elicited in intervals. Regressions in column 4 and 8 control 
for the personality trait which is not balanced across the treatment and control group for the given gender, see Table 3-10. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual 
level in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Table 3-12: Predicted certainty equivalents for a lottery paying 4,000 ECU or 0 ECu with 50% 
probability each, by treatment and gender. 
 
      









   
Exposed to stressor 1695,93 79,11 
 (1540.87; 
1850.98) 
Control 1938,67 90,26 (1761.77; 2115.57) 
Treatment effect 242,74 
  Females 
   
Exposed to stressor 1469,00 89,72 
 (1293.15; 
1644.84) 
Control 1587,15 114,94 (1361.87; 1812.43) 
Treatment effect 118,16     
Gender difference in the 
control group  351,52 
  Treatment effect MEN as % 
of the gender diff. 69% 
  Treatment effect WOMEN 
as % of the gender diff. 34%     









   
Under stress 1638,10 105,52 
 (1431.294; 
1844.91) 
Not under stress 2052,61 128,52 (1800.72; 2304.50) 
Treatment effect 414,51 
  Females 
   Under stress 1355,52 215,60 (932.94; 1778.10) 
Not under stress 1585,42 1355,52 (1362.97; 1807.88) 
Treatment effect 229,90     
Gender difference in the 
control group  467,19 
  Treatment effect MEN as % 
of the gender diff. 89% 
  Treatment effect WOMEN 
as % of the gender diff. 49%     
Notes: Panel A presents predicted values from the regressions reported in columns 4 (Males) 
and 5 (Females) of Table 3-1, fixing age and personality profiles on the gender-specific 
sample averages. Panel B presents predicted values from the regressions reported in columns 4 
(Males) and 5 (Females) of Table 3-3, fixing age and personality profiles on the gender-
specific sample averages.  
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4 Chapter Four: Herding under Acute 
Stress 
Abstract 
Individual decisions are often made simultaneously under social influence and acute 
stress, yet despite its importance, it has been unknown whether and how stress 
influences the weight which people give others' decisions.  To answer this question 
we ran a laboratory experiment where we exposed 140 healthy subjects to either an 
acute stressor or a control procedure, immediately after which we tested their 
behavior in a simple Bayesian updating task. Using three measures (salivary cortisol, 
heart-rate and multidimensional mood questionnaire) we show that subjects in the 
treatment group were under considerable levels of stress. Even though we predicted 
that stress would increase the weight they put on information coming from the 
observation of others, we observe no effect of stress on the updating behavior, neither 
after private nor after public signals, nor on the precision of the updating behavior. 
This result holds across different specifications and after the addition of various 
personal controls, including Big-Five personality traits and the psychological 
measure of conformity. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The effects of social interaction on individual decision making are ubiquitous – be it 
the "lemming-like" behavior of investors in financial markets, teenagers' experiments 
with illegal drugs, conforming to peers at school, coordinating fertility practices,  or 
purchase behavior according to fads, fashion and top-10 lists (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1998; Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Zafar, 2011). Moreover, 
choices in social context are often made under stress. Traders, lawyers, politicians, 
and other professionals regularly have to make decisions under severe pressure and 
stress while they may be influenced by the behavior of others. Like other behavioral 
biases, stress reaction cannot be controlled by will while it may seriously affect 
behavior (Starcke & Brand, 2012). Consider a bursting bubble in a stock or financial 
market, when traders are in a situation where they need to immediately decide about 
enormous amounts of money on the basis of information from either objective 
sources like technical analysis, or from what all the other traders are doing. If they 
tend to be influenced more by others' behavior in the times of stress, it may have 
huge consequences in many areas since their trading behavior influences world 
market prices, which are crucial for the stability and growth of economies. However, 
how stress affects herding behavior is still largely unknown. Even though at least one 
paper has aimed in a similar direction (Buckert, Oechssler, et al., 2014), this paper is 
one of the first studies that clearly identifies the causal effects of stress on individual 
herding behavior. To do so, we run a laboratory experiment where we expose 
subjects to an acute psychosocial stressor and examine changes in their reaction to 
signals coming from private and public sources that we have full control over.  
The influence of others on one's decisions resulting in a convergent social 
behavior has been labeled differently in different disciplines, be it social learning, 
herding, group-mind, crowd- or mob-behavior, social imitation or mimicry (Raafat, 
Chater, & Frith, 2009). In economics this phenomenon has mostly been studied in the 
context of herding in financial markets
31
 (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Park & Sabourian, 
2011). So far, two main theoretical explanations of herding behavior have been 
proposed: (i) bounded-rationality and (ii) behavioral explanation (Baddeley et al., 
2010, 2007; Baddeley, 2010; Cao & Hirshleifer, 2000). The bounded-rationality 
explanation posits that herding is just a bounded rational use of information a 
decision-maker obtains from the observation of the decisions of others, while 
                                                 
31 The existence of herding in financial and capital markets in various countries has been addressed in 
many papers (Avery & Zemsky, 1998; Hirshleifer & Hong Teoh, 2003; Sharma & Bikhchandani, 
2000). It has been documented and modeled also in other areas such as asset markets (Hott, 2009; Choi 
& Skiba, 2015) and online-product choice (Huang & Chen, 2006; Chen, Ma, Li, & Wang, 2010). 
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behavioral biases are neglected, with information cascades
32
 being a prominent 
example (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). The behavioral 
explanation suggests that herding is caused by various social and psychological 
factors such as personality type, peer-pressure and a natural preference for 
conformity (Asch, 1951; Sanfey, 2007) while it disregards the informational reasons. 
Baddeley et al. (2010) identified that a younger female with high scores in the 
personality traits
33
 venturesomeness and impulsivity has a higher probability  of 
following others. The identification and separation of these channels has already been 
made (Baddeley et al., 2010, 2007) and in our design we have full control over both 
aforementioned explanations: the information provided to participants as well as their 
personality characteristics and observe how these influence individual herding 
behavior under stress. 
Documented physiological and neurological responses to stress suggest that 
both the abovementioned drivers of herding behavior can be affected under stress. 
Apart from the protective and adaptive effects of acute stress
34
 on the body, one of 
the main physiological effects is the down-regulation of prefrontal cortex activity 
(PFC, McEwen, 2007; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). The prefrontal cortex is generally 
known to be the brain centre of executive and cognitive control and will power (E. K. 
Miller & Cohen, 2001; E. K. Miller, 2000) and can be considered the part of the brain 
which executes the bounded-rational driver of herding.
35
 With the expected 
deterioration of higher cognitive abilities we therefore hypothesized that the precision 
of the information updating process would decline under stress. Moreover, we 
hypothesized that stress would cause individuals to rely more on public information 
than the control group since the precision of one's updating process deteriorates. 
                                                 
32 This theory has been extensively experimentally tested, (see e.g. Anderson & Holt, 1997; and a 
review in Weizsäcker, 2010) with the general result that people behave more or less according to the 
theory, they only rely too much on their private signals compared to the optimal reaction. The caveat 
of this informational approach is that it neglects individual behavioral differences and focuses solely 
on information processing. 
33 Personal characteristics are usually tracked by standardized psychometric protocols. The most 
commonly used protocols are those that measure the "Big Five" dimensions such as NEO-PI-R (Costa 
and McCrae 1992) or the freely available IPIP-NEO (Goldberg 2010). The latter is used in our design. 
34 The change of behavior under stress is mostly documented in the areas of memory impairment and 
attitudes to risk, see e.g. Lundberg (1993) or the review in (Starcke & Brand, 2012). The neural and 
physiological responses are very complex and it is not in the scope of this text to cover them, see e.g. 
Everly & Lating (2013).  
35 Particularly the medial part of prefrontal cortex is associated with social behavior as has been shown 
in a number of autism studies (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2008) and studies using fMRI (Burke, 
Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernández, 2009; 
Klucharev, Munneke, Smidts, & Fernández, 2011) 
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To illustrate that reasoning in an example, consider traders in the stock market 
that suddenly experience a shock that induces a stress reaction. The first effect of 
stress (on the bounded-rational channel) may be that due to stress reaction their 
cognitive abilities deteriorate and in turn their response to new information is not 
optimal – they may simply have higher variance in their judgment.  Second, the 
behavioral channel may be affected in the way that under stress, traders become more 
sensitive to the observed behavior of others and put more weight on what others do 
relative to what they should do; both directly due to physiological processes in brain 
caused by the stress reaction, and also indirectly through knowing about their 
deterioration of cognitive abilities. In the latter case, traders may be aware that others 
under stress may also suffer from the same cognitive decline and thus not change 
their behavior: this would however require traders to be sophisticated and know how 
they react to stress relative to others, or that others react similarly as they do. This 
may be the case in the real markets, but not in our experiment, where the subjects are 
anonymous to each other and have no prior knowledge of the reaction to stress of 
others. 
The subjects in the treatment group were indeed physiologically and 
psychologically stressed: The success of our manipulation is demonstrated using two 
physiological (salivary cortisol levels and heart-rate) and one psychological 
(Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire scores, Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & 
Eid, 1997) measures.
36
 While not different between the groups during the baseline 
measurement, cortisol levels slightly decreased in the control group during the TSST-
Procedure while they almost doubled in the treatment group. Heart-rate was on 
average 10 beats per minute higher for the treatment group than for the control group; 
and the treatment group felt significantly worse and more nervous than the control 
group. Overall, these measures show that we induced stress in a comparable manner 
as in the related literature (Allen et al., 2014; von Dawans et al., 2011). 
                                                 
36 Regarding the physiological reaction to stress, we advise the reader to read Everly & Lating (2013) 
and only note that many complicated processes occur there that can be measurable in some of their 
outcomes, with salivary cortisol being one of them, but not the only one. To make sure that an 
individual is really under stress, we combine three measures of stress since some measures may 
increase, but actually due to another cause (e.g. heart-rate may increase due to stress, but also due to 
increased focus or physical exercise). We focus on heart rate and salivary cortisol since both have been 
established as reliable biomarkers of acute stress (Hellhammer, Wüst, & Kudielka, 2009; Kudielka, 
Buske-Kirschbaum, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2004). We complement the two physiological 
measures with one subjective measure which is administered with the English version of 
Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire (MDM questionnaire, Steyer et al., 1997).  
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Our main result stemming from an experiment with 140 subjects
37
 is that 
stress has no effect on herding behavior, i.e. the weight in which the public and 
private signals are given is the same for both groups and the precision of the resulting 
estimates as well. This result is robust to the addition of various control variables, 
including psychological measures of conformity and personality traits. Moreover, our 
data replicates common findings in the literature concerning the updating behavior as 
we observe behavioral regularities, such as the clustering of probability estimates on 
multiples of five, conservativeness and an updating behavior generally consistent 
with the Bayes theorem since it aligns with reinforcing a win-stay heuristic (Charness 
& Levin, 2005; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Salop, 1987). Contrary to Baddeley et 
al. (2007), we find personality trait Extroversion insignificant; it is rather Neuroticism 
and Agreeableness which negatively influence the stated probability of an event. 
To induce stress
38
 we employ the Trier Social Stress Test for Groups 
(Kirschbaum et al., 1993; von Dawans et al., 2011) which has been  considered  the 
most efficient laboratory stressor in terms of the magnitude of cortisol increase it 
stimulates (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Moreover, the type of stress it induces in 
subjects, acute psycho-social stress, is the most common type of stress experienced 
by the general public in the workplace (Ganster & Rosen, 2013; Goh et al., 2015). 
The peak of the cortisol response occurs 20 to 40 minutes after the start of the 
stressor and the whole cortisol response lasts 40 to 60 minutes after the stressor 
ceases (Allen et al., 2014; Kemeny, 2003). We use this fact in our design when the 
behavioral task is administered right after the end of the stress procedure when the 
stress response should be the highest. 
As a measure of the difference in using public and private information signals 
we use a simple probabilistic task based on Anderson & Holt, (1997) and Grether 
(1980) which allows for maximum control over the information provided so that we 
can exactly calculate the optimal stated probability according to the Bayes formula. 
In the task there are two possible states of the world, one of them being randomly 
                                                 
37 This number of subjects is comparable or larger than what has typically been used in the literature 
and assures sufficient statistical power, see section Discussion of Results  (Goette et al., 2015; 
Haushofer et al., 2013; von Dawans et al., 2012) 
38 We define stress as the physiological, psychological and behavioral reaction arising from perceived 
environmental demands threatening an important goal of an organism (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; 
Goldstein & McEwen, 2002). Generally speaking, an individual's reaction to stress is highly complex 
and differs with respect to the type and duration of stressor (Joëls & Baram, 2009) as well as with 
respect to various individual characteristics (Kudielka et al., 2009; McEwen, 2007) and has been 
subjected to a number of models (for a summary of physiological models, see Everly & Laitin, 2013; 
for an example of applications to health-related issues see Ganster & Rosen, 2013).  
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selected by a computer, but kept secret to subjects until the end of each round. The 
goal of the subjects is to state their beliefs about which state of the world is more 
probable to have occurred and re-adjust their beliefs after each signal they get, 
according to which they are then paid. The signals are first "private" then "public"; 
private signals are not revealed to others, while the public signal is information about 
the decisions of some other participants. We then compare the stated beliefs for the 
treatment and control groups while controlling for the optimal prediction of the Bayes 
formula, personality profile and the performance in the task before stress using a 
difference-in-differences approach. 
As to studies focusing on social learning under stress, conformity under stress 
has already been studied but stress was induced rather indirectly: the authors 
experimentally tested conformity within the ranks of male U.S. Navy students under 
the threat of tear-gas infusion into the room (Driskell & Salas, 1991). Both the high 
and low status subjects behaved in a similar manner and became more willing to 
accept the opinion of their partner who was not exposed to the stress condition. 
Unfortunately, the authors do not provide any evidence that the subjects were under 
stress and their measure of conformity is rather crude. In another study subjects were 
exposed to time pressure and a Stroop test while their cortisol and heart rate were 
measured (Buckert, Oechssler, et al., 2014). However, such manipulations are 
normally used as distractions in order to deplete the cognitive resources and thus 
produce intuitive responses rather than stress. Their task of interest was a repeated 
Cournot oligopoly game where the players could request the price and quantity set by 
other players as opposed to using a profit calculator. The authors argue that because 
the cortisol levels slightly increased, their manipulation was successful. They further 
claim that both groups show signs of more imitation relative to control since (i) the 
participants in the two "stress" groups requested more information on the prices and 
quantities set by others and (ii) based on this information there were more 
occurrences of setting very similar prices to the observed ones in the Time-pressure 
group than in the other two groups. Lastly they show that subjects with higher 
physiological responses are more likely to imitate the choices of others, though with 
no difference across the treatments. As is usual for time-pressure studies (see e.g. the 
discussion on the intuition and cooperation in Tinghög et al., 2013) the authors in 
their construction of the design disregard all choices that were not made in time in the 
time-pressure treatment. Moreover, from the observed choices of prices and 
quantities, it is hard to infer what the original decision of the subjects was and 
whether they changed it due to new information or there was just more similar 
behavior among subjects in general, as the convergence toward equilibrium tends to 
be faster under time pressure (Kocher & Sutter, 2006). In contrast to this, we use an 
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efficient stressor and prove subjects were under considerable stress; and in our task 
we are able to  perfectly measure the difference in the weight of private vs. public 
signals. 
In the literature other outcomes than herding that change under stress have 
also been investigated. Relatively lot of attention has been devoted to attitudes to risk, 
but no consensus has been achieved as is shown in the introduction of this 
dissertation and this topic has been addressed in Chapter 3 (for a summary of 
previous work refer to Allen et al., 2014; Buckert, Schwieren, et al., 2014). Apart 
from that, social stress has been found to induce more pro-social preferences in men 
(Vinkers et al., 2013; von Dawans et al., 2012) but no effect was observed on time 
preferences (Haushofer et al., 2013). Stress also decreases strategizing abilities 
(Leder et al., 2013, 2015) and depending on trait anxiety, it can increase or decrease 
individual confidence (Goette, Bendahan, Thoresen, Hollis, & Sandi, 2015). 
Our findings generally imply that observed phenomena in the real world, such 
as bank runs and herding behavior in financial markets are more likely the result of 
changes in different dimensions of human behavior than the increased propensity to 
engage in herding behavior, like change in expectations or change in risk-preferences, 
and their investigation is suggested for future research.  
4.2 Methodology 
Task 
In order to have an environment with the maximum possible control over the 
information that the participants receive, we use the following task about Bayesian 
updating based on Anderson and Holt (1997) and Grether (1980). In the task, subjects 
state their beliefs about which of the two possible states of the world occurred based 
on the information they receive, and are monetarily rewarded for a correct prediction. 
Particularly, the states of the world are framed as two possible unmarked bags 
containing marbles of two colors, blue and yellow. The “Yellow” bag contains more 
yellow marbles than blue marbles whereas in the “Blue” bag the ratio of the colors is 
symmetrically reversed. At the beginning of each round, one of the bags is randomly 
chosen by the computer with a 50% chance; the same bag for all participants in a 
given round. First of all, subjects are informed about the composition of the colors in 
both bags. With each new signal, subjects are asked to state or revise their beliefs 
using a slider that indicates a percentage probability of both outcomes (visualized in 
Figure 4-1). A private signal is the information about the color of a ball drawn with 
replacement from the chosen bag. After receiving private signals, participants are 
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presented with the public signal in one of the forms described further. At the end of 
each round, subjects receive feedback on which bag was really chosen by the 
computer and how much ECU this round would pay if selected for payoff. Subjects 
are paid for each decision according to the quadratic scoring rule
39
 for stating their 
beliefs in a given round, and all decisions in a given round added up to a total amount 
of ECU which could be earned from this round. The amount of ECU paid for the 
outcomes updated on the screen simultaneously with the movement of the slider. 
Prior to starting the task, subjects were informed that out of the 13 rounds, three 
would be randomly chosen for payoff at the end of the experiment. The ratio of the 
colors as well as the number of private and public signals varied across the rounds so 
that the subjects (i) would not get bored and (ii) would not develop a simple rule of 
thumb.  
Figure 4-1: The layout of the decision-making environment. 
 
Note: Representation of the decision-making environment of the subjects. The left part of the figure 
shows the decision after the arrival of the first private signal (top-left corner). The right part of the 
figure shows the representation of public information in the upper right corner; particularly in the 
strategic form ("What if" scenario). 
In each round after all private signals had been revealed, public information was 
presented, i.e. information about the decisions of some other randomly chosen 
players. Subjects were randomly divided into small groups and presented with the 
beliefs of all other players in the group, where the size of the groups changed across 
rounds. The public information was conveyed by showing a small bag in the upper 
                                                 
39 The quadratic scoring rule was explained and demonstrated by a table with selected probabilities and 
respective payments in the instructions. Moreover, as they moved the slider, the respective amount 
paid in case one of the bags was chosen changed in real time. As this approach is incentive compatible 
only if the subjects are risk-neutral, we discuss the effects of risk preferences in the Appendix. 
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right corner of a blue or yellow color (see right part of Figure 4-1). The color of the 
small bags represented the color the other subjects indicated to be more probable; 
each subject was presented as one small bag. If the odds were 50/50, the color of the 
small bag was chosen randomly. Participants either saw the color of the bag(s) and 
made a direct response, which was framed as "Scenario: Reality", or were presented 
with all possible combinations of the actions of others and were asked to state the 
probability conditionally for each situation. This strategy method was framed as  the 
"Scenario: What if" and participants were paid only according to the situation that 
really occurred. Here we also manipulated the order of the public signal so that in 
five rounds the opposite signal to the current beliefs of participant was presented first, 
whereas a random order of the signals was implemented in another three rounds (see 
Table 4-1). For the sake of simplicity we assume that all subjects are rational and 
have symmetric expectations about other subjects which allows us to calculate the 
optimal response based on the information contained in the signals using the Bayes 
formula.  
















Type of public 
signal 
Strategy method: 
Order of public 
signals 
trial 1 10 3 2 4 Direct response 
 









round 2 10 7 2 5 Direct response 
 




round 4 10 5 4 4 Direct response 
 









round 7 13 4 2 4 Direct response 
 





round 9 7 2 4 2 Direct response 
 




round 11 5 4 3 3 Direct response 
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Treatment manipulation: Stress-inducing procedure 
Subjects were exposed to a slightly modified
40
 Trier Social Stress Test for Groups 
(TSST-G, von Dawans et al., 2011), which is a standardized psychological protocol 
for inducing psychosocial stress. The approval of the Institutional Review Board of 
the Laboratory of Experimental Economics was obtained prior to the experiment. The 
subjects were randomly divided into two groups of seven and after reading the 
instructions silently for 3 minutes, they went into two separate rooms adjacent to the 
lab that were set-up for the procedures. The treatment (stress-inducing) TSST-G 
condition consisted of two parts: a public speaking and a mental arithmetic part, 
which were framed as a mock job-interview and a serial subtraction of 17 from 4578, 
respectively.
41
 The instructions obtained in the laboratory mentioned only the first 
part, i.e. the mock job interview. Further the instructions informed the participants 
that there would be two people closely observing their behavior during their speech 
and that there would be a video-camera recording the whole procedure. After entering 
the room, the participants stood in places separated by cardboard dividers so that they 
would not interact with each other, and had on headphones connected to MP3 players 
with ambient traffic noise on so that they would not hear others and could not infer 
relative performance. Two additional experimenters, who were referred to as a 
"committee" during the procedure, sat at a desk in front of the participants, wore 
white laboratory coats and had a video camera by their side. The committee had been 
trained not to give any feedback on the subjects’ performance either verbally or 
physically. With a neutral expression on their faces, they called subjects in a random 
order, who then had two minutes to present their job-interview. When all subjects had 
finished their job-interviews, the committee asked the subjects again one-by-one to 
complete the arithmetic task for one minute. The committee made notes during the 
whole procedure. In the control condition, subjects jointly read a scientific text aloud 
in a low voice, also while standing in a group and facing two panel members, but the 
panel members wore normal clothes, they did not take any notes, had no video 
cameras by their side and were allowed to behave naturally. The arithmetic part of the 
control procedure consisted of counting in steps of a certain magnitude, e.g. 5, 10, 15, 
20 etc. A careful debriefing was carried out with the treatment group before they 
received the payments at the end of the experiment.  
                                                 
40 The original script of Von Dawans et al. was slightly modified so that no deception was present. The 
changes to the original protocol concerned mainly the information given to participants regarding the 
behavioral training of the panel members and regarding the fact that the video recordings would later 
be analyzed.   
41 The numbers differed across subjects so that they could not learn from others in case they could hear 
them. 
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4.3 Procedures 
By using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) 140 healthy subjects were recruited: 67 females 
(mean age 22.1, SD = 2 years) and 73 males (mean age 22.6, SD = 2.7 years).
42
 They 
were mostly students of economics, management or related disciplines (72%). We 
followed best practice in order to avoid any factors confounding cortisol 
measurement (Nicolson, 2007).
43
 A majority of the subjects had no acquaintances 
among the other participants thus the possible social support which may have 
disrupted the effect of the stress procedure was minimized (Heinrichs, Baumgartner, 
Kirschbaum, & Ehlert, 2003). They did not receive any information about the 
purpose of the experiment beforehand in order to minimize selection bias. All 
participants signed an informed consent form which referred to the treatment 
procedure as a "challenge" task. They were specifically informed about the chance to 
leave the experiment at any point in time while still obtaining a show-up fee in such a 
case. The details of the treatment protocol were only revealed before its start. None 
decided to leave before the regular end of the experiment.  
All experimental payoffs were denominated in experimental currency units 
(ECUs) and were converted to Czech crowns at the end of the experiment.
44
 The 
experiment lasted on average a little less than 2.5 hours and was conducted in 
English. All subjects were listed in the database for experiments conducted in English 
and indicated no difficulties understanding the instructions or speaking. One 
experimental session included 14 subjects (seven in the treatment and seven in the 
control group), two experimenters and four members of the committee for the TSST-
G procedure. All sessions started at 16:30 in order to make the cortisol measurement 
comparable across sessions due to the natural diurnal cortisol cycle. The average 
payoff was 490 CZK, i.e. 19.6 EUR. 
 
                                                 
42 The sessions were run in two batches with identical procedures, experimenters and committee 
members, therefore we pool the results. The first five sessions were run in April 2012 and the next five 
sessions in November 2014. 
43 Subjects received an invitation email already with instructions to abstain from fatty food, nicotine 
and heavy exercise at least 2 hours prior to the experiment. Immediately before the experiment 
subjects were screened for any circumstances that could potentially disrupt the cortisol response: 
health status, drug intake, caffeine, heavy meals, and contraceptive intake. We then performed 
robustness checks and none of the problematic factors mattered for the main results (available upon 
request). With one exception the participants were all normal body-weight and twelve women 
indicated taking oral contraceptives. Out of these twelve women, five were assigned to the treatment 
group; two of these did not show the expected cortisol increase. 
44 The conversion rate was 32 ECU=1 CZK. 
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Figure 4-2: The timeline of the experiment. 
 
The timeline of the experiment is summarized in Figure 4-2: After arriving at the 
laboratory the subjects were randomly assigned to computers, signed the consent 
form and the general instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. Participants 
got the heart-rate monitors, and were asked to fill-in a questionnaire assessing their 
personality profile. The instructions for the task were then read aloud and subjects 
had to answer three questions confirming their understanding. Then they had two trial 
and five real rounds of the task. At this point they were asked to give the first sample 
of saliva and fill in the first part of the MDM questionnaire. Instructions to the TSST-
G treatment and control procedure were distributed next. Participants read them 
silently and had few minutes to either prepare for the job interview or for reading a 
scientific text which was subsequently performed in adjacent separate rooms, i.e. the 
full TSST-G treatment and control procedures were carried out. After this, the 
participants returned to the lab, were seated back at computers, the second sample of 
saliva was collected and they filled in the second part of the MDM questionnaire. 
Then the participants were to solve eight more rounds of the previous task. When 
finished, the participants gave their third saliva sample and completed a simple paid-
for task aimed at measuring their risk-preferences (protocol based on Dohmen et al., 
2010). At the end of the experiment, three rounds of the task were randomly drawn 
for payment,
45
 subjects completed a short questionnaire on their personal 
                                                 
45 The reason for using random incentive scheme is purely to minimize hedging of the subjects 
resulting from a wealth effect. We acknowledge that due to recent evidence on the differences in 
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characteristics and proceeded to payment. All subjects were paid in private, and when 
the control group had left the laboratory, a thorough debriefing of the TSST-G 
procedure was carried out with the treatment group. Participants were asked to sign a 
statement of confidentiality with respect to the experimental procedure.   
Questionnaires - Personality measurement 
Participants filled in the 50-item set of IPIP Big-Five Factor Markers (Goldberg et al., 
2006) which is a measure of the five major factors of personality, openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. In 
addition to that, we included a conformity inventory IPIP measuring construct similar 
to the revised Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1983) to control for the natural 
behavioral propensity to conform to the opinion of others.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
outcomes depending on different payment scheme, the elicited parameters may not be generally valid 
beyond this setting (Cox et al., 2015). However, the main purpose of this experiment is the dif-in-dif 
comparison of treatment and control groups only and not establishing the parameters as in the case of 
e.g. the experiments on trust, so the bias potentially induced by the payment method should be similar 
in both groups and cancel out. 
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4.4 Results 
Randomization check 
We perform a randomization check of observable characteristics that may influence 
the stated probability after public signals. Table 4-6 in the Appendix shows that the 
treatment and control groups were balanced with respect to gender, age and 
education. Further factors that may influence the results are the "Big-5" personality 
traits and conformity. The treatment group was higher in extraversion and 
neuroticism, while not statistically different in the other dimensions, which is the 
reason to add these controls to the regression analysis.  
Manipulation check 
Using three measures we show that stress induction was successful.
46
 First we present 
in panel (a) of Figure 4-3 the cortisol reaction that we consider the most reliable 
indicator of induced stress. The level of concentration of salivary cortisol is not 
different for the treatment and control groups before the TSST-G procedure (two-
sample Wilcoxon ranksum test: z = -0.21, p = 0.83, d = -0.1),
47
 but the sample taken 
after the procedure as well as the sample taken after the end of the task show a 
significant increase for the treatment group (z = -6.22, p < 0.001, d = -1.1 and z = -
6.05, p < 0.001, d = -1.04, respectively).
48
  
Second, panel (b) of Figure 4-3 summarizes the heart-rate before, during and 
after the stress procedure.
49
 Heart-rate does not differ between the treatment and 
control groups before (z = -0.77, p = 0.44, d = -0.14) and after (z = -0.99, p = 0.32, d 
= -0.12) the TSST-G procedure, however, there is a significant difference during the 
                                                 
46 See Table 4-7 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics of all the variables 
47 Reported effect sizes are Cohen's d, corrected for uneven groups. 
48 The procedure of saliva sampling as well as the administration of the heart-rate monitor chest belts 
may have been by some perceived as stressful, which would confound our baseline measurement and 
thus the control group would be also under the influence of stress. To capture this we for the sake of 
simplicity focus only on salivary cortisol and compare the levels in our control group (7.7 +/- 3.9 
nmol/l) with the values observed in similar studies (cca 12 nmol/l, von Dawans, Fischbacher, 
Kirschbaum, Fehr, & Heinrichs, 2012, 7 nmol/l, von Dawans et al., 2011 and 9 nmol/l, Kirschbaum et 
al., 1993) as well as in the general population for this type of physical activity and part of the day 
(refer to Appendix Figure 4-8). We conclude that the levels in our group were smaller or equal than 
those in the relevant literature and they do not substantially differ from the reference values for general 
population. This suggests that the subjects were not stressed already at the baseline. Moreover, the 
types of measurement used of both variables are considered to be the least obtrusive from all the 
available methods (Baum et al., 1982).  
49 We note that there were technical problems with measurement in several subjects. With some we 
were completely unable to find the signal while with others the signal kept turning on and off during 
the procedure. Therefore we do not have a full number of observations for this measure. 
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procedure (z = -1.84, p = 0.066, d = -0.41) which supports the claim that subjects in 
the treatment group were physiologically under stress.  
 
Figure 4-3: Induced Stress Reaction: Cortisol and Heart-Rate. 
 
Notes: The darker color indicates the treatment group. Panel (a): Mean levels of free salivary cortisol; 
Sample 1 was collected before the treatment or control TSST-G procedure, sample 2 after the TSST-G 
procedure and sample 3 before the risk task. Panel (b): Mean levels of heart-rate calculated from 
individual averages over the time periods before, during and after the TSST-G procedure. Error bars 
indicate standard errors of the mean. 
The subjective effect of stress was captured by the change in the subjects' mood 
reported in the MDM questionnaire. Panel (a) of Figure 4-4 shows that before the 
treatment procedure, the treatment and control groups' scores were not different in 
any of the three dimensions ("good-bad": z = -1.05; p = 0.29; d = -0.11; "awake-
tired": z = -0.83; p = 0.83; d = -0.00; "calm-nervous": z = -1.2; p = 0.23; d = -1.12). 
Panel (b) of Figure 4-4  reveals that after the TSST-G procedure, the treatment group 
reported scores significantly different than the control group: the treatment group 
scored closer to the "bad" (z = 3.60; p < 0.001; d = 0.68) and the "nervous" (z = 3.44; 
p < 0.001; d = 0.61) dimensions. The last "awake-tired" dimension was not different 
across the two groups (z=-1.59; p = 0.11; d = -0.1). This finding shows that subjects 
in the treatment group were also under psychological stress. 
The changes of the two physiological measures (cortisol and heart-rate) are 
significantly correlated, (ρ= 0.385; p < 0.001). The cortisol response is further 
correlated with the MDM score in the good-bad dimension (ρ = -0.259; p < 0.01) and 
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in the calm-nervous dimension (ρ = -0.23; p < 0.01). The association of heart-rate and 
psychological measures is significant in the calm-nervous dimension (ρ = -0.21; p = 
0.02) and the awake-tired dimension (ρ = 0.15; p = 0.09). The three mood dimensions 
are further highly correlated, as could be expected. 
Figure 4-4: Induced Stress Reaction: Mood. 
Notes: Mood before (panel a) and after (panel b) the TSST-G procedure - scores from the 
Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire. The darker color indicates the treatment group. Error 
bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
Herding behavior 
The variable of interest in our analysis, Decision, is the stated probability entered by 
subjects after each new signal using a slider that they moved from the initial point 
50/50. We take the value of the distance from the 50/50 point to the new position of 
the slider in the direction of the new signal (see Figure 4-5). Apart from the actual 
decision of the subjects we also calculate the optimal decision (“True” value), given 
all information a subject had received prior to the current decision in a given round. 
While calculating True we assume that a decision maker is rational in that she uses 
the Bayes formula
50
 for updating his/her priors and disregards any irrelevant 
information in the sense that there is no interdependence between the answers in the 
"What-if" scenario. Further, we assume that for calculating the public information, 
subjects also took into account the possibility that when the other subjects stated 
exactly the same probabilities of both bags having been selected, the resulting signal 
was chosen at random.  
                                                 
50 We are aware of the on-going debate as to whether people really use the Bayes formula in their 
decision making and thus we note that it is a rather simplified assumption made for the sake of 
convenience. 
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We can then easily define a new variable Difference as the difference between 
Decision and True, which then shows whether subjects over- or under-valued the 
signal compared to the True value, if the Decision was higher or lower than the True, 
respectively (Figure 4-5). True captures the informational content of the signals, 
therefore also the composition of the bag, number of signals received and the share of 
signals for the chosen color. 
Figure 4-5: Variables of interest. 
 
Note: Example of a situation when the chosen bag was blue, subject received one private "yellow" 
signal and moved the slider to the position where the stated probability of the event “selected bag is 
Blue” was 35%. 
Figure 4-6 illustrates that subjects suffered from typical behavioral biases identified 
in the literature, such as stating more likely probabilities rounded to 5 or 10 and being 
reluctant to state the probability closer to the extreme, when contrasted with the True 
probability. 
Figure 4-6: Histograms of variables True and Decision. 
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Figure 4-7: Histogram of variable Difference, both types of signals pooled. 
 
When examining the density of the variable Difference (Figure 4-7), it reveals 
that the subjects reacted rather rationally to the signals they had received since the 
distribution is centered on the mean of zero is not skewed to either side. When 
divided into the two types of signals, qualitatively no difference emerges. 
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Regression analysis 
Since we observe the decisions of both groups before and after the treatment 
manipulation, we analyze the level differences using the difference-in-differences 
approach. First we look at the differences in updating only after the private signals, 
which should answer the question whether the subjects' cognitive abilities were 
affected by stress. To do this, we regress the variable Decision on Treatment dummy, 
the dummy indicating decisions made after the treatment procedure Round after 
stress and their interaction Treatment *Round after stress while controlling for True 
probability. In Table 4-2 we show that the interaction term Treatment *Round after 
stress is not significantly different from zero (p=0.259) in the baseline specification 
in column 1, and stays insignificant when we add fixed effects for sessions to account 
for the unobserved heterogeneity across sessions (column 2). The significance of the 
control variable True shows that subjects used the information contained in the 
signals, and for each percentage point in the probability predicted by the Bayes 
formula they moved the slider by 0.65 points in the correct direction. The 
insignificance of the term Treatment reveals that there are no systematic differences 
between the two groups in decision making and the term Round after stress shows no 
difference between the decisions made before the treatment procedure and after the 
procedure. Further we test a gender-specific effect of the stressor by adding a set of 
dummy variables Female, Treatment*Female and Treatment*Female*Round after 
stress (column 3). None of these is significant in the regression, even when tested 
jointly, and the coefficient of Treatment *Round after stress also does not change so 
we conclude that there is no difference when it comes to gender. In Column 4 we 
show results when we add into the regression a set of observable characteristics that 
include Age, the "Big-Five" personality traits and Conformity. Coefficient of Age is 
significant and positive, which means that older subjects stated probability after a 
private signal larger than the younger ones. Personality traits are insignificant with 
the exception of Neuroticism which is significant on a 1% level and negative, which 
means that subjects that are more neurotic and emotionally unstable stated a 
probability smaller than other subjects. Further we test whether there was a difference 
in the stated probability after the first private signal in a round (column 5) when we 
restrict the observations to only the first signals each subject received in a given 
round to conclude that there was no difference. To summarize, even after the addition 
of all these control variables, the coefficient of Treatment *Round after stress does 
not change its size or significance.  
Next we move to the analysis of the reaction to the public signal. Table 4-3 
reveals that subjects again used the provided signals as the coefficient of True is 
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significant in their updating process, but with a smaller weight since the magnitude is 
about a half of the coefficient in the regressions for the private signal. However, there 
is no difference between the treatment and the control groups either before or after 
the treatment procedure (coefficient of Treatment *Round after stress), with and 
without additional controls (Columns 2 to 4). Column 4 of Table 4-3 presents that 
gender-specific treatment effects are not present, and only the coefficient of variable 
Female is significant and negative. Column 6 of Table 4-3 shows the result of 
analysis when the observations were restricted only to the decision after the first 
public signal which serves as a check when we avoid any influence of the order that 
may change the value of the rest of the signals. Again, there is no statistical 
difference between the treatment and control groups and the personality 
characteristics behave similarly as in the analysis of private signals: Age is significant 
and positive and the personality trait Neuroticism is significant and negative. 
Additionally to that, the personality trait Agreeableness is also significant and 
negative, which means that more agreeable people tended to state the probability as 
smaller than the rest.  
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Table 4-2: Regression analysis, observations restricted only to decisions after private signals.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Private signals 
VARIABLES Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision 
            
True 0.653*** 0.655*** 0.656*** 0.656*** 0.626*** 
 
(0.0317) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0311) (0.0396) 
Treatment 0.926 0.928 -0.331 1.512 1.768 
 
(1.185) (1.094) (1.522) (1.061) (1.086) 
Round after stress 0.0341 0.0302 0.0292 0.0293 -0.951 
 
(0.661) (0.662) (0.662) (0.661) (0.747) 
Treatment *Round after stress -0.919 -0.922 -1.026 -0.923 -1.160 
 
(0.811) (0.812) (0.926) (0.814) (0.903) 
Female 
  
-1.450 -0.335 1.295 
   
(1.564) (1.158) (1.297) 
Age 
   
0.576*** 0.485** 
    
(0.212) (0.214) 
Openness to Experience 
   
-0.136 -0.131 
    
(0.127) (0.131) 
Conscientiousness 
   
0.0919 0.151* 
    
(0.0854) (0.0898) 
Extraversion 
   
0.124 0.0969 
    
(0.0845) (0.0893) 
Agreeableness 
   
-0.150 -0.153 
    
(0.100) (0.109) 
Neuroticism 
   
-0.207*** -0.207*** 
    
(0.0696) (0.0701) 
Conformity 
   
-0.0557 -0.0308 






   
(2.214) 





   
(1.015) 
  
Constant 9.270*** 8.496*** 9.177*** 6.549 4.533 
 
(1.044) (2.933) (3.144) (9.264) (8.802) 
      
Observations 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 1,820 
R-squared 0.493 0.509 0.511 0.524 0.400 
Session FE NO YES YES YES YES 
F 118.4 44.31 38.69 35.84 23.12 
Notes: Dependent variable Decision. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4-3: Regression analysis, observations restricted to decisions after public signals.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Public signals 
VARIABLES Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision 
              
True 0.330*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.332*** 0.287*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0162) 
Treatment 0.832 0.832 0.832 -0.677 1.468 0.873 
 
(1.464) (1.414) (1.414) (1.906) (1.398) (1.565) 
Round after stress 0.981 0.974 0.974 0.977 0.976 0.524 
 
(0.907) (0.908) (0.908) (0.908) (0.909) (1.059) 
Treatment *Round after stress -0.0206 -0.0203 -0.0203 0.164 -0.0203 0.616 
 
(1.092) (1.093) (1.093) (1.250) (1.094) (1.309) 
Age 
    
0.606** 0.554** 
     
(0.253) (0.269) 
Female 
   
-3.426* -1.645 -1.313 
    
(1.846) (1.408) (1.530) 
Openness to Experience 
    
-0.105 -0.107 
     
(0.156) (0.166) 
Conscientiousness 
    
-0.00219 0.0365 
     
(0.0992) (0.111) 
Extraversion 
    
0.144 0.159 
     
(0.102) (0.108) 
Agreeableness 
    
-0.276** -0.283** 
     
(0.134) (0.142) 
Neuroticism 
    
-0.226*** -0.223** 
     
(0.0860) (0.0943) 
Conformity 
    
-0.0605 -0.124 
     
(0.129) (0.137) 
Treatment*Female 
   
3.207 
  
    
(2.868) 
  Treatment*Female*Round after 
stress 
   
-0.380 
  
    
(1.212) 
  Constant 17.20*** 15.61*** 15.61*** 17.16*** 20.49* 23.84** 
 
(1.104) (3.401) (3.401) (3.545) (10.90) (11.41) 
       Observations 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 1,820 
R-squared 0.236 0.251 0.251 0.256 0.273 0.213 
Session FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
F 137.3 48.98 48.98 43.00 39.13 20.97 
 Notes: Dependent variable Decision. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4-4 presents results of the regression analysis when the observations include 
stated probability after both of the types of signals simultaneously which on the one 
hand increases the statistical power but on the other makes the interpretation rather 
difficult. Here we again confirm null treatment effect: first, the coefficient of the 
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variable Treatment *Round after stress is not different from zero, which informs us 
that the general weight of either type of a signal was similar for both treatment and 
the control groups after the TSST-G procedure. Further we test whether the weight of 
public signals after the TSST-G procedure was different in the treatment and the 
control groups. To do this, we conduct the F-test of the linear combination of 
coefficients Public*Treatment*Round after stress + Treatment *Round after stress + 
Treatment which is not significantly different from zero in any of the tested models 
(F = 0.31, p = 0.58; F = 0.33, p = 0,57; F = 1.21, p = 0.27 for the columns 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively). The significant and positive coefficient of the indicator variable Public 
which equals one if the signal was from public sources informs us that the signal 
from public sources followed by 1.9 percentage points more than the private signal, 
which is actually inconsistent with the literature (Weizsäcker, 2010) where the typical 
finding is that people tend to rely more on private than on public information.  
Precision of estimates 
Another potential effect of stress was hypothesized to appear in the precision of 
individual estimates relative to the value predicted by the Bayes theorem. Using again 
the difference-in-differences approach we regress the variable Difference in an 
absolute value on the set of dummies while including the same set of controls as in 
the preceding sections. In Table 4-5 we show that for both types of the signal, we 
cannot reject that the precision of estimates is the same for both treatment and control 
groups since the coefficient of Treatment *Round after stress is not different from 
zero, even in the specifications including additional controls. The coefficient Round 
after stress is significant and negative for the decisions made after the public signal 
which shows that both treatment and control groups improved the precision of the 
estimates after the TSST-G procedure. The addition of personality controls (column 
3) does not increase the coefficient of determination vastly, and the only significant 
predictor is the Openness to experience which is significant and negative. In column 
6 Female is significant and positive which informs us that women tended to have 
smaller precision of estimates than men; and the negative coefficient Conformity 
means that subjects high in Conformity tended to have more precise estimates when 
they reacted to the signal from public sources.  
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Table 4-4: Regression analysis, all observations.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
All observations 
VARIABLES Decision Decision Decision 
        
True 0.455*** 0.458*** 0.457*** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0179) 
Treatment 0.815 0.816 1.448 
 
(1.247) (1.174) (1.149) 
Round after stress 0.362 0.358 0.358 
 
(0.648) (0.649) (0.648) 
Treatment *Round after stress -0.662 -0.664 -0.664 
 
(0.795) (0.795) (0.795) 
Public 1.956*** 1.951*** 1.952*** 
 
(0.476) (0.476) (0.475) 
Public *Round after stress 0.283 0.282 0.282 
 
(0.628) (0.629) (0.629) 
Public *Round after stress*Treatment 0.665 0.667 0.666 
 




   
(1.230) 
Openness to experience 
  
-0.117 






























   
(0.224) 
Constant 12.79*** 11.55*** 12.95 
 
(0.958) (3.009) (9.720) 
    Observations 9,240 9,240 9,240 
R-squared 0.341 0.356 0.373 
Session FE NO YES YES 
F 107.1 53.27 45.08 
Notes: Dependent variable Decision. Variable Public *Round after stress*Treatment indicates the 
decision of the subjects in treatment group after public signals. Robust standard errors clustered on the 
individual level in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4-5: Precision of estimates – regression analysis.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Difference in absolute value 
Signal type: Private Public 
True -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.107*** -0.350*** -0.349*** -0.347*** 
 
(0.0315) (0.0304) (0.0300) (0.0218) (0.0216) (0.0214) 
Treatment 0.430 0.432 0.171 -0.278 -0.278 -0.265 
 
(0.908) (0.879) (0.894) (0.747) (0.731) (0.721) 
Round after stress 0.117 0.112 0.103 -1.742*** -1.743*** -1.748*** 
 
(0.521) (0.521) (0.521) (0.504) (0.504) (0.504) 
Treatment *Round after 
stress 0.0448 0.0405 0.0339 0.698 0.698 0.698 
 









































































Constant 10.87*** 14.13*** 13.62* 24.65*** 27.38*** 36.55*** 
 
(1.038) (2.406) (7.942) (0.818) (1.744) (6.352) 
       
Observations 5,320 5,320 5,320 3,920 3,920 3,920 
R-squared 0.041 0.063 0.080 0.290 0.295 0.298 
Session FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
F 4.174 2.101 2.308 78.24 28.61 21.40 
Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in absolute values. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robustness checks 
To investigate whether there were any different treatment effects with respect to the 
reactivity to stress, we also perform the difference-in-differences comparison of the 
stressed and non-stressed subjects, where we define that a subject is stressed as 1 if 
cortisol increased by at least 2.5 nmol/l between the baseline (sample 1) and the 
higher of the two samples taken after the treatment procedure (R. Miller et al., 
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2013).
51
 We re-run all the regression models in Tables 4-2, 3, and 5 to conclude that 
our results are robust against this change of specification, which would reveal 
correlations between being stressed and a change in behavior (results in the 
Appendix, Table 4-8 and Table 4-9). We further check for a correlation between the 
cortisol increase and the variables of interest (Decision and Difference in absolute 
value) for the treatment group only to see that the interaction of the cortisol increase 
with Round after stress  is not significant. We then substitute the increase in cortisol 
with the change in heart-rate during the procedure, change in mood in the good-bad 




Variance analysis  
To further check for possible differences in treatment effects we also conduct the 
analysis of the equality of variance between the treatment and control groups. The 
variance ratio test revealed no differences between the two groups in the variable 
Decision; either before (p = 0.94) or after (p = 0.77) the TSST-G procedure. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution functions also showed no 
differences (corrected p-values: before, p = 0.18; after, p = 0.3).  
When carried out for the variable Difference in absolute value, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed no difference before (corrected p-value=0.36), 
but after (p=0.013) the TSST-G procedure. When examined with the robust test for 
the equality of variances,
53
 the differences disappear (Pr > F = 0.37 and above). 
4.5 Discussion of results 
The absence of finding the hypothesized relationships may be due to several reasons. 
Either our design was unable to correctly identify the proposed relationship, or the 
relationship is smaller than could be found with the statistical power in this design, or 
the relationship is indeed not there, or two opposing stress effects may have cancelled 
each other out. We cannot rule out the last possibility since for example the change in 
preferences and change in expectations may have yielded opposing effects: subjects 
may have been more likely to take into account the information from the public 
                                                 
51 See Table 4-10 in the Appendix for the resulting distribution of the compliers in the treatment and 
control groups. 
52 Results available upon request. 
53 As implemented in Stata 12 in the command robvar, which uses the Levene's robust statistic. Since 
the distribution is highly skewed (p<0.001), a standard test of the equality of variances would deliver 
biased results. 
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signal due to a change in their preferences, but at the same time, since they knew 
others were also under stress and may have reacted to the new situations even more, 
they may have discounted their beliefs about the real value of public signal.  
Next, to check the statistical power of our design we used G*POWER 3.1 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) which revealed that with the sample size of 
140 subjects and the power of 0.8 our design was able to detect already a relatively 
small effect size of 0.27 SD. Therefore it seems unlikely that the null result is due to 
insufficient power of the experimental design. 
If stress causes changes in risk preferences, we should observe a systematic 
difference between the treatment and control groups after the treatment manipulation; 
i.e. the coefficient of the variable Treatment*Round after stress should be 
significantly different from zero.
54
 However, we do not observe any such effect, even 
though the results from Chapter 3 suggest otherwise. Either the effect is too small to 
be identified in the regressions, or it is already captured in some of the control 
variables, or it is offset by a combination of other factors, such as differences in 
beliefs about others and about the riskiness of the signals. Another potential reason 
may be hidden in the opposing effects of an increased reward responsiveness under 
stress (Porcelli, Lewis, & Delgado, 2012) and increased risk aversion that cancel each 
other out.  
Another possible explanation for our null result is that despite our design 
feature of constantly changing the setting of the parameters of the problem, the 
updating process in the task could have already been mastered in the rounds before 
the stress procedure. In such a case, the decision making process would be operated 
by the fast automatic, Type-I processes rather than by the slower Type-II, rational 
processes. Indeed, in a recent study Bayesian updating has been found to be governed 
rather by automatic processes than by rational thought (Achtziger & Alós-Ferrer, 
2014). If a stress reaction affects the higher-cognitive functions operated in the PFC 
as is generally suggested in the literature (McEwen, 2007; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009), 
but does not impair habitual automatic behavior, our design was not able to capture 
the effects of stress on herding behavior initiated in the higher-order cognitive 
structures.   
Even though we have no reason to suspect this, the null results may 
potentially be a due to an experimenter demand of showing the public information 
                                                 
54 Because the treatment intervention could operate through cortisol and not only through the change in 
preferences, including it in the regression specification would pose a danger of endogeneity in the 
estimation. See a detailed discussion in the Appendix and the respective robustness check. 
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that interacts with treatment, i.e. that the induced demand effect on the weight of 
public information is of an opposite sign between the two groups and the effect of 
stress is therefore cancelled. An experimenter demand effect may be characterized as 
the change in behavior of subjects due to cues about what constitutes proper behavior 
of the experiment that is closely related to the beliefs about the experimental 
objectives (Zizzo, 2010). Since it stems from the beliefs of the subjects that may be 
rooted in the non-quantifiable uncertainty of the situation, it may be determined by 
the preferences for ambiguity aversion. Then, even though in the related literature 
ambiguity aversion was found not to change under stress, we cannot rule this out 
since we do not measure it (Buckert, Schwieren, et al., 2014).  
In the related literature investigating the effects of stress on economic 
decision making, no effects were found on inter-temporal discounting (Haushofer et 
al., 2013), non-social risk-taking (von Dawans et al., 2012), or ambiguity aversion 
(Buckert, Schwieren, et al., 2014). Moreover, basically the effects of stress can vary 
by the stressor used (Haushofer & Jang, 2015) and the timing when the behavioral 
task was administered (Pabst et al., 2013a), which may also explain why we observe 
different results than Buckert, Oechssler, et al., (2014). 
4.6 Conclusion 
As a first study of this type in the literature, using an efficient stressor and a standard 
Bayesian updating task we provide evidence that there is no effect of acute stress on 
herding behavior. Using salivary cortisol levels, heart rate and changes in mood we 
demonstrate that unlike participants in the control group, participants in the treatment 
group were under considerable levels of stress. The use of information in the process 
of Bayesian updating as well as the precision of the subjective estimates does not 
differ for the participants who underwent a stress-inducing treatment procedure and 
the control participants, and this is true for both private and public signals they 
received. We further conduct several robustness checks to prove that this null result is 
not due to different reactions of stressed and non-stressed subjects in terms of cortisol 
increase, different gender reactions to stress, differences in personality, and due to 
subject-specific and session-specific effects. Our results thus suggest that despite the 
existing literature on the effects of acute stress on decision making (Starcke & Brand, 
2012), individual-level herding behavior is not affected by mild psycho-social stress, 
though we cannot conclude the existence of effects of a more severe or a different 
type of stress (Haushofer & Jang, 2015).  
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If we assume that the daily routine behavior of decision makers, e.g. 
professional traders, is more a habitual than a higher cognitive activity, the results of 
our study imply that the observed real-world phenomena when people engage in 
herding behavior in stressful situations, such as bank-runs, herding in financial 
markets during increased volatility and panic in general, as well as the results of the 
related studies (Buckert, Oechssler, et al., 2014; Driskell & Salas, 1991), occur due to 
changes in a different dimension of human behavior than herding and information 
updating, with the likely candidates being risk preferences, beliefs about the behavior 
of others and the general adaptation to a new environment. The real underlying 
reasons of these phenomena should thus be investigated in the future research.  
  111 111 
4.7 Appendix A 
Table 4-6: Randomization check  
  Total Control Treatment p-value 
Gender Male (%) 52.1 52.9 51.4 0.87 
Female (%) 47.9 47.1 48.6  
Count 140 70 70  
Age Mean 22.3 22.6 22.1 0.51 
SD 2.4 2.8 1.8  
Valid N 140 70 70   
Education Elementary (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0  
High school (%) 55.7 60.0 51.4 0.35 
University (%) 44.3 40.0 48.6  
Count 140 70 70  
Openness to experience Mean 36.8 37.1 36.5 0.26 
SD 5.3 5.6 5.0  
Valid N 140 70 70   
Conscientiousness Mean 33.6 34.0 33.2 0.38 
SD 6.2 6.6 5.9  
Valid N 140 70 70  
Extraversion Mean 33.2 32.1 34.3 0.08 
SD 7.7 7.9 7.4  
Valid N 140 70 70   
Agreeableness Mean 36.2 35.9 36.5 0.33 
SD 5.8 5.1 6.4  
Valid N 140 70 70   
Neuroticism Mean 30.2 29.0 31.4 0.08 
SD 7.8 8.1 7.4  
Valid N 140 70 70   
Conformity Mean 28.6 28.7 28.5 0.92 
SD 5.7 6.0 5.4  
Valid N 140.0 70.0 70.0  
Note: p-value from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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Table 4-7: Manipulation check 
    
Control Treatment 
p-value Male Female 
  z-value 
    Cohen's 
D 
Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Cortisol 1 - Before 
treatment 
Mean 7.76 8.21 0.83 6.81 8.45 8.80 7.95 
SD 3.89 4.39 -0.21 4.11 4.59 3.41 4.22 
Valid N 69 70 -0.1 36 36 33 34 
Cortisol 2 - After 
treatment 
Mean 6.97 16.79 0.00 7.02 19.27 6.92 14.17 
SD 4.16 11.96 -6.22 5.20 12.10 2.62 11.39 
Valid N 70 70 -1.1 37 36 33 34 
Cortisol 3 - Before 
risk-task 
Mean 7.07 16.13 0.00 7.07 17.99 7.06 14.09 
SD 4.24 11.64 -6.05 5.13 11.00 3.06 12.15 
Valid N 69 69 -1.04 36 36 33 33 
Heart rate - Before 
treatment 
Mean 80.68 82.43 0.44 79.91 78.89 81.63 86.09 
SD 12.77 12.53 -0.77 12.89 12.40 12.79 11.76 
Valid N 65 65 -0.14 36 33 29 32 
Heart rate - During 
treatment 
Mean 92.92 100.99 0.07 90.88 96.31 95.74 105.97 
SD 20.41 19.25 -1.84 14.95 16.08 26.25 21.27 
Valid N 62 64 -0.41 36 33 26 31 
Heart rate - after 
treatment 
Mean 79.87 81.70 0.32 76.22 79.06 84.43 84.41 
SD 16.01 12.88 -0.99 12.98 12.64 18.37 12.74 
Valid N 63 65 -0.12 35 33 28 32 
MDM Good-Bad 1 - 
before Treatment 
Mean 22.89 23.36 0.29 23.41 23.19 22.30 23.53 
SD 4.40 4.45 -1.05 4.75 4.70 3.97 4.23 
Valid N 70 70 -0.11 37 36 33 34 
MDM Good-Bad 2 - 
after Treatment 
Mean 21.31 17.79 0.00 22.00 18.31 20.55 17.24 
SD 4.57 5.71 3.60 4.76 5.83 4.30 5.62 
Valid N 70 70 0.68 37 36 33 34 
MDM Awake-Tired 
1 - before Treatment 
Mean 20.41 20.44 0.83 21.14 21.60 19.61 19.24 
SD 5.53 4.83 -0.22 5.53 5.10 5.50 4.29 
Valid N 70 69 -0.001 37 35 33 34 
MDM Awake-Tired 
2 - after Treatment 
Mean 18.83 19.91 0.11 19.54 20.81 18.00 18.97 
SD 5.15 5.36 -1.59 4.29 5.04 5.95 5.61 
Valid N 69 70 -0.1 37 36 32 34 
MDM Calm-
Nervous 1 - before 
Treatment 
Mean 21.79 22.91 0.23 21.97 22.47 21.58 23.39 
SD 4.77 4.49 -1.20 4.91 4.10 4.68 4.89 
Valid N 70 69 -0.24 37 36 33 33 
MDM Calm-
Nervous 2 - after 
Treatment 
Mean 20.10 17.22 0.00 20.87 18.00 19.24 16.36 
SD 4.70 4.85 3.44 4.76 4.52 4.54 5.13 
Valid N 70 69 0.61 37 36 33 33 
Note: p-value from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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Table 4-8: Regression analysis: correlations.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent var.: Decision 
Observations: Private signals Public signals 
True 0.652*** 0.654*** 0.655*** 0.654*** 0.329*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.332*** 
 
(0.0318) (0.0313) (0.0317) (0.0306) (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0134) 
Stressed 0.455 0.516 0.0290 1.478 1.873 2.127 2.127 2.457* 
 
(1.162) (1.082) (1.272) (1.142) (1.459) (1.450) (1.450) (1.475) 
Round after stress -0.413 -0.419 -0.325 -0.418 1.269* 1.264* 1.264* 1.261* 
 
(0.594) (0.596) (0.629) (0.592) (0.688) (0.688) (0.688) (0.689) 
Stressed * Round 
after stress 
-0.0252 -0.0248 0.0189 -0.0249 -0.727 -0.729 -0.729 -0.731 
 
(0.805) (0.806) (0.820) (0.806) (1.125) (1.125) (1.125) (1.127) 
Constant 9.559*** 8.753*** 8.903*** 14.11 16.87*** 15.14*** 15.14*** 26.60* 
 
(1.004) (2.876) (3.135) (11.23) (1.059) (3.313) (3.313) (13.77) 
    
  
    Observations 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 
R-squared 0.493 0.509 0.510 0.535 0.237 0.253 0.253 0.284 
Session FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Observables NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Female specific NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
F 109.2 42.73 37.39 33.45 135.5 48.82 48.82 35.23 
Note: Stressed defined as an individual who showed an increase of cortisol higher than 2.5 nmol/l. 
Dependent variable Decision. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level in the 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4-9: Regression analysis: correlations.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent var.: Difference, in absolute value 
Observations: Private signals Public signals 
True -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.346*** 
 
(0.0309) (0.0296) (0.0287) (0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0212) 
Stressed -1.273 -1.322 -0.384 -0.927 -0.881 -0.235 
 
(0.871) (0.870) (0.903) (0.734) (0.738) (0.672) 
Round after stress 0.133 0.125 0.112 -1.516*** -1.517*** -1.524*** 
 
(0.463) (0.462) (0.461) (0.439) (0.439) (0.440) 
Stressed* Round 
after_stress 
0.00575 0.00632 0.00715 0.300 0.300 0.297 
 
(0.623) (0.624) (0.625) (0.702) (0.703) (0.704) 
Constant 11.58*** 14.88*** 18.82** 24.87*** 27.60*** 43.86*** 
 
(1.010) (2.293) (8.617) (0.739) (1.679) (6.748) 
Observations 5,320 5,320 5,320 3,920 3,920 3,920 
R-squared 0.045 0.067 0.096 0.290 0.295 0.303 
Session FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observables NO NO YES NO NO YES 
F 3.521 1.806 2.049 76.63 28.00 19.48 
Note: Stressed defined as an individual who showed an increase of cortisol higher than 2.5 nmol/l. 
Dependent variable Difference in absolute value. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual 
level in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  114 114 
Table 4-10: Classification of subjects whether they reacted to the treatment procedure according 




Total No Yes 
Group: 
Control 60 10 70 
Treatment 23 47 70 
 
Total 83 57 140 
Figure 4-8: Normal values of salivary cortisol during the day. 
 
Note: Adapted from Kirschbaum & Hellhammer (2000), p. 381. 
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4.8 Appendix B - discussion of the role of 
risk-preferences 
This part is devoted to the discussion of the influence of risk-preferences on 
the relative weight of the signals in the decision-making procedure. The subjects were 
paid according to the quadratic scoring rule which is incentive compatible only for 
risk-neutral preferences. In the measurement of risk-preferences (see Chapter 3) we 
obtained a wide variety of estimates of individual risk-aversion, which calls the 
employed payment scheme into question in terms of incentive compatibility. It is not 
clear whether this poses negative impact on the main results (treatment differences) 
since the procedure was constant across the two groups. A problem may arise when 
the risk-aversion interacts with treatment, which  we show is the case and analyze in 
detail in Chapter 3. The subjects that become more risk-averse in treatment group 
may then face different incentives than the subjects in the control group: they  should 
generally state their estimates of probability closer to the safe midpoint relative to the 
control group which would serve as a confounding factor. It is not clear though 
whether more risk-averse subjects  should put more or less weight on the public 
signal relative to private, but  generally this change in behavior due to change in risk-
attitudes would be observed in the dif-in-dif regressions, though with no differences 
between reactions to public and private signals. We do not observe any significant 
differences in behavior between treatment and control groups in any of the steps of 
analysis, which may indicate either that the reaction to signals did not really depend 
on risk-preferences (maybe rather on ambiguity aversion) or there were two opposing 
forces: increased risk-aversion decreased the weight of both private and public 
signals while increased reward responsiveness under stress cancelled the effect on 
behavior mediated by the change in risk-attitudes (Porcelli et al., 2012). Even though 
we do dispose with the individual risk-parameters, we should not enter it as a control 
variable in the regression equation, because it is also determined by treatment and the  
concerns of potential bias stemming from the endogeneity. Having this limitation in 
mind, we perform another robustness check to examine the stability of the coefficient 
of interest when we add the variable Certaintyequivalent that represents the 
individual risk-attitudes into the three main regression specifications. The results are 
presented in Appendix Table 4-11 where it is evident that indeed the coefficients of 
interest are fairly stable in terms of magnitude as well as their significance. 
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Table 4-11: Robustness check with respect to risk-preferences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Signals: Private Public Private Public 
Dependent 
variable Decision Difference in absolute values 



















(0.0311) (0.0323) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0300) (0.0307) (0.0214) (0.0220) 
Treatment 1.512 1.543 1.468 1.512 0.171 0.159 -0.265 -0.361 
 
(1.061) (1.029) (1.398) (1.349) (0.894) (0.896) (0.721) (0.728) 
Round after stress 0.0293 0.0878 0.976 1.179 0.103 0.100 -1.748*** -1.818*** 
 
(0.661) (0.697) (0.909) (0.947) (0.521) (0.548) (0.504) (0.532) 
Treatment after 
stress -0.923 -0.980 -0.0203 -0.214 0.0339 0.0430 0.698 0.776 
 
(0.814) (0.842) (1.094) (1.127) (0.635) (0.657) (0.683) (0.704) 
Female -0.335 0.491 -1.645 -0.415 1.037 0.866 1.070* 1.023 
 
(1.158) (1.176) (1.408) (1.391) (0.816) (0.837) (0.632) (0.651) 
Age 0.576*** 0.526** 0.606** 0.504** 0.157 0.198 -0.0575 -0.0258 
 
(0.212) (0.215) (0.253) (0.246) (0.202) (0.203) (0.154) (0.160) 
Openness to 
experience -0.136 -0.156 -0.105 -0.131 
-
0.183** -0.190** -0.0867 -0.0972 
 
(0.127) (0.120) (0.156) (0.146) (0.0864) (0.0877) (0.0753) (0.0774) 
Conscientiousnes
s 0.0919 0.133 -0.00219 0.0458 0.0399 0.0496 0.0256 0.0233 
 
(0.0854) (0.0841) (0.0992) (0.0982) (0.0594) (0.0599) (0.0501) (0.0513) 
Extraversion 0.124 0.143* 0.144 0.171* 0.0610 0.0649 0.00929 0.0110 
 
(0.0845) (0.0790) (0.102) (0.0965) (0.0609) (0.0615) (0.0477) (0.0477) 
Agreeableness -0.150 -0.130 -0.276** -0.238* 0.0185 0.00926 0.00934 0.00252 
 
(0.100) (0.0944) (0.134) (0.134) (0.0684) (0.0682) (0.0489) (0.0488) 
Neuroticism -0.207*** -0.251*** 
-
0.226*** -0.286*** 0.0409 0.0380 -0.0577 -0.0579 
 
(0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0860) (0.0890) (0.0513) (0.0518) (0.0397) (0.0408) 
Conformity -0.0557 -0.0306 -0.0605 -0.0347 -0.0947 -0.0677 -0.173*** -0.162*** 
 




















Constant 6.549 0.742 20.49* 12.72 13.62* 12.32 36.55*** 37.02*** 
 
(9.264) (8.645) (10.90) (10.59) (7.942) (7.826) (6.352) (6.159) 
         
Observations 5,320 5,168 3,920 3,808 5,320 5,168 3,920 3,808 
R-squared 0.524 0.530 0.273 0.286 0.080 0.084 0.298 0.303 
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F 35.84 33.53 39.13 34.81 2.308 2.265 21.40 23.14 
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6 Response to Reviewers 
Pre-defense report on manuscript "Essays on Decision Making under Stress" 
as of April 19. 
I would like to express my deep thanks to the reviewers for their helpful 
comments on the pre-defense version of my dissertation thesis. Their often general 
comments will actually not only improve this thesis, but also help me in my future 
work. Below I present my responses. 
Response to Dr. Levinský: I am grateful to Dr. Levínský for his thoughtful report on 
my thesis. His main comment is as follows: "...using just TSST-G technique questions 
the robustness of the results. A family of experiments that would induce stress by 
various methods will give us a much broader picture of behaviour under stress. For 
instance, it would be interesting to see how different the results would be if the 
authors would employ more physiological instruments (as, e.g., glucose-clamp 
technique). However, it is understandable that such a manipulation could be easily 
beyond the technical capabilities of research institutions where the research project 
was developed. " 
 Response: This comment is certainly valid and the possibility to do that would 
substantially improve the research value added of this thesis, but it addresses rather 
future lines of stress research than a possible improvement of the present form of this 
thesis. Employing this stressor is the current frontier in the literature and only very 
few papers have went beyond and addressed the robustness of behavioral changes 
across various types of stressors: the most recent (Haushofer & Chang, 2015) uses, 
unlike the previous studies, consistent methodology to show that the effects of three 
different types of stressor induce three different behavioral reactions, particularly in 
the domain of time-preferences. I consider my thesis as the first step in the direction 
of investigating the effects of a frequently experienced type of stress on risk 
preferences and herding behavior: I specifically chose this type of stressor since it 
resembles the situations that people in contemporary society face most frequently in 
their lives, as discussed in page 82, to maximize the external validity of the results. I 
add the following two paragraphs in the Introduction section where I specifically 
discuss the effects of different types of stressors.  
The effects of stress may differ with respect to the type of stressor. Stress 
typically arises when an organism is threatened on life and its body is exposed to 
non-standard conditions. Such stress may thus be termed the physical stress with 
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stressors being all sorts of life-threatening circumstances, including blood-loss, 
electric shocks, infection, pain, food and sleep deprivation, dental procedures, hyper 
or hypothermia and drug withdrawal states. Psychological (mental) stressors do not 
threaten the physical survival, but are connected with important goal in one’s social, 
emotional or personal life.  Emotional stressors then include interpersonal conflict, 
loss of relationship, death in family and loss of a child, while personal psychological 
stressors can be daily hassle, meeting deadlines, traffic jams or interpersonal conflicts 
(Sapolsky et al., 2000; Sinha, 2008). A prominent type of a psychological stressor is 
the psycho-social stressor. Since human is a social animal, it possesses also a "social-
self", which reflects one's social value, esteem, status and is mostly based on 
individual perception of self-worth. Threat to preserving such social self has been 
shown to induce similar stress reaction as a threat to physical survival. Generally, the 
aforementioned types of stress differ in terms of physiological and psychological 
response. (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Behaviorally, the effects may also differ: as 
noted below, Haushofer & Jang (2015) compare the effects of three different types of 
stressors on temporal discounting: social, physical and an economic game. They find 
opposing effects of the social stressor and the economic game, while the physical 
stressor has no effect.  
Based on a meta-study of 208 laboratory studies, the Trier Social Stress Test 
(TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993; von Dawans et al., 2011) used in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 has been considered the most efficient laboratory stressor in terms of the 
magnitude of cortisol increase it stimulates (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Moreover, 
the type of stress it induces in subjects, acute psycho-social stress, is the most 
common type of stress experienced by the general public in the workplace (Ganster & 
Rosen, 2013; Goh et al., 2015) compared to other types of stressors. A different 
typical laboratory stressor that induces physical stress is the Cold Pressor Test: the 
procedure consists of putting the non-dominant hand or one foot into ice-cold water 
(0-4ˇC) for a period of 5 minutes (Blandini et al., 1995; Hines & Brown, 1936; 
Schwabe et al., 2008). However, e.g. the result of Lighthall et al. (2009) show this 
procedure may be problematic: the male treated subjects did not have the cortisol 
change significantly different to the control group and the female subjects showed 
only a mild increase. Apart from the mentioned procedures, commonly used are also 
time pressure (Buckert, Oechssler, et al., 2014), information about future performing 
in TSST protocol (Engert et al., 2013), and mere watching other participant 
undergoing TSST (Engert et al., 2014). Also combinations of psychological and 
physical stressors have been used, e.g. Cold Pressor Test in combination with mental 
arithmetic task and social evaluation (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004).   
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The current frontier in the stress research is to use one type of a stressor and 
study its effects on one type of behavior. The next steps will be to focus on the 
robustness of the behavioral results with respect to various changes in the protocol, 
such as the change of the type of stressor, the timing of the intervention and 
behavioral task, the age of the subjects, culturally specific reaction to stressors etc. In 
particular, the robustness of the behavioral results with respect to the type of stressor 
has been studied consistently only once, particularly in the domain of time-
preferences (Haushofer & Jang 2015). Thus, investigating the effects of a wider 
variety of stressors on risk-preferences and herding behavior would certainly increase 
the scientific value and the external validity of this thesis, but it is not within its scope 
and rather suggested for future research. 
Response to Dr. Skořepa: I am grateful to Dr. Skořepa for his thoughtful report on 
my thesis. He specifically mentions the following improvement: "While the papers do 
not explicitly report the range of actual or possible payoffs, the average figure allows 
one to think that the difference in payoffs depending on a subject’s behavior was 
perhaps not dramatically high, compared to what participants can earn outside the 
lab in real-life tasks of the nature being studied such as trading in security markets 
or investing. This is a well-known issue concerning “external validity” of the 
experimental research: in real life where the incentives are (possibly) stronger, 
human behavior may be different from what is observed in the lab. ... So one 
improvement that I can imagine is to devote some space in the thesis to this issue, 
including a suggestion that future research might study whether the effects of time 
pressure or stress increase when the incentives for subjects to give the correct 
response in the experimental task are higher" 
 Response: The issue regarding the size of stakes is a legitimate concern and I 
have added the following paragraph in the Introduction section where I point out that 
this an important area for future research  
 Another issue worth discussing is the relative importance of the monetary 
stakes that subjects disposed with during the experiments in this thesis: the amounts 
were typical for the experiments in the area and not too much smaller than the stakes 
used in comparable experiment in other countries, when adjusted for the purchasing 
power parity. However, the intrinsic hardship of the situation created by the stress 
procedure may have prevailed over the extrinsic concern over money (Skořepa, 2010) 
and the subjects may have not cared about their decisions enough. Thus what we 
observe is probably only a lower bound of the effects of stress on the particular type 
of behavior, and it is an interesting area for a future research to assess the effects of 
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stake size, as has been the case with other phenomena in behavioral economics (e.g. 
Ultimatum game; Andersen et al., 2011), since in many "choking-under-pressure" 
situations people get stressed because they deal with big amounts of money 
(Dohmen, 2008). 
Response to prof. Servátka : I am very grateful for all the comments of prof. 
Servátka that he brought up in his report on my thesis. He specifically mentions the 
following improvements:  
1. "My main comment, which at this stage is relevant mostly for the third paper 
(but to some degree also applies to the two published papers), is the (lack of) 
motivation why propensity to herd should be influenced by stress. Although 
the paper mentions various scenarios where stress might matter, I think it 
would benefit from a more focused discussion that would dissect a particular 
example related to updating. Alternatively, it would be great to have a formal 
theory that explains how stress influences different domains of decision-
making. Such theory would inform the experimental design as well as make it 
easier to justify the choice of task and implemented procedures. At the 
moment, one could always raise a comment that the null result is due to the 
experimental task not capturing the essential features of decision-making 
under stress or it is simply something that subjects do not care much about 
(despite the financial incentives). " 
Response: This is a very important comment that I address by extending the 
discussion on page 84 where I discuss the hypothesized effects of stress on 
herding behavior and illustrate it on an example of traders in a stock-market. 
To illustrate that reasoning in an example, consider traders in the stock market 
that suddenly experience a shock that induces a stress reaction. The first effect of 
stress (on the bounded-rational channel) may be that due to stress reaction their 
cognitive abilities deteriorate and in turn their response to new information is not 
optimal – they may simply have higher variance in their judgment.  Second, the 
behavioral channel may be affected in the way that under stress, traders become more 
sensitive to the observed behavior of others and put more weight on what others do 
relative to what they should do; both directly due to physiological processes in brain 
caused by the stress reaction, and also indirectly through knowing about their 
deterioration of cognitive abilities. In the latter case, traders may be aware that others 
under stress may also suffer from the same cognitive decline and thus not change 
their behavior: this would however require traders to be sophisticated and know how 
they react to stress relative to others, or that others react similarly as they do. This 
may be the case in the real markets, but not in our experiment, where the subjects are 
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anonymous to each other and have no prior knowledge of the reaction to stress of 
others. 
2. "is it possible that the  measurement of, say, heart rate or saliva induced 
stress even in the baseline, which would explain the null result? Alternatively, 
is there a possibility of an interaction effect with treatments?" 
Response: This is an interesting comment. To monitor the stress reaction we 
administered a proper control group and have three different measures of 
stress. We observe in the control group that their cortisol levels were stable 
declining over the time of the experiment, following the natural circadian 
rhythm. Similarly, heart-rate increased in the control group, but less than in 
the treatment group.  Moreover, to check whether the measurement 
procedures induced stress per se, we compare the levels of cortisol and heart-
rate in our control group with the typical values observed in similar literature 
as well as in the general population for this type of physical activity and part 
of the day to conclude they do not differ (Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989). 
This type of measurement of both is generally the least obtrusive from the 
available methods of sampling for cortisol analysis / measurement of heart-
rate. I summarize that in the footnote: 
The procedure of saliva sampling as well as the administration of the heart-
rate monitor chest belts may have been by some perceived as stressful, which would 
confound our baseline measurement and thus the control group would be also under 
the influence of stress. To capture this we for the sake of simplicity focus only on 
salivary cortisol and compare the levels in our control group (7.7 +/- 3.9 nmol/l) with 
the values observed in similar studies (cca 12 nmol/l,  von Dawans, Fischbacher, 
Kirschbaum, Fehr, & Heinrichs, 2012, 7 nmol/l, von Dawans et al., 2011 and 9 
nmol/l Kirschbaum et al., 1993) as well as in the general population for this type of 
physical activity and part of the day (refer to Appendix Figure 4-8). We conclude that 
the levels in our group were smaller or equal than those in the relevant literature and 
they do not substantially differ from the reference values for general population. This 
suggests that the subjects were not stressed already at the baseline. Moreover, the 
types of measurement used of both variables are considered to be the least obtrusive 
from all the available methods (Baum, Grunberg, & Singer, 1982).  
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Figure 4-8: Normal values of salivary cortisol during the day. 
 
Note: Adapted from (Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 2000), p. 381. 
3. "In the same vein, is it possible that informing subjects about decisions of 
others introduces an experimenter demand effect which then interacts with 
stress?" 
Response: This is an interesting comment which can also be potentially 
contribute to the explanation of the null results. However I have no reason to 
suspect the differential experimenter demand effect for the treatment and the  
control groups. I add a paragraph where I discuss this possibility of inducing 
the demand effect on the weight of public signal that is of the opposite sign in 
the treatment group than in the control group due to possible change in 
ambiguity aversion.  
Even though we have no reason to suspect this, the null results may 
potentially be a due to an experimenter demand of showing the public information 
that interacts with treatment, i.e. that the induced demand effect on the weight of 
public information is of an opposite sign between the two groups and the effect of 
stress is therefore cancelled. An experimenter demand effect may be characterized as 
the change in behavior of subjects due to cues about what constitutes proper behavior 
of the experiment that is closely related to the beliefs about the experimental 
objectives (Zizzo, 2010). Since it stems from the beliefs of the subjects that may be 
rooted in the non-quantifiable uncertainty of the situation, it may be determined by 
the preferences for ambiguity aversion. Then, even though in the related literature 
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ambiguity aversion was found not to change under stress, we cannot rule this out 
since we do not measure it (Buckert, Schwieren, et al., 2014).  
4. "I would like to see a justification of some of the payment procedures, e.g. pay 
three decisions randomly in the third paper. This is very important given the 
recent evidence on various payment procedures (see Cox, Sadiraj & Schmidt, 
EE 2015 and Cox, Sadiraj & Schmidt, forthcoming in Int. Adv. Econ Res.) 
and should be discussed. " 
Response: This comment raises concern about the payment method, since it 
has been shown that the method of paying subjects for  a randomly chosen 
subsample of their decisions may induce changes in their responses due to the 
violation of isolation assumption when compared to other methods of 
payment, like pay all decisions sequentially or pay all independently. This is 
an interesting comment that is important for the general validity of my 
estimates of the behavior. However, the payment procedure is constant across 
treatments so if the bias introduced by the elicitation procedure is not 
interacting with the stress treatment, then in the comparison the bias induced 
by this technique should cancel out. I add a footnote where I address this. 
The reason for using random incentive scheme is purely to minimize hedging 
of the subjects resulting from a wealth effect. We acknowledge that due to recent 
evidence on the differences in outcomes depending on different payment scheme, the 
elicited parameters may not be generally valid beyond this setting (Cox, Sadiraj, & 
Schmidt, 2015). However, the main purpose of this experiment is the dif-in-dif 
comparison of treatment and control groups only and not establishing the parameters 
as in the case of e.g. the experiments on trust, so the bias potentially induced by the 
payment method should be similar in both groups and cancel out. 
5. "Discussion of risk-preferences (footnote 39)  is missing" 
Response: I add the discussion in the Appendix as the section Appendix B:  
 This part is devoted to the discussion of the influence of risk-preferences on 
the relative weight of the signals in the decision-making procedure. The subjects were 
paid according to the quadratic scoring rule which is incentive compatible only for 
risk-neutral preferences. In the measurement of risk-preferences (see Chapter 3) we 
obtained a wide variety of estimates of individual risk-aversion, which calls the 
employed payment scheme into question in terms of incentive compatibility. It is not 
clear whether this poses negative impact on the main results (treatment differences) 
since the procedure was constant across the two groups. A problem may arise when 
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the risk-aversion interacts with treatment, which  we show is the case and analyze in 
detail in Chapter 3. The subjects that become more risk-averse in treatment group 
may then face different incentives than the subjects in the control group: they  should 
generally state their estimates of probability closer to the safe midpoint relative to the 
control group which would serve as a confounding factor. It is not clear though 
whether more risk-averse subjects  should put more or less weight on the public 
signal relative to private, but  generally this change in behavior due to change in risk-
attitudes would be observed in the dif-in-dif regressions, though with no differences 
between reactions to public and private signals. We do not observe any significant 
differences in behavior between treatment and control groups in any of the steps of 
analysis, which may indicate either that the reaction to signals did not really depend 
on risk-preferences (maybe rather on ambiguity aversion) or there were two opposing 
forces: increased risk-aversion decreased the weight of both private and public 
signals while increased reward responsiveness under stress cancelled the effect on 
behavior mediated by the change in risk-attitudes (Porcelli et al., 2012). Even though 
we do dispose with the individual risk-parameters, we should not enter it as a control 
variable in the regression equation, because it is also determined by treatment and the  
concerns of potential bias stemming from the endogeneity. Having this limitation in 
mind, we perform another robustness check to examine the stability of the coefficient 
of interest when we add the variable Certaintyequivalent that represents the 
individual risk-attitudes into the three main regression specifications. The results are 
presented in Appendix Table 4-6 where it is evident that indeed the coefficients of 
interest are fairly stable in terms of magnitude as well as their significance.   
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Table 4-6: Robustness check with respect to risk-preferences. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Signals: Private Public Private Public 
Dependent 
variable Decision Difference in absolute values 
                  










(0.0311) (0.0323) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0300) (0.0307) (0.0214) (0.0220) 
Treatment 1.512 1.543 1.468 1.512 0.171 0.159 -0.265 -0.361 
 
(1.061) (1.029) (1.398) (1.349) (0.894) (0.896) (0.721) (0.728) 






(0.661) (0.697) (0.909) (0.947) (0.521) (0.548) (0.504) (0.532) 
Treatment after 
stress -0.923 -0.980 -0.0203 -0.214 0.0339 0.0430 0.698 0.776 
 
(0.814) (0.842) (1.094) (1.127) (0.635) (0.657) (0.683) (0.704) 
Female -0.335 0.491 -1.645 -0.415 1.037 0.866 1.070* 1.023 
 
(1.158) (1.176) (1.408) (1.391) (0.816) (0.837) (0.632) (0.651) 
Age 0.576*** 0.526** 0.606** 0.504** 0.157 0.198 -0.0575 -0.0258 
 
(0.212) (0.215) (0.253) (0.246) (0.202) (0.203) (0.154) (0.160) 
Openness to 
experience -0.136 -0.156 -0.105 -0.131 -0.183** -0.190** -0.0867 -0.0972 
 
(0.127) (0.120) (0.156) (0.146) (0.0864) (0.0877) (0.0753) (0.0774) 
Conscientiousness 0.0919 0.133 -0.00219 0.0458 0.0399 0.0496 0.0256 0.0233 
 
(0.0854) (0.0841) (0.0992) (0.0982) (0.0594) (0.0599) (0.0501) (0.0513) 
Extraversion 0.124 0.143* 0.144 0.171* 0.0610 0.0649 0.00929 0.0110 
 
(0.0845) (0.0790) (0.102) (0.0965) (0.0609) (0.0615) (0.0477) (0.0477) 
Agreeableness -0.150 -0.130 -0.276** -0.238* 0.0185 0.00926 0.00934 0.00252 
 
(0.100) (0.0944) (0.134) (0.134) (0.0684) (0.0682) (0.0489) (0.0488) 
Neuroticism -0.207*** -0.251*** 
-
0.226*** -0.286*** 0.0409 0.0380 -0.0577 -0.0579 
 
(0.0696) (0.0722) (0.0860) (0.0890) (0.0513) (0.0518) (0.0397) (0.0408) 

























Constant 6.549 0.742 20.49* 12.72 13.62* 12.32 36.55*** 37.02*** 
 
(9.264) (8.645) (10.90) (10.59) (7.942) (7.826) (6.352) (6.159) 
         
Observations 5,320 5,168 3,920 3,808 5,320 5,168 3,920 3,808 
R-squared 0.524 0.530 0.273 0.286 0.080 0.084 0.298 0.303 
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F 35.84 33.53 39.13 34.81 2.308 2.265 21.40 23.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
